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[RFC] powerpc/book3s/hash: Drop _PAGE_PRIVILEGED from PAGE_NONE

Message ID 20231102132327.294050-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State RFC
Headers show
Series [RFC] powerpc/book3s/hash: Drop _PAGE_PRIVILEGED from PAGE_NONE | expand

Commit Message

Aneesh Kumar K V Nov. 2, 2023, 1:23 p.m. UTC
There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite.
But that got dropped by
commit 6a56ccbcf6c6 ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite")

With this change numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte
with RWX cleared (no-access). This also remove pte_user() from
book3s/64.

pte_access_permitted() now checks for _PAGE_EXEC because we now support
EXECONLY mappings.

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 23 +++++---------------
 arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c        | 17 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

Comments

Nicholas Piggin Nov. 13, 2023, 10:16 a.m. UTC | #1
On Thu Nov 2, 2023 at 11:23 PM AEST, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite.
> But that got dropped by
> commit 6a56ccbcf6c6 ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite")
>
> With this change numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte
> with RWX cleared (no-access).

You mean "that" above change (not *this* change), right?

> This also remove pte_user() from
> book3s/64.

Nice cleanup. That was an annoying hack.

> pte_access_permitted() now checks for _PAGE_EXEC because we now support
> EXECONLY mappings.

AFAIKS pte_exec() is not required, GUP is really only for read or
write access. It should be a separate patch if you think it's needed.

>
> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 23 +++++---------------
>  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c        | 17 +++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> index cb77eddca54b..7c7de7b56df0 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> @@ -17,12 +17,6 @@
>  #define _PAGE_EXEC		0x00001 /* execute permission */
>  #define _PAGE_WRITE		0x00002 /* write access allowed */
>  #define _PAGE_READ		0x00004	/* read access allowed */
> -#define _PAGE_NA		_PAGE_PRIVILEGED
> -#define _PAGE_NAX		_PAGE_EXEC
> -#define _PAGE_RO		_PAGE_READ
> -#define _PAGE_ROX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
> -#define _PAGE_RW		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE)
> -#define _PAGE_RWX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
>  #define _PAGE_PRIVILEGED	0x00008 /* kernel access only */
>  #define _PAGE_SAO		0x00010 /* Strong access order */
>  #define _PAGE_NON_IDEMPOTENT	0x00020 /* non idempotent memory */

Did you leave PAGE_NONE as _PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_PRIVILEGED below?
Shouldn't that be changed too? Then this patch is not only hash
but also radix.

Why is the hash change required? Previously PAGE_NONE relied on
privileged bit to prevent access, now you need to handle a PTE
without that bit? In that case could that be patch 1, then the
rest patch 2?

__pte_flags_need_flush() should be updated after this too,
basically revert commit 1abce0580b894.

> @@ -119,9 +113,9 @@
>  /*
>   * user access blocked by key
>   */
> -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO		 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ)
>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
> +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RWX	(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
>  /*
>   * _PAGE_CHG_MASK masks of bits that are to be preserved across

No need to reorder defines.

Thanks,
Nick

> @@ -523,19 +517,14 @@ static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
>  }
>  #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS */
>  
> -static inline bool pte_user(pte_t pte)
> -{
> -	return !(pte_raw(pte) & cpu_to_be64(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED));
> -}
> -
>  #define pte_access_permitted pte_access_permitted
>  static inline bool pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
>  {
> -	/*
> -	 * _PAGE_READ is needed for any access and will be
> -	 * cleared for PROT_NONE
> -	 */
> -	if (!pte_present(pte) || !pte_user(pte) || !pte_read(pte))
> +
> +	if (!pte_present(pte))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (!(pte_read(pte) || pte_exec(pte)))
>  		return false;
>  
>  	if (write && !pte_write(pte))
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> index ad2afa08e62e..b2eda22195f0 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> @@ -310,9 +310,26 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, unsigned long flags
>  			else
>  				rflags |= 0x3;
>  		}
> +		WARN_ON(!(pteflags & _PAGE_RWX));
>  	} else {
>  		if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
>  			rflags |= 0x2;
> +		else {
> +			/*
> +			 * PAGE_NONE will get mapped to 0b110 (slb key 1 no access)
> +			 * We picked 0b110 instead of 0b000 so that slb key 0 will
> +			 * get only read only access for the same rflags.
> +			 */
> +			if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_KERNEL_RO))
> +				rflags |= (HPTE_R_PP0 | 0x2);
> +			/*
> +			 * rflags = HPTE_R_N
> +			 * Without KERNEL_RO feature this will result in slb
> +			 * key 0 with read/write. But ISA only supports that.
> +			 * There is no key 1 no-access and key 0 read-only
> +			 * pp bit support.
> +			 */
> +		}
>  		if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
>  			rflags |= 0x1;
>  	}
Aneesh Kumar K V Nov. 13, 2023, 10:45 a.m. UTC | #2
On 11/13/23 3:46 PM, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
> On Thu Nov 2, 2023 at 11:23 PM AEST, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
>> There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite.
>> But that got dropped by
>> commit 6a56ccbcf6c6 ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite")
>>
>> With this change numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte
>> with RWX cleared (no-access).
> 
> You mean "that" above change (not *this* change), right?
> 

