From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:26 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887136 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y9J3mzYz9s44 for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:43:48 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402y9J248nzDqGZ for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:43:48 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y4L5TvfzF1ZB for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:39:30 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098414.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdEN8054921 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:28 -0400 Received: from e31.co.us.ibm.com (e31.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.149]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grkpub2vd-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:27 -0400 Received: from localhost by e31.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:22 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdMqn10879422; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:22 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id F007478047; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:21 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D39B978037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:17 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 01/12] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:26 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-8235-0000-0000-00000D2BE07A X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:26 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-8236-0000-0000-00004016E2E4 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-2-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" IMA will use the module_signature format for append signatures, so export the relevant definitions and factor out the code which verifies that the appended signature trailer is valid. Also, create a CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT option so that IMA can select it and be able to use validate_module_sig() without having to depend on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Jessica Yu --- include/linux/module.h | 3 -- include/linux/module_signature.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++ init/Kconfig | 6 +++- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/module.c | 1 + kernel/module_signing.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h index d44df9b2c131..275cbc2579eb 100644 --- a/include/linux/module.h +++ b/include/linux/module.h @@ -24,9 +24,6 @@ #include #include -/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ -#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" - /* Not Yet Implemented */ #define MODULE_SUPPORTED_DEVICE(name) diff --git a/include/linux/module_signature.h b/include/linux/module_signature.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..890135437b6b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/module_signature.h @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Module signature handling. + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H +#define _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H + +/* In stripped ARM and x86-64 modules, ~ is surprisingly rare. */ +#define MODULE_SIG_STRING "~Module signature appended~\n" + +enum pkey_id_type { + PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ + PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ + PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */ +}; + +/* + * Module signature information block. + * + * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: + * + * - Signer's name + * - Key identifier + * - Signature data + * - Information block + */ +struct module_signature { + u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */ + u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */ + u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */ + u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */ + u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */ + u8 __pad[3]; + __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ +}; + +int validate_module_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len); +int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen); + +#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */ diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index e37f4b2a6445..56a9679671b5 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1760,7 +1760,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL config MODULE_SIG bool "Module signature verification" depends on MODULES - select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT help Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature is simply appended to the module. For more information see @@ -1775,6 +1775,10 @@ config MODULE_SIG debuginfo strip done by some packagers (such as rpmbuild) and inclusion into an initramfs that wants the module size reduced. +config MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + def_bool n + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + config MODULE_SIG_FORCE bool "Require modules to be validly signed" depends on MODULE_SIG diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index f85ae5dfa474..a4c7a7a0cce7 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ obj-y += up.o endif obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o -obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signing.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index ad2d420024f6..292eee54e390 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 937c844bee4a..a7c2c461c598 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -11,36 +11,41 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include "module-internal.h" -enum pkey_id_type { - PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */ - PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */ - PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */ -}; - -/* - * Module signature information block. +/** + * validate_module_sig - validate that the given signature is sane * - * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: - * - * - Signer's name - * - Key identifier - * - Signature data - * - Information block + * @ms: Signature to validate. + * @file_len: Size of the file to which @ms is appended. */ -struct module_signature { - u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */ - u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */ - u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */ - u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */ - u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */ - u8 __pad[3]; - __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ -}; +int validate_module_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len) +{ + if (be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len) >= file_len - sizeof(*ms)) + return -EBADMSG; + + if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) { + pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n"); + return -ENOPKG; + } + + if (ms->algo != 0 || + ms->hash != 0 || + ms->signer_len != 0 || + ms->key_id_len != 0 || + ms->__pad[0] != 0 || + ms->__pad[1] != 0 || + ms->__pad[2] != 0) { + pr_err("PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + return 0; +} /* * Verify the signature on a module. @@ -49,6 +54,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen) { struct module_signature ms; size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len; + int ret; pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); @@ -56,30 +62,15 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen) return -EBADMSG; memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); - modlen -= sizeof(ms); + + ret = validate_module_sig(&ms, modlen); + if (ret) + return ret; sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); - if (sig_len >= modlen) - return -EBADMSG; - modlen -= sig_len; + modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); *_modlen = modlen; - if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) { - pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n"); - return -ENOPKG; - } - - if (ms.algo != 0 || - ms.hash != 0 || - ms.signer_len != 0 || - ms.key_id_len != 0 || - ms.