From patchwork Thu Jun 8 01:49:13 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Thiago Jung Bauermann X-Patchwork-Id: 772762 Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3wjpQ16C6Nz9s7v for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2017 11:54:33 +1000 (AEST) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3wjpQ15P0rzDqZw for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2017 11:54:33 +1000 (AEST) X-Original-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3wjpKH1NMKzDqLt for ; Thu, 8 Jun 2017 11:50:26 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.20/8.16.0.20) with SMTP id v581mnf5064379 for ; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 21:50:24 -0400 Received: from e24smtp04.br.ibm.com (e24smtp04.br.ibm.com [32.104.18.25]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2axvhjhe0d-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 07 Jun 2017 21:50:24 -0400 Received: from localhost by e24smtp04.br.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 22:50:20 -0300 Received: from d24av03.br.ibm.com (d24av03.br.ibm.com [9.8.31.95]) by d24relay04.br.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id v581oJmO51904516 for ; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 22:50:20 -0300 Received: from d24av03.br.ibm.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by d24av03.br.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.14.4/NCO v10.0 AVout) with ESMTP id v581oK39028980 for ; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 22:50:21 -0300 Received: from morokweng.ibm.com ([9.85.151.222]) by d24av03.br.ibm.com (8.14.4/8.14.4/NCO v10.0 AVin) with ESMTP id v581nXii028468; Wed, 7 Jun 2017 22:50:09 -0300 From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2 4/6] integrity: Introduce struct evm_hmac_xattr Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 22:49:13 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1496886555-10082-1-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1496886555-10082-1-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-MML: disable x-cbid: 17060801-0028-0000-0000-000001BEC0FF X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17060801-0029-0000-0000-000014BFD81E Message-Id: <1496886555-10082-5-git-send-email-bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2017-06-08_01:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=1 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1703280000 definitions=main-1706080032 X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Jessica Yu , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Rusty Russell , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" , David Howells , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, Herbert Xu , Thiago Jung Bauermann , Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , "Serge E. Hallyn" Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+patchwork-incoming=ozlabs.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" Even though struct evm_ima_xattr_data includes a fixed-size array to hold a SHA1 digest, most of the code ignores the array and uses the struct to mean "type indicator followed by data of unspecified size" and tracks the real size of what the struct represents in a separate length variable. The only exception to that is the EVM code, which correctly uses the definition of struct evm_ima_xattr_data. This patch makes this explicit in the code by removing the length specification from the array in struct evm_ima_xattr_data. It also changes the name of the element from digest to data, since in most places the array doesn't hold a digest. A separate struct evm_hmac_xattr is introduced, with the original definition of evm_ima_xattr_data to be used in the places that actually expect that definition. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/integrity.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f5f12727771a..e1081cf2f9c5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ #define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 #define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 +struct evm_hmac_xattr { + u8 type; /* Should be EVM_XATTR_HMAC. */ + u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; +} __packed; + extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; extern char *evm_hash; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index d7f282d75cc1..08dde59f3128 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; + struct evm_hmac_xattr xattr_data; int rc = 0; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 063d38aef64e..b7c1e11a915e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; - struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc; + struct evm_hmac_xattr calc; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; int rc, xattr_len; @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: - if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_hmac_xattr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) break; - rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { - struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; + struct evm_hmac_xattr *xattr_data; int rc; if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 809ba70fbbbf..87d2b601cf8e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, return sig->hash_algo; break; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: - ret = xattr_value->digest[0]; + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) return ret; break; @@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, /* this is for backward compatibility */ if (xattr_len == 21) { unsigned int zero = 0; - if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[16], &zero, 4)) + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) return HASH_ALGO_MD5; else return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; @@ -253,7 +254,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 */ - rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->digest[hash_start], + rc = memcmp(&xattr_value->data[hash_start], iint->ima_hash->digest, iint->ima_hash->length); else diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index a53e7e4ab06c..874211aba6e9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { struct evm_ima_xattr_data { u8 type; - u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 data[]; } __packed; #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64