With the change in this patch numa fault pte will not have _PAGE_PRIVILEGED set because 
PAGE_NONE now maps to just _PAGE_BASE


>> This also remove pte_user() from
>> book3s/64.
> 
> Nice cleanup. That was an annoying hack.
> 
>> pte_access_permitted() now checks for _PAGE_EXEC because we now support
>> EXECONLY mappings.
> 
> AFAIKS pte_exec() is not required, GUP is really only for read or
> write access. It should be a separate patch if you think it's needed.
> 

I have a v2 dropping that based on https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com 
I kept pte_user with pte_access_permitted being the only user. I can open code that
if needed. 

>>
>> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 23 +++++---------------
>>  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c        | 17 +++++++++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
>> index cb77eddca54b..7c7de7b56df0 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
>> @@ -17,12 +17,6 @@
>>  #define _PAGE_EXEC		0x00001 /* execute permission */
>>  #define _PAGE_WRITE		0x00002 /* write access allowed */
>>  #define _PAGE_READ		0x00004	/* read access allowed */
>> -#define _PAGE_NA		_PAGE_PRIVILEGED
>> -#define _PAGE_NAX		_PAGE_EXEC
>> -#define _PAGE_RO		_PAGE_READ
>> -#define _PAGE_ROX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
>> -#define _PAGE_RW		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE)
>> -#define _PAGE_RWX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
>>  #define _PAGE_PRIVILEGED	0x00008 /* kernel access only */
>>  #define _PAGE_SAO		0x00010 /* Strong access order */
>>  #define _PAGE_NON_IDEMPOTENT	0x00020 /* non idempotent memory */
> 
> Did you leave PAGE_NONE as _PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_PRIVILEGED below?
> Shouldn't that be changed too? Then this patch is not only hash
> but also radix.
> 

A recent patch moved PAGE_NONE to pgtable-mask.h 
a5a08dc90f4513d1a78582ec24b687fad01cc843

> Why is the hash change required? Previously PAGE_NONE relied on
> privileged bit to prevent access, now you need to handle a PTE
> without that bit? In that case could that be patch 1, then the
> rest patch 2?
> 

Looking at older kernel, I guess check_pte_access used _PAGE_PRIVILEGED 
as a way to prevent access to PAGE_NONE ptes. We now depend on
_PAGE_READ

> __pte_flags_need_flush() should be updated after this too,
> basically revert commit 1abce0580b894.
> 

Will update the patch to include the revert.

>> @@ -119,9 +113,9 @@
>>  /*
>>   * user access blocked by key
>>   */
>> -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
>>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO		 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ)
>>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
>> +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
>>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RWX	(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
>>  /*
>>   * _PAGE_CHG_MASK masks of bits that are to be preserved across
> 
> No need to reorder defines.
> 