__pad[0] != 0 || - ms.__pad[1] != 0 || - ms.__pad[2] != 0) { - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n"); - return -EBADMSG; - } - return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, NULL, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:27 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887159 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402ylm5L4pz9sSf for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 08:10:12 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402ylm3dSCzDr2S for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 08:10:12 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:28 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdRxd12190154; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:27 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 837FD78037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:27 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D16778038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:23 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 02/12] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_message_sig() and verify_pkcs7_message_sig() Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:27 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0028-0000-0000-0000094FE1E1 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004028; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:32 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0029-0000-0000-000039FEBB99 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-3-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160244 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" IMA will need to know the key that signed a given PKCS#7 message, so add pkcs7_get_message_sig(). It will also need to verify an already parsed PKCS#7 message. For this purpose, add verify_pkcs7_message_sig() which takes a struct pkcs7_message for verification instead of the raw bytes that verify_pkcs7_signature() takes. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Cc: David Howells Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- certs/system_keyring.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 16 +++++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 2 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 10 ++++++ 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 6251d1b27f0c..7ddc8b7a3062 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -190,33 +190,27 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION /** - * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. + * verify_pkcs7_message_sig - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). * @len: Size of @data. - * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. - * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. + * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. * @ctx: Context for callback. */ -int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, - const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, - struct key *trusted_keys, - enum key_being_used_for usage, - int (*view_content)(void *ctx, - const void *data, size_t len, - size_t asn1hdrlen), - void *ctx) +int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) { - struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; int ret; - pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); - if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) - return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); - /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */ if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) { pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n"); @@ -258,6 +252,41 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, } error: + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} + +/** + * verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data. + * @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data). + * @len: Size of @data. + * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature. + * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7. + * @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only, + * (void *)1UL for all trusted keys). + * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. + * @view_content: Callback to gain access to content. + * @ctx: Context for callback. + */ +int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, + const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx) +{ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7; + int ret; + + pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len); + if (IS_ERR(pkcs7)) + return PTR_ERR(pkcs7); + + ret = verify_pkcs7_message_sig(data, len, pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, + view_content, ctx); + pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7); pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index a6dcaa659aa8..456b803972b5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -683,3 +683,19 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return -ENOMEM; return 0; } + +/** + * pkcs7_get_message_sig - get signature in @pkcs7 + */ +const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig( + const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +{ + /* + * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature, + * so don't return anything in that case. + */ + if (pkcs7->signed_infos == NULL || pkcs7->signed_infos->next != NULL) + return NULL; + + return pkcs7->signed_infos->sig; +} diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h index 583f199400a3..6f51d0cb6d12 100644 --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const void **_data, size_t *_datalen, size_t *_headerlen); +extern const struct public_key_signature *pkcs7_get_message_sig( + const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); /* * pkcs7_trust.c diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index a10549a6c7cd..f04dac2728ec 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR]; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION struct key; +struct pkcs7_message; extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len, @@ -38,6 +39,15 @@ extern int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, const void *data, size_t len, size_t asn1hdrlen), void *ctx); +extern int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trusted_keys, + enum key_being_used_for usage, + int (*view_content)(void *ctx, + const void *data, + size_t len, + size_t asn1hdrlen), + void *ctx); #ifdef CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:28 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887140 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yDF6NHGz9s7h for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:46:21 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yDF5BnJzDqYx for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:33 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdX0n7143748; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:33 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E3937803F; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:33 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E461278037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:28 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 03/12] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest() Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:28 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0008-0000-0000-00000977E340 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783317; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:37 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0009-0000-0000-0000466BDD2C Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-4-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" IMA will need to access the digest of the PKCS7 message (as calculated by the kernel) before the signature is verified, so introduce pkcs7_get_digest() for that purpose. Also, modify pkcs7_digest() to detect when the digest was already calculated so that it doesn't have to do redundant work. Verifying that sinfo->sig->digest isn't NULL is sufficient because both places which allocate sinfo->sig (pkcs7_parse_message() and pkcs7_note_signed_info()) use kzalloc() so sig->digest is always initialized to zero. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Cc: David Howells Cc: Herbert Xu Cc: "David S. Miller" Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index 39e6de0c2761..bd02360f8be5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo); + /* The digest was calculated already. */ + if (sig->digest) + return 0; + if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo) return -ENOPKG; @@ -122,6 +126,27 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, return ret; } +int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u8 *len) +{ + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; + int ret; + + /* + * This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature. + */ + if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL) + return -EBADMSG; + + ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo); + if (ret) + return ret; + + *buf = sinfo->sig->digest; + *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size; + + return 0; +} + /* * Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7 * uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h index 6f51d0cb6d12..cfaea9c37f4a 100644 --- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -46,4 +46,7 @@ extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const void *data, size_t datalen); +extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, + u8 *len); + #endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */ From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:29 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887144 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [103.22.144.68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yGZ6g3Qz9s7h for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:48:22 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yGZ5M8yzDrCg for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:48:22 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y4h085vzF1ZL for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:39:47 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdaKL079487 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:45 -0400 Received: from e38.co.us.ibm.com (e38.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.159]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grkejbm5v-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:45 -0400 Received: from localhost by e38.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:39 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdc6n11731422; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:38 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9979C78037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:38 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EE4478038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:34 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 04/12] ima: Introduce is_ima_sig() Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:29 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0028-0000-0000-0000094FE1E7 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:43 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0029-0000-0000-000039FEBBB3 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-5-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" With the introduction of another IMA signature type (modsig), some places will need to check for both of them. It is cleaner to do that if there's a helper function to tell whether an xattr_value represents an IMA signature. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 +++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 35fe91aa1fc9..4bafa6a97967 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -155,6 +155,11 @@ unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void); int ima_init_template(void); void ima_init_template_list(void); +static inline bool is_ima_sig(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) +{ + return xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG; +} + /* * used to protect h_table and sha_table */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index a6b2995b7d0b..01172eab297b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -325,15 +325,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && - (!xattr_value || - xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { + !is_ima_sig(xattr_value)) { if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && - xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) { + is_ima_sig(xattr_value)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } @@ -448,7 +447,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); + is_ima_sig(xvalue)); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 5afaa53decc5..afb52a90e532 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; - if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) + if (!is_ima_sig(xattr_value)) return 0; return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:30 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887147 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [103.22.144.68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yJs2B2Qz9sPk for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:50:21 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yJs0g3MzDrHv for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:50:21 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y4m5ZsHzF1ZC for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:39:52 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098413.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdEpG035584 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:50 -0400 Received: from e33.co.us.ibm.com (e33.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.151]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grhkfyyb6-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:49 -0400 Received: from localhost by e33.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:44 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdiMW11272454; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:44 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2026B7803F; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:44 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0693378038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:39 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 05/12] integrity: Introduce integrity_keyring_from_id() Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:30 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0008-0000-0000-00000977E345 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783317; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:48 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0009-0000-0000-0000466BDD45 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-6-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" IMA will need to obtain the keyring used to verify file signatures so that it can verify the module-style signature appended to files. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/digsig.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 6f9e4ce568cd..e641a67b9fc7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -48,11 +48,10 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata; #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted #endif -int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, - const char *digest, int digestlen) +struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id) { - if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2) - return -EINVAL; + if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); if (!keyring[id]) { keyring[id] = @@ -61,17 +60,32 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, int err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_err("no %s keyring: %d\n", keyring_name[id], err); keyring[id] = NULL; - return err; + return ERR_PTR(err); } } + return keyring[id]; +} + +int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *digest, int digestlen) +{ + struct key *keyring; + + if (siglen < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(id); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return PTR_ERR(keyring); + switch (sig[1]) { case 1: /* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */ - return digsig_verify(keyring[id], sig + 1, siglen - 1, + return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest, digestlen); case 2: - return asymmetric_verify(keyring[id], sig, siglen, + return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest, digestlen); } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 79799a0d9195..2d245f44ca26 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE +struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id); int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen); @@ -157,6 +158,11 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id); int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path); #else +static inline struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id) +{ + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); +} + static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:31 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887149 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yMS4Wvtz9sCc for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:52:36 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yMS379tzDr8B for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:52:36 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y4t6J91zF1Zn for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:39:58 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098414.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdF0i054985 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:57 -0400 Received: from e35.co.us.ibm.com (e35.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.153]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grkpub3dw-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:39:56 -0400 Received: from localhost by e35.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:55 -0600 Received: from b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.17) by e35.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:50 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdnaD12911100; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:49 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A5E6B78057; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:49 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81D0878038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:45 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 06/12] integrity: Introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key() Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:31 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0012-0000-0000-000015E8E1CC X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:53 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0013-0000-0000-000051E62A69 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-7-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" IMA will only look for a modsig if the xattr sig references a key which is not in the expected kernel keyring. To that end, introduce asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(). The logic of extracting the key used in the xattr sig is factored out from asymmetric_verify() so that it can be used by the new function. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 8 +++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index ab6a029062a1..241647970c19 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -79,26 +79,48 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) return key; } -int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, - int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) +static struct key *asymmetric_key_from_sig(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen) { - struct public_key_signature pks; - struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; - struct key *key; - int ret = -ENOMEM; + const struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *) sig; if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr)) - return -EBADMSG; + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); siglen -= sizeof(*hdr); if (siglen != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size)) - return -EBADMSG; + return ERR_PTR(-EBADMSG); if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) - return -ENOPKG; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG); + + return request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); +} + +bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen) +{ + struct key *key; + + key = asymmetric_key_from_sig(keyring, sig, siglen); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(key)) + return false; + + key_put(key); + + return true; +} + +int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) +{ + struct public_key_signature pks; + struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; + struct key *key; + int ret = -ENOMEM; - key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); + key = asymmetric_key_from_sig(keyring, sig, siglen); if (IS_ERR(key)) return PTR_ERR(key); @@ -109,7 +131,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, pks.digest = (u8 *)data; pks.digest_size = datalen; pks.s = hdr->sig; - pks.s_size = siglen; + pks.s_size = siglen - sizeof(*hdr); ret = verify_signature(key, &pks); key_put(key); pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 2d245f44ca26..4c381b992e11 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -179,12 +179,20 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen); +bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen); #else static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +static inline bool asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(struct key *keyring, + const char *sig, int siglen) +{ + return false; +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:32 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:55 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08025.