Message ID | 20240301172858.665135-8-andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com |
---|---|
State | New |
Headers | show |
Series | qga/commands-posix: replace code duplicating commands with a helper | expand |
On Fri, Mar 01, 2024 at 07:28:58PM +0200, Andrey Drobyshev wrote: > There's no need to check for the existence of the "chpasswd", "pw" > executables, as the exec() call will do that for us. > > Signed-off-by: Andrey Drobyshev <andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com> > --- > qga/commands-posix.c | 96 ++++++-------------------------------------- > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/qga/commands-posix.c b/qga/commands-posix.c > index f3f4a05e2d..f2e9496b80 100644 > --- a/qga/commands-posix.c > +++ b/qga/commands-posix.c > @@ -2144,14 +2144,8 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, > Error **errp) > { > Error *local_err = NULL; > - char *passwd_path = NULL; > - pid_t pid; > - int status; > - int datafd[2] = { -1, -1 }; > - char *rawpasswddata = NULL; > + g_autofree char *rawpasswddata = NULL; > size_t rawpasswdlen; > - char *chpasswddata = NULL; > - size_t chpasswdlen; > > rawpasswddata = (char *)qbase64_decode(password, -1, &rawpasswdlen, errp); > if (!rawpasswddata) { > @@ -2162,95 +2156,31 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, > > if (strchr(rawpasswddata, '\n')) { > error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in raw password"); > - goto out; > + return; > } > > if (strchr(username, '\n') || > strchr(username, ':')) { > error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in username"); > - goto out; > + return; > } > > #ifdef __FreeBSD__ > - chpasswddata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); > - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("pw"); > + g_autofree char *chpasswdata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); > + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h"; > + const char *argv[] = {"pw", "usermod", "-n", username, > + crypt_flag, "0", NULL}; > #else > - chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, rawpasswddata); > - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("chpasswd"); > + g_autofree char *chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, > + rawpasswddata); > + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-e" : NULL; Style nit-pick - no '(...)' around 'crypted' is needed here, or the other place later in this method. Yes, that was a pre-existing issue, but since you're refactoring the code, might as well kill the redundant brackets. > + const char *argv[] = {"chpasswd", crypt_flag, NULL}; > #endif > > - chpasswdlen = strlen(chpasswddata); > - > - if (!passwd_path) { > - error_setg(errp, "cannot find 'passwd' program in PATH"); > - goto out; > - } > - > - if (!g_unix_open_pipe(datafd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) { > - error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs"); > - goto out; > - } > - > - pid = fork(); > - if (pid == 0) { > - close(datafd[1]); > - /* child */ > - setsid(); > - dup2(datafd[0], 0); > - reopen_fd_to_null(1); > - reopen_fd_to_null(2); > - > -#ifdef __FreeBSD__ > - const char *h_arg; > - h_arg = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h"; > - execl(passwd_path, "pw", "usermod", "-n", username, h_arg, "0", NULL); > -#else > - if (crypted) { > - execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", "-e", NULL); > - } else { > - execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", NULL); > - } > -#endif > - _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); > - } else if (pid < 0) { > - error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process"); > - goto out; > - } > - close(datafd[0]); > - datafd[0] = -1; > - > - if (qemu_write_full(datafd[1], chpasswddata, chpasswdlen) != chpasswdlen) { > - error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "cannot write new account password"); > - goto out; > - } > - close(datafd[1]); > - datafd[1] = -1; > - > - ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err); > + ga_run_command(argv, chpasswddata, "set user password", &local_err); > if (local_err) { > error_propagate(errp, local_err); > - goto out; > - } > - > - if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { > - error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally"); > - goto out; > - } > - > - if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) { > - error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to set user password"); > - goto out; > - } > - > -out: > - g_free(chpasswddata); > - g_free(rawpasswddata); > - g_free(passwd_path); > - if (datafd[0] != -1) { > - close(datafd[0]); > - } > - if (datafd[1] != -1) { > - close(datafd[1]); > + return; > } > } > #else /* __linux__ || __FreeBSD__ */ > -- > 2.39.3 > > With regards, Daniel
On 3/5/24 20:38, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > On Fri, Mar 01, 2024 at 07:28:58PM +0200, Andrey Drobyshev wrote: >> There's no need to check for the existence of the "chpasswd", "pw" >> executables, as the exec() call will do that for us. >> >> Signed-off-by: Andrey Drobyshev <andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com> >> --- >> qga/commands-posix.c | 96 ++++++-------------------------------------- >> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/qga/commands-posix.c b/qga/commands-posix.c >> index f3f4a05e2d..f2e9496b80 100644 >> --- a/qga/commands-posix.c >> +++ b/qga/commands-posix.c >> @@ -2144,14 +2144,8 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, >> Error **errp) >> { >> Error *local_err = NULL; >> - char *passwd_path = NULL; >> - pid_t pid; >> - int status; >> - int datafd[2] = { -1, -1 }; >> - char *rawpasswddata = NULL; >> + g_autofree char *rawpasswddata = NULL; >> size_t rawpasswdlen; >> - char *chpasswddata = NULL; >> - size_t chpasswdlen; >> >> rawpasswddata = (char *)qbase64_decode(password, -1, &rawpasswdlen, errp); >> if (!rawpasswddata) { >> @@ -2162,95 +2156,31 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, >> >> if (strchr(rawpasswddata, '\n')) { >> error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in raw password"); >> - goto out; >> + return; >> } >> >> if (strchr(username, '\n') || >> strchr(username, ':')) { >> error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in username"); >> - goto out; >> + return; >> } >> >> #ifdef __FreeBSD__ >> - chpasswddata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); >> - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("pw"); >> + g_autofree char *chpasswdata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); >> + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h"; >> + const char *argv[] = {"pw", "usermod", "-n", username, >> + crypt_flag, "0", NULL}; >> #else >> - chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, rawpasswddata); >> - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("chpasswd"); >> + g_autofree char *chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, >> + rawpasswddata); >> + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-e" : NULL; > > Style nit-pick - no '(...)' around 'crypted' is needed here, or > the other place later in this method. > > Yes, that was a pre-existing issue, but since you're refactoring > the code, might as well kill the redundant brackets. > > [...] Sure, let's get rid of them. Thanks.