ok


> Thanks,
> Nick
> 
>> @@ -523,19 +517,14 @@ static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
>>  }
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS */
>>  
>> -static inline bool pte_user(pte_t pte)
>> -{
>> -	return !(pte_raw(pte) & cpu_to_be64(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED));
>> -}
>> -
>>  #define pte_access_permitted pte_access_permitted
>>  static inline bool pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
>>  {
>> -	/*
>> -	 * _PAGE_READ is needed for any access and will be
>> -	 * cleared for PROT_NONE
>> -	 */
>> -	if (!pte_present(pte) || !pte_user(pte) || !pte_read(pte))
>> +
>> +	if (!pte_present(pte))
>> +		return false;
>> +
>> +	if (!(pte_read(pte) || pte_exec(pte)))
>>  		return false;
>>  
>>  	if (write && !pte_write(pte))
>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>> index ad2afa08e62e..b2eda22195f0 100644
>> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>> @@ -310,9 +310,26 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, unsigned long flags
>>  			else
>>  				rflags |= 0x3;
>>  		}
>> +		WARN_ON(!(pteflags & _PAGE_RWX));
>>  	} else {
>>  		if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
>>  			rflags |= 0x2;
>> +		else {
>> +			/*
>> +			 * PAGE_NONE will get mapped to 0b110 (slb key 1 no access)
>> +			 * We picked 0b110 instead of 0b000 so that slb key 0 will
>> +			 * get only read only access for the same rflags.
>> +			 */
>> +			if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_KERNEL_RO))
>> +				rflags |= (HPTE_R_PP0 | 0x2);
>> +			/*
>> +			 * rflags = HPTE_R_N
>> +			 * Without KERNEL_RO feature this will result in slb
>> +			 * key 0 with read/write. But ISA only supports that.
>> +			 * There is no key 1 no-access and key 0 read-only
>> +			 * pp bit support.
>> +			 */
>> +		}
>>  		if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
>>  			rflags |= 0x1;
>>  	}
> 

V2 is also dropping the above change, because we will never have hash table entries inserted. 

This is added to commit message.

    Hash fault handling code did get some WARN_ON added because those
    functions are not expected to get called with _PAGE_READ cleared.
    commit 18061c17c8ec ("powerpc/mm: Update PROTFAULT handling in the page fault path")
    explains the details.



-aneesh
Nicholas Piggin Nov. 13, 2023, 11:47 a.m. UTC | #3
On Mon Nov 13, 2023 at 8:45 PM AEST, Aneesh Kumar K V wrote:
> On 11/13/23 3:46 PM, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
> > On Thu Nov 2, 2023 at 11:23 PM AEST, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> >> There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite.
> >> But that got dropped by
> >> commit 6a56ccbcf6c6 ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite")
> >>
> >> With this change numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte
> >> with RWX cleared (no-access).
> > 
> > You mean "that" above change (not *this* change), right?
> > 
>
> With the change in this patch numa fault pte will not have _PAGE_PRIVILEGED set because 
> PAGE_NONE now maps to just _PAGE_BASE

Right, I guess I was confused because I missed the pgtable-mask.h move.

> >> This also remove pte_user() from
> >> book3s/64.
> > 
> > Nice cleanup. That was an annoying hack.
> > 
> >> pte_access_permitted() now checks for _PAGE_EXEC because we now support
> >> EXECONLY mappings.
> > 
> > AFAIKS pte_exec() is not required, GUP is really only for read or
> > write access. It should be a separate patch if you think it's needed.
> > 
>
> I have a v2 dropping that based on https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/87bkc1oe8c.fsf@linux.ibm.com 
> I kept pte_user with pte_access_permitted being the only user. I can open code that
> if needed. 

I don't mind keeping pte_user() and the check in pte_access_permitted().

> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 23 +++++---------------
> >>  arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c        | 17 +++++++++++++++
> >>  2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> >> index cb77eddca54b..7c7de7b56df0 100644
> >> --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
> >> @@ -17,12 +17,6 @@
> >>  #define _PAGE_EXEC		0x00001 /* execute permission */
> >>  #define _PAGE_WRITE		0x00002 /* write access allowed */
> >>  #define _PAGE_READ		0x00004	/* read access allowed */
> >> -#define _PAGE_NA		_PAGE_PRIVILEGED
> >> -#define _PAGE_NAX		_PAGE_EXEC
> >> -#define _PAGE_RO		_PAGE_READ
> >> -#define _PAGE_ROX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
> >> -#define _PAGE_RW		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE)
> >> -#define _PAGE_RWX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
> >>  #define _PAGE_PRIVILEGED	0x00008 /* kernel access only */
> >>  #define _PAGE_SAO		0x00010 /* Strong access order */
> >>  #define _PAGE_NON_IDEMPOTENT	0x00020 /* non idempotent memory */
> > 
> > Did you leave PAGE_NONE as _PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_PRIVILEGED below?
> > Shouldn't that be changed too? Then this patch is not only hash
> > but also radix.
> > 
>
> A recent patch moved PAGE_NONE to pgtable-mask.h 
> a5a08dc90f4513d1a78582ec24b687fad01cc843

Thanks I did miss it.