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKdtYX13238718; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:39:55 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3153B78037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:55 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13B1978057; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:50 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 07/12] integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:32 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-8235-0000-0000-00000D2BE086 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511021; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:39:59 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-8236-0000-0000-00004016E31F Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-8-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" This avoids a dependency cycle in CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG (introduced by a later patch in this series): it will select CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT which in turn selects CONFIG_KEYS. Kconfig then complains that CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE depends on CONFIG_KEYS. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig index da9565891738..0d642e0317c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig @@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ if INTEGRITY config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE bool "Digital signature verification using multiple keyrings" - depends on KEYS default n + select KEYS select SIGNATURE help This option enables digital signature verification support From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:33 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887153 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [103.22.144.68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yT934vMz9sCc for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:57:33 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yT91cTTzF0fZ for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:57:33 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y5629yqzF1bP for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:40:10 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdbUO079528 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:08 -0400 Received: from e38.co.us.ibm.com (e38.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.159]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grkejbmmu-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:07 -0400 Received: from localhost by e38.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:01 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKe0oh11338226; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:40:00 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id AFAA478043; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:00 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 91B0278037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:39:56 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 08/12] ima: Export func_tokens Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:33 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0028-0000-0000-0000094FE1F2 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:40:05 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0029-0000-0000-000039FEBBE1 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-9-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" ima_read_modsig() will need it so that it can show an error message. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 4bafa6a97967..99f2bab15009 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -196,6 +196,8 @@ enum ima_hooks { __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify) }; +extern const char *const func_tokens[]; + /* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 51a4cd999a49..833da24c7009 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -992,6 +992,12 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void) } } +#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str), + +const char *const func_tokens[] = { + __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify) +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY enum { mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append @@ -1004,12 +1010,6 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = { "MAY_APPEND" }; -#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str), - -static const char *const func_tokens[] = { - __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify) -}; - void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { loff_t l = *pos; From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:34 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887154 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yWT6lGGz9sCc for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:59:33 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yWT5HG2zDr3x for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:59:33 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y593VdGzF1ZS for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:40:13 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdnYa011198 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:11 -0400 Received: from e36.co.us.ibm.com (e36.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.154]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grhudqexj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:11 -0400 Received: from localhost by e36.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:10 -0600 Received: from b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.16) by e36.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.136) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:06 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKe6U211469242; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:40:06 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4618178037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:06 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D1E578038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:01 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 09/12] ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:34 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0020-0000-0000-00000D99E2B1 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511021; IPR=6.00783317; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:40:10 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0021-0000-0000-00006085C7C2 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-10-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" This patch introduces the modsig keyword to the IMA policy syntax to specify that a given hook should expect the file to have the IMA signature appended to it. Here is how it can be used in a rule: appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig With this rule, IMA will accept either a signature stored in the extended attribute or an appended signature. For now, the rule above will behave exactly the same as if appraise_type=imasig was specified because the actual modsig implementation will be introduced in a separate patch. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++-- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index b8465e00ba5f..835d9da9b26e 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Description: euid:= decimal value fowner:= decimal value lsm: are LSM specific - option: appraise_type:= [imasig] + option: appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig] pcr:= decimal value default policy: @@ -103,3 +103,7 @@ Description: measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4 measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK pcr=5 + + Example of appraise rule allowing modsig appended signatures: + + appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 6a8f67714c83..ee278189e0bb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -164,6 +164,16 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. fix, log) from the boot command line. +config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG + bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" + depends on IMA_APPRAISE + default n + help + Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the + appended signature is the same used for signed kernel modules. + The modsig keyword can be used in the IMA policy to allow a hook + to accept such signatures. + config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index d921dc4f9eb0..31d57cdf2421 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) += ima_modsig.o ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 99f2bab15009..c61d8fc5190d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -299,6 +299,15 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func); +#else +static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ + /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d8ea811b6f74 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * IMA support for appraising module-style appended signatures. + * + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + * + * Author: + * Thiago Jung Bauermann + */ + +#include "ima.h" + +/** + * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook? + * + * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file, because only they + * preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in some + * cases, but not when reached from vfs_open. POLICY_CHECK can support it, but + * it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny. + */ +bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) +{ + switch (func) { + case FIRMWARE_CHECK: + case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK: + case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 833da24c7009..e7421fd94277 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -887,6 +887,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from); if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED; + else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) && + strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED + | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1176,8 +1180,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } } - if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) - seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { + if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig "); + else + seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig "); + } if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 4c381b992e11..6643c6550787 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 #define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000 #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 +#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:35 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887155 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yZq28Rcz9sPk for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 08:02:27 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 402yZq0ZnGzDr7s for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 08:02:27 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.vnet.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402y5K23nmzF1ZS for ; Sat, 17 Mar 2018 07:40:21 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098416.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w2GKdaS5001971 for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:18 -0400 Received: from e34.co.us.ibm.com (e34.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.152]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2grmb9sq7k-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA256 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 16:40:18 -0400 Received: from localhost by e34.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:12 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp07028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKeBs211534744; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:40:11 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id C412378047; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:11 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6B4F78038; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:07 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 10/12] ima: Add functions to read and verify a modsig signature Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:35 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0016-0000-0000-00000867DF4E X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:40:16 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0017-0000-0000-00003DDF26D0 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-11-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" This is the code needed by IMA-appraise to work with modsig signatures. It will be used by the next two patches. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 41 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 226 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index ee278189e0bb..306601d62f0b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -167,6 +167,9 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool "Support module-style signatures for appraisal" depends on IMA_APPRAISE + depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select MODULE_SIG_FORMAT default n help Adds support for signatures appended to files. The format of the diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index c61d8fc5190d..49aef56dc96d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -301,11 +301,52 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func); +int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len); +int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo, + const u8 **hash, u8 *len); +int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len); +int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); +void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr); #else static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) { return false; } + +static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, + loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, + enum hash_algo *algo, const u8 **hash, + u8 *len) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, + int *data_len) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +static inline int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} + +static inline void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + kfree(hdr); +} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */ /* LSM based policy rules require audit */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c index d8ea811b6f74..105fd04d585e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c @@ -8,8 +8,25 @@ * Thiago Jung Bauermann */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + #include "ima.h" +struct modsig_hdr { + uint8_t type; /* Should be IMA_MODSIG. */ + struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_msg; + int raw_pkcs7_len; + + /* + * This is what will go to the measurement list if the template requires + * storing the signature. + */ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data raw_pkcs7; +}; + /** * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook? * @@ -29,3 +46,167 @@ bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func) return false; } } + +static bool modsig_has_known_key(struct modsig_hdr *hdr) +{ + const struct public_key_signature *pks; + struct key *keyring; + struct key *key; + + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return false; + + pks = pkcs7_get_message_sig(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + if (!pks) + return false; + + key = find_asymmetric_key(keyring, pks->auth_ids[0], NULL, false); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return false; + + key_put(key); + + return true; +} + +int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int *xattr_len) +{ + const size_t marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const struct module_signature *sig; + struct modsig_hdr *hdr; + size_t sig_len; + const void *p; + int rc; + + /* + * Not supposed to happen. Hooks that support modsig are whitelisted + * when parsing the policy using ima_hooks_supports_modsig(). + */ + if (!buf || !buf_len) { + WARN_ONCE(true, "%s doesn't support modsig\n", + func_tokens[func]); + return -ENOENT; + } else if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig)) + return -ENOENT; + + p = buf + buf_len - marker_len; + if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len)) + return -ENOENT; + + buf_len -= marker_len; + sig = (const struct module_signature *) (p - sizeof(*sig)); + + rc = validate_module_sig(sig, buf_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len); + buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig); + + /* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */ + hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hdr) + return -ENOMEM; + + hdr->pkcs7_msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf + buf_len, sig_len); + if (IS_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + goto err_no_msg; + } + + rc = pkcs7_supply_detached_data(hdr->pkcs7_msg, buf, buf_len); + if (rc) + goto err; + + if (!modsig_has_known_key(hdr)) { + rc = -ENOKEY; + goto err; + } + + memcpy(hdr->raw_pkcs7.data, buf + buf_len, sig_len); + hdr->raw_pkcs7_len = sig_len + 1; + hdr->raw_pkcs7.type = IMA_MODSIG; + + hdr->type = IMA_MODSIG; + + *xattr_value = (typeof(*xattr_value)) hdr; + *xattr_len = sizeof(*hdr); + + return 0; + + err: + pkcs7_free_message(hdr->pkcs7_msg); + err_no_msg: + kfree(hdr); + return rc; +} + +int ima_get_modsig_hash(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr, enum hash_algo *algo, + const u8 **hash, u8 *len) +{ + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (typeof(modsig)) hdr; + const struct public_key_signature *pks; + int i; + + if (!hdr || hdr->type != IMA_MODSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + pks = pkcs7_get_message_sig(modsig->pkcs7_msg); + if (!pks) + return -EBADMSG; + + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) + if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], pks->hash_algo)) + break; + + *algo = i; + + return pkcs7_get_digest(modsig->pkcs7_msg, hash, len); +} + +int ima_modsig_serialize_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data **data, int *data_len) +{ + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) *data; + + if (!*data || (*data)->type != IMA_MODSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + *data = &modsig->raw_pkcs7; + *data_len = modsig->raw_pkcs7_len; + + return 0; +} + +int ima_modsig_verify(const unsigned int keyring_id, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) hdr; + struct key *keyring; + + if (!hdr || hdr->type != IMA_MODSIG) + return -EINVAL; + + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(keyring_id); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return PTR_ERR(keyring); + + return verify_pkcs7_message_sig(NULL, 0, modsig->pkcs7_msg, keyring, + VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); +} + +void ima_free_xattr_data(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *hdr) +{ + if (!hdr) + return; + + if (hdr->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + struct modsig_hdr *modsig = (struct modsig_hdr *) hdr; + + pkcs7_free_message(modsig->pkcs7_msg); + } + + kfree(hdr); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 6643c6550787..4acb1fb86b3b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, + IMA_MODSIG, IMA_XATTR_LAST }; 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:18 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKeIrU10223978; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:40:18 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF22178057; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:17 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AEB578047; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:13 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 11/12] ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:36 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0004-0000-0000-000013CFE576 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004028; UDB=6.00511020; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:40:21 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0005-0000-0000-0000867DDB88 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-12-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=3 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" This patch actually implements the appraise_type=imasig|modsig option, allowing IMA to read and verify modsig signatures. In case both are present in the same file, IMA will first check whether the key used by the xattr signature is present in the kernel keyring. If not, it will try the appended signature. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 21 +++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 49aef56dc96d..c11ccb7c5bfb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ void ima_init_template_list(void); static inline bool is_ima_sig(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value) { - return xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG; + return xattr_value && (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG || + xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG); } /* @@ -253,6 +254,8 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); +bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); @@ -291,6 +294,12 @@ ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) return ima_hash_algo; } +static inline bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data + *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return false; +} + static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 01172eab297b..84e0fd5a19c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -189,6 +189,22 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return ima_hash_algo; } +bool ima_xattr_sig_known_key(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct key *keyring; + + if (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + return false; + + keyring = integrity_keyring_from_id(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) + return false; + + return asymmetric_sig_has_known_key(keyring, (const char *) xattr_value, + xattr_len); +} + int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) { @@ -221,8 +237,12 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0; + size_t xattr_contents_len; + void *xattr_contents; - if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ + if ((xattr_value == NULL || xattr_value->type != IMA_MODSIG) && + !