diff --git a/qga/commands-posix.c b/qga/commands-posix.c index f3f4a05e2d..f2e9496b80 100644 --- a/qga/commands-posix.c +++ b/qga/commands-posix.c @@ -2144,14 +2144,8 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, Error **errp) { Error *local_err = NULL; - char *passwd_path = NULL; - pid_t pid; - int status; - int datafd[2] = { -1, -1 }; - char *rawpasswddata = NULL; + g_autofree char *rawpasswddata = NULL; size_t rawpasswdlen; - char *chpasswddata = NULL; - size_t chpasswdlen; rawpasswddata = (char *)qbase64_decode(password, -1, &rawpasswdlen, errp); if (!rawpasswddata) { @@ -2162,95 +2156,31 @@ void qmp_guest_set_user_password(const char *username, if (strchr(rawpasswddata, '\n')) { error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in raw password"); - goto out; + return; } if (strchr(username, '\n') || strchr(username, ':')) { error_setg(errp, "forbidden characters in username"); - goto out; + return; } #ifdef __FreeBSD__ - chpasswddata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("pw"); + g_autofree char *chpasswdata = g_strdup(rawpasswddata); + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h"; + const char *argv[] = {"pw", "usermod", "-n", username, + crypt_flag, "0", NULL}; #else - chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, rawpasswddata); - passwd_path = g_find_program_in_path("chpasswd"); + g_autofree char *chpasswddata = g_strdup_printf("%s:%s\n", username, + rawpasswddata); + const char *crypt_flag = (crypted) ? "-e" : NULL; + const char *argv[] = {"chpasswd", crypt_flag, NULL}; #endif - chpasswdlen = strlen(chpasswddata); - - if (!passwd_path) { - error_setg(errp, "cannot find 'passwd' program in PATH"); - goto out; - } - - if (!g_unix_open_pipe(datafd, FD_CLOEXEC, NULL)) { - error_setg(errp, "cannot create pipe FDs"); - goto out; - } - - pid = fork(); - if (pid == 0) { - close(datafd[1]); - /* child */ - setsid(); - dup2(datafd[0], 0); - reopen_fd_to_null(1); - reopen_fd_to_null(2); - -#ifdef __FreeBSD__ - const char *h_arg; - h_arg = (crypted) ? "-H" : "-h"; - execl(passwd_path, "pw", "usermod", "-n", username, h_arg, "0", NULL); -#else - if (crypted) { - execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", "-e", NULL); - } else { - execl(passwd_path, "chpasswd", NULL); - } -#endif - _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); - } else if (pid < 0) { - error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process"); - goto out; - } - close(datafd[0]); - datafd[0] = -1; - - if (qemu_write_full(datafd[1], chpasswddata, chpasswdlen) != chpasswdlen) { - error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "cannot write new account password"); - goto out; - } - close(datafd[1]); - datafd[1] = -1; - - ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err); + ga_run_command(argv, chpasswddata, "set user password", &local_err); if (local_err) { error_propagate(errp, local_err); - goto out; - } - - if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { - error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally"); - goto out; - } - - if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) { - error_setg(errp, "child process has failed to set user password"); - goto out; - } - -out: - g_free(chpasswddata); - g_free(rawpasswddata); - g_free(passwd_path); - if (datafd[0] != -1) { - close(datafd[0]); - } - if (datafd[1] != -1) { - close(datafd[1]); + return; } } #else /* __linux__ || __FreeBSD__ */
There's no need to check for the existence of the "chpasswd", "pw" executables, as the exec() call will do that for us. Signed-off-by: Andrey Drobyshev <andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com> --- qga/commands-posix.c | 96 ++++++-------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)