>
> > Why is the hash change required? Previously PAGE_NONE relied on
> > privileged bit to prevent access, now you need to handle a PTE
> > without that bit? In that case could that be patch 1, then the
> > rest patch 2?
> > 
>
> Looking at older kernel, I guess check_pte_access used _PAGE_PRIVILEGED 
> as a way to prevent access to PAGE_NONE ptes. We now depend on
> _PAGE_READ
>
> > __pte_flags_need_flush() should be updated after this too,
> > basically revert commit 1abce0580b894.
> > 
>
> Will update the patch to include the revert.
>
> >> @@ -119,9 +113,9 @@
> >>  /*
> >>   * user access blocked by key
> >>   */
> >> -#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
> >>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO		 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ)
> >>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
> >> +#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
> >>  #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RWX	(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
> >>  /*
> >>   * _PAGE_CHG_MASK masks of bits that are to be preserved across
> > 
> > No need to reorder defines.
> > 
>
> ok
>
>
> > Thanks,
> > Nick
> > 
> >> @@ -523,19 +517,14 @@ static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
> >>  }
> >>  #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS */
> >>  
> >> -static inline bool pte_user(pte_t pte)
> >> -{
> >> -	return !(pte_raw(pte) & cpu_to_be64(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED));
> >> -}
> >> -
> >>  #define pte_access_permitted pte_access_permitted
> >>  static inline bool pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
> >>  {
> >> -	/*
> >> -	 * _PAGE_READ is needed for any access and will be
> >> -	 * cleared for PROT_NONE
> >> -	 */
> >> -	if (!pte_present(pte) || !pte_user(pte) || !pte_read(pte))
> >> +
> >> +	if (!pte_present(pte))
> >> +		return false;
> >> +
> >> +	if (!(pte_read(pte) || pte_exec(pte)))
> >>  		return false;
> >>  
> >>  	if (write && !pte_write(pte))
> >> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> >> index ad2afa08e62e..b2eda22195f0 100644
> >> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> >> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
> >> @@ -310,9 +310,26 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, unsigned long flags
> >>  			else
> >>  				rflags |= 0x3;
> >>  		}
> >> +		WARN_ON(!(pteflags & _PAGE_RWX));
> >>  	} else {
> >>  		if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
> >>  			rflags |= 0x2;
> >> +		else {
> >> +			/*
> >> +			 * PAGE_NONE will get mapped to 0b110 (slb key 1 no access)
> >> +			 * We picked 0b110 instead of 0b000 so that slb key 0 will
> >> +			 * get only read only access for the same rflags.
> >> +			 */
> >> +			if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_KERNEL_RO))
> >> +				rflags |= (HPTE_R_PP0 | 0x2);
> >> +			/*
> >> +			 * rflags = HPTE_R_N
> >> +			 * Without KERNEL_RO feature this will result in slb
> >> +			 * key 0 with read/write. But ISA only supports that.
> >> +			 * There is no key 1 no-access and key 0 read-only
> >> +			 * pp bit support.
> >> +			 */
> >> +		}
> >>  		if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
> >>  			rflags |= 0x1;
> >>  	}
> > 
>
> V2 is also dropping the above change, because we will never have hash table entries inserted. 
>
> This is added to commit message.
>
>     Hash fault handling code did get some WARN_ON added because those
>     functions are not expected to get called with _PAGE_READ cleared.
>     commit 18061c17c8ec ("powerpc/mm: Update PROTFAULT handling in the page fault path")
>     explains the details.

Should it be a WARN_ON_ONCE? Any useful way to recover from it? Could
the added WARN come with some comments from that commit that explain
it?

Thanks,
Nick
Aneesh Kumar K V Nov. 13, 2023, 3:46 p.m. UTC | #4
On 11/13/23 5:17 PM, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
> On Mon Nov 13, 2023 at 8:45 PM AEST, Aneesh Kumar K V wrote:

....

