@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ The guest policy is passed as plaintext. A hypervisor may choose to read it,
but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
several flags that restricts what can be done on a running SEV guest.
-See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
+See SEV API Spec [1] section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below)
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ expects.
LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic
context.
-See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
+See SEV API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
complete flow chart.
To launch a SEV guest
@@ -113,6 +113,47 @@ a SEV-ES guest:
- Requires in-kernel irqchip - the burden is placed on the hypervisor to
manage booting APs.
+Calculating expected guest launch measurement
+---------------------------------------------
+In order to verify the guest launch measurement, The Guest Owner must compute
+it in the exact same way as it is calculated by the AMD-SP. SEV API Spec [1]
+section 6.5.1 describes the AMD-SP operations:
+
+ GCTX.LD is finalized, producing the hash digest of all plaintext data
+ imported into the guest.
+
+ The launch measurement is calculated as:
+
+ HMAC(0x04 || API_MAJOR || API_MINOR || BUILD || GCTX.POLICY || GCTX.LD || MNONCE; GCTX.TIK)
+
+ where "||" represents concatenation.
+
+The values of API_MAJOR, API_MINOR, BUILD, and GCTX.POLICY can be obtained
+from the 'query-sev' qmp command.
+
+The value of MNONCE is part of the response of 'query-sev-launch-measure': it
+is the last 16 bytes of the base64-decoded data field (see SEV API Spec [1]
+section 6.5.2 Table 52: LAUNCH_MEASURE Measurement Buffer).
+
+The value of GCTX.LD is SHA256(firmware_blob || kernel_hashes_blob || vmsas_blob),
+where:
+
+* firmware_blob is the content of the entire firmware flash file (for example,
+ OVMF.fd). Note that you must build a stateless firmware file which doesn't
+ use an NVRAM store, because the NVRAM area is not measured, and therefore it
+ is not secure to use a firmware which uses state from an NVRAM store.
+* if kernel is used, and kernel-hashes=on, then kernel_hashes_blob is the
+ content of PaddedSevHashTable (including the zero padding), which itself
+ includes the hashes of kernel, initrd, and cmdline that are passed to the
+ guest. The PaddedSevHashTable struct is defined in target/i386/sev.c .
+* if SEV-ES is enabled (policy & 0x4 != 0), vmsas_blob is the concatenation of
+ all VMSAs of the guest vcpus. Each VMSA is 4096 bytes long; its content is
+ defined inside Linux kernel code as struct vmcb_save_area, or in AMD APM
+ Volume 2 [2] Table B-2: VMCB Layout, State Save Area.
+
+If kernel hashes are not used, or SEV-ES is disabled, use empty blobs for
+kernel_hashes_blob and vmsas_blob as needed.
+
Debugging
-----------
Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access to
@@ -134,8 +175,11 @@ References
AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
-Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management:
-[1] http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization API:
+[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
+
+AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming
+[2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
KVM Forum slides:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
Add a section explaining how the Guest Owner should calculate the expected guest launch measurement for SEV and SEV-ES. Also update the name and link to the SEV API Spec document. Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> --- v2: - Explain that firmware must be built without NVRAM store. --- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) base-commit: 212a33d3b0c65ae2583bb1d06cb140cd0890894c