| Message ID | 20190806165429.19327-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
| Series | Add SEV guest live migration support | expand |
* Singh, Brijesh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote: > The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the > incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest > memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the > incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the > RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest > memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command > to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be > executed. > > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> OK, some comments about the return values of the functions would help, but other than that. Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> > --- > accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 6 ++ > accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ > include/sysemu/sev.h | 1 + > target/i386/sev.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > target/i386/trace-events | 3 + > 5 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > index a5b0ae9363..ba0e7fa2be 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c > @@ -180,9 +180,15 @@ static int kvm_memcrypt_save_outgoing_page(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, > bytes_sent); > } > > +static int kvm_memcrypt_load_incoming_page(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + return sev_load_incoming_page(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle, f, ptr); > +} > + > static struct MachineMemoryEncryptionOps sev_memory_encryption_ops = { > .save_setup = kvm_memcrypt_save_setup, > .save_outgoing_page = kvm_memcrypt_save_outgoing_page, > + .load_incoming_page = kvm_memcrypt_load_incoming_page, > }; > > int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) > diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > index 51b17b8141..1b6773ef72 100644 > --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c > @@ -36,3 +36,8 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, > { > return 1; > } > + > +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + return 1; > +} > diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h > index f06fd203cd..e9371bd2dd 100644 > --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h > +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h > @@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ int sev_save_setup(void *handle, const char *pdh, const char *plat_cert, > const char *amd_cert); > int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, > uint32_t size, uint64_t *bytes_sent); > +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr); > #endif > diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c > index 1820c62a71..a689011991 100644 > --- a/target/i