>>>> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>>>> index ad2afa08e62e..b2eda22195f0 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
>>>> @@ -310,9 +310,26 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, unsigned long flags
>>>>  			else
>>>>  				rflags |= 0x3;
>>>>  		}
>>>> +		WARN_ON(!(pteflags & _PAGE_RWX));
>>>>  	} else {
>>>>  		if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
>>>>  			rflags |= 0x2;
>>>> +		else {
>>>> +			/*
>>>> +			 * PAGE_NONE will get mapped to 0b110 (slb key 1 no access)
>>>> +			 * We picked 0b110 instead of 0b000 so that slb key 0 will
>>>> +			 * get only read only access for the same rflags.
>>>> +			 */
>>>> +			if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_KERNEL_RO))
>>>> +				rflags |= (HPTE_R_PP0 | 0x2);
>>>> +			/*
>>>> +			 * rflags = HPTE_R_N
>>>> +			 * Without KERNEL_RO feature this will result in slb
>>>> +			 * key 0 with read/write. But ISA only supports that.
>>>> +			 * There is no key 1 no-access and key 0 read-only
>>>> +			 * pp bit support.
>>>> +			 */
>>>> +		}
>>>>  		if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
>>>>  			rflags |= 0x1;
>>>>  	}
>>>
>>
>> V2 is also dropping the above change, because we will never have hash table entries inserted. 
>>
>> This is added to commit message.
>>
>>     Hash fault handling code did get some WARN_ON added because those
>>     functions are not expected to get called with _PAGE_READ cleared.
>>     commit 18061c17c8ec ("powerpc/mm: Update PROTFAULT handling in the page fault path")
>>     explains the details.
> 
> Should it be a WARN_ON_ONCE? Any useful way to recover from it? Could
> the added WARN come with some comments from that commit that explain
> it?
> 

This should never happen unless someone messed up check_pte_access(). The WARN_ON() is a way
to remind me not to add no access ppp mapping in the htab_convert_pte_flags() as I did above.
Initially I was planning to add only a comment, but then in the rare case of we getting it wrong
it is nice to do a console log.

-aneesh
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
index cb77eddca54b..7c7de7b56df0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h
@@ -17,12 +17,6 @@ 
 #define _PAGE_EXEC		0x00001 /* execute permission */
 #define _PAGE_WRITE		0x00002 /* write access allowed */
 #define _PAGE_READ		0x00004	/* read access allowed */
-#define _PAGE_NA		_PAGE_PRIVILEGED
-#define _PAGE_NAX		_PAGE_EXEC
-#define _PAGE_RO		_PAGE_READ
-#define _PAGE_ROX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
-#define _PAGE_RW		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE)
-#define _PAGE_RWX		(_PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
 #define _PAGE_PRIVILEGED	0x00008 /* kernel access only */
 #define _PAGE_SAO		0x00010 /* Strong access order */
 #define _PAGE_NON_IDEMPOTENT	0x00020 /* non idempotent memory */
@@ -119,9 +113,9 @@ 
 /*
  * user access blocked by key
  */
-#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
 #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RO		 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ)
 #define _PAGE_KERNEL_ROX	 (_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
+#define _PAGE_KERNEL_RW		(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)
 #define _PAGE_KERNEL_RWX	(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
 /*
  * _PAGE_CHG_MASK masks of bits that are to be preserved across
@@ -523,19 +517,14 @@  static inline bool arch_pte_access_permitted(u64 pte, bool write, bool execute)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS */
 
-static inline bool pte_user(pte_t pte)
-{
-	return !(pte_raw(pte) & cpu_to_be64(_PAGE_PRIVILEGED));
-}
-
 #define pte_access_permitted pte_access_permitted
 static inline bool pte_access_permitted(pte_t pte, bool write)
 {
-	/*
-	 * _PAGE_READ is needed for any access and will be
-	 * cleared for PROT_NONE
-	 */
-	if (!pte_present(pte) || !pte_user(pte) || !pte_read(pte))
+
+	if (!pte_present(pte))
+		return false;
+
+	if (!(pte_read(pte) || pte_exec(pte)))
 		return false;
 
 	if (write && !pte_write(pte))
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
index ad2afa08e62e..b2eda22195f0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/hash_utils.c
@@ -310,9 +310,26 @@  unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags, unsigned long flags
 			else
 				rflags |= 0x3;
 		}
+		WARN_ON(!(pteflags & _PAGE_RWX));
 	} else {
 		if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
 			rflags |= 0x2;
+		else {
+			/*
+			 * PAGE_NONE will get mapped to 0b110 (slb key 1 no access)
+			 * We picked 0b110 instead of 0b000 so that slb key 0 will
+			 * get only read only access for the same rflags.
+			 */
+			if (mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_KERNEL_RO))
+				rflags |= (HPTE_R_PP0 | 0x2);
+			/*
+			 * rflags = HPTE_R_N
+			 * Without KERNEL_RO feature this will result in slb
+			 * key 0 with read/write. But ISA only supports that.
+			 * There is no key 1 no-access and key 0 read-only
+			 * pp bit support.
+			 */
+		}
 		if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
 			rflags |= 0x1;
 	}