From patchwork Fri Jan 7 11:53:47 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Michal Suchanek X-Patchwork-Id: 1576609 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: bilbo.ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=susede2_rsa header.b=i9rGu/JH; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=ed25519-sha256 header.s=susede2_ed25519 header.b=ofOoR+NG; dkim-atps=neutral Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=lists.ozlabs.org (client-ip=2404:9400:2:0:216:3eff:fee1:b9f1; helo=lists.ozlabs.org; envelope-from=linuxppc-dev-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org; receiver=) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2404:9400:2:0:216:3eff:fee1:b9f1]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bilbo.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4JVhYc2vjhz9sCD for ; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 22:57:56 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4JVhYc1rjBz3cNl for ; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 22:57:56 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=susede2_rsa header.b=i9rGu/JH; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=ed25519-sha256 header.s=susede2_ed25519 header.b=ofOoR+NG; dkim-atps=neutral X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=suse.de (client-ip=195.135.220.29; helo=smtp-out2.suse.de; envelope-from=msuchanek@suse.de; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key; unprotected) header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=susede2_rsa header.b=i9rGu/JH; dkim=pass header.d=suse.de header.i=@suse.de header.a=ed25519-sha256 header.s=susede2_ed25519 header.b=ofOoR+NG; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from smtp-out2.suse.de (smtp-out2.suse.de [195.135.220.29]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4JVhWD3pf9z30NS for ; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 22:55:52 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from relay2.suse.de (relay2.suse.de [149.44.160.134]) by smtp-out2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id D5C6B1F3A2; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:55:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1641556549; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=n95/EChcNWLq6K+5H2r00OaKisQUtcA4DNMdUmUrV5M=; b=i9rGu/JHrIhXY401UoWlurHzlcCK8TC1otAbR+0QdTYZc5O6xqobPJamDdoVjWxkEcXf9A evp4qrdtCW2675/nhO5V+WcP5OOJaZmxXCnJ9nmE3swSsNu1OICSYIfcXNYQME8b+HA+j/ /kiz3norXPkIxpggQSvZuyNSzM9Gs3g= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1641556549; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=n95/EChcNWLq6K+5H2r00OaKisQUtcA4DNMdUmUrV5M=; b=ofOoR+NG0vp7tx5kq/5O5QetqaoW22NFk9+CNClgNptgjApYL6i6ShB3t28/FuAPzbnRR6 RYBWcZkKAeqyhjBg== Received: from kitsune.suse.cz (kitsune.suse.cz [10.100.12.127]) by relay2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DD8BA3B8B; Fri, 7 Jan 2022 11:55:49 +0000 (UTC) From: Michal Suchanek To: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification. Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 12:53:47 +0100 Message-Id: <378d956adfa3be2a6d95a71391b4bb2f7458ada3.1641555875.git.msuchanek@suse.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Nayna , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Mackerras , Alexander Gordeev , Rob Herring , Herbert Xu , Baoquan He , Christian Borntraeger , James Morris , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , Michal Suchanek , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Vasily Gorbik , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Heiko Carstens , Dmitry Kasatkin , Hari Bathini , Daniel Axtens , Christian Borntraeger , Philipp Rudo , Frank van der Linden , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Luis Chamberlain , Sven Schnelle , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jessica Yu , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, "David S. Miller" , Thiago Jung Bauermann , buendgen@de.ibm.com Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" Module verification already implements appeded signature verification. Reuse it for kexec_file. Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek --- v3: - Philipp Rudo : Update the dependency on MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG - Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 22 +++++----------------- arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 21 ++++----------------- include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -- kernel/module.c | 4 +++- kernel/module_signing.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 8 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c index 98d1cb5135b4..9442666ca69d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, @@ -153,12 +154,10 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, } #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG -int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) { + size_t kernel_len = length; const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; - struct module_signature *ms; - unsigned long sig_len; - int ret; if (marker_len > kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; @@ -168,19 +167,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); - ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); - if (ret) - return ret; - - sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len; - - return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, - NULL, NULL); + return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + "kexec_file"); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall. diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c index c944d71316c7..75e0c17cf0eb 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c @@ -26,12 +26,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { }; #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG -int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) +int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length) { + size_t kernel_len = length; const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; - struct module_signature *ms; - unsigned long sig_len; - int ret; /* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag) @@ -45,19 +43,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) return -EKEYREJECTED; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms); - ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec"); - if (ret) - return ret; - - sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len; - - return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, - NULL, NULL); + return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + "kexec_file"); } #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index a655923335ae..c1cf0582012a 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage); #endif +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys, + const char *what); + #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */ diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644 --- a/kernel/module-internal.h +++ b/kernel/module-internal.h @@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info { unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; } index; }; - -extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info); diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "module-internal.h" @@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ info->len -= markerlen; - err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info); + err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module"); if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true; return 0; diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index 8723ae70ea1f..f492e410564d 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -14,13 +14,19 @@ #include #include "module-internal.h" -/* - * Verify the signature on a module. +/** + * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the + * signature marker stripped. + * @data: The data to be verified + * @len: Size of @data. + * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification + * @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, + struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what) { struct module_signature ms; - size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; + size_t sig_len, modlen = *len; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen); @@ -28,18 +34,18 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info) if (modlen <= sizeof(ms)) return -EBADMSG; - memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); + memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); - ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module"); + ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what); if (ret) return ret; sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms); - info->len = modlen; + *len = modlen; - return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, + trusted_keys, VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL); }