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (rc <= 0) { @@ -241,13 +261,29 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, goto out; } - status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); + /* + * If it's a modsig, we don't have the xattr contents to pass to + * evm_verifyxattr(). + */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + xattr_contents = NULL; + xattr_contents_len = 0; + } else { + xattr_contents = xattr_value; + xattr_contents_len = xattr_len; + } + + status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_contents, + xattr_contents_len, iint); switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ + /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) + break; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; @@ -288,11 +324,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + case IMA_MODSIG: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); - rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, - (const char *)xattr_value, rc, - iint->ima_hash->digest, - iint->ima_hash->length); + if (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, + (const char *)xattr_value, + rc, iint->ima_hash->digest, + iint->ima_hash->length); + else + rc = ima_modsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, + xattr_value); if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } else if (rc) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5d122daf5c8a..1b11c10f09df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; bool violation_check; - enum hash_algo hash_algo; + enum hash_algo hash_algo = HASH_ALGO__LAST; if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0; @@ -277,11 +277,24 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || - strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) + strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { /* read 'security.ima' */ xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); + if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && + (xattr_len <= 0 || !ima_xattr_sig_known_key(xattr_value, + xattr_len))) { + /* + * Even if we end up using a modsig, hash_algo should + * come from the xattr (or even the default hash algo). + */ + hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); + ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &xattr_value, + &xattr_len); + } + } - hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); + if (hash_algo == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) @@ -309,7 +322,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) rc = -EACCES; mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - kfree(xattr_value); + ima_free_xattr_data(xattr_value); out: if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); From patchwork Fri Mar 16 20:38:37 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 887158 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [103.22.144.68]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 402yhY5Jfmz9sSf for ; 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Violators will be prosecuted; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:24 -0600 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp08028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w2GKeN1l11731382; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 13:40:23 -0700 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82EC478047; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:23 -0600 (MDT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.199.230]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BA5178037; Fri, 16 Mar 2018 14:40:19 -0600 (MDT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v6 12/12] ima: Write modsig to the measurement list Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2018 17:38:37 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.2 In-Reply-To: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20180316203837.10174-1-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18031620-0020-0000-0000-00000D99E2CA X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008686; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000254; SDB=6.01004029; UDB=6.00511021; IPR=6.00783318; MB=3.00020079; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-03-16 20:40:28 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18031620-0021-0000-0000-00006085C7F6 Message-Id: <20180316203837.10174-13-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-03-16_13:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1803160243 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Jessica Yu , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Dmitry Kasatkin , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" Define new "d-sig" template field which holds the digest that is expected to match the one contained in the modsig. Also add modsig support to the "sig" template field, allowing the the contents of the modsig to be included in the measurement list. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 5 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst index 2cd0e273cc9a..f2a0f4225857 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst @@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash algorithm (field format: [:]digest, where the digest prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5); + - 'd-sig': the digest of the event for files that have an appended modsig. This + field is calculated without including the modsig and thus will differ from + the total digest of the file, but it is what should match the digest + contained in the modsig (if it doesn't, the signature is invalid). It is + shown in the same format as 'd-ng'; - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations; - 'sig': the file signature. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 30db39b23804..36fc32f538b5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_string}, {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, + {.field_id = "d-sig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_sig_init, + .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, }; -#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 15 +#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN 24 static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template; static struct ima_template_desc *lookup_template_desc(const char *name); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index afb52a90e532..1dca082cce43 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp, return 0; } -static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, u8 hash_algo, +static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, + u8 hash_algo, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { /* @@ -323,6 +324,35 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, hash_algo, field_data); } +/* + * This function writes the digest of the file which is expected to match the + * digest contained in the file's embedded signature. + */ +int ima_eventdigest_sig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data) +{ + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; + enum hash_algo hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + const u8 *cur_digest = NULL; + u8 cur_digestsize = 0; + int ret; + + if (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != IMA_MODSIG) + return 0; + + if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */ + goto out; + + ret = ima_get_modsig_hash(xattr_value, &hash_algo, &cur_digest, + &cur_digestsize); + if (ret) + return ret; + + out: + return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize, + hash_algo, field_data); +} + static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data, bool size_limit) @@ -379,10 +409,23 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; + int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len; if (!is_ima_sig(xattr_value)) return 0; - return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, + /* + * The xattr_value for IMA_MODSIG is a runtime structure containing + * pointers. Get its raw data instead. + */ + if (xattr_value->type == IMA_MODSIG) { + int rc; + + rc = ima_modsig_serialize_data(&xattr_value, &xattr_len); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, xattr_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index 6a3d8b831deb..3cd353e83f73 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); +int ima_eventdigest_sig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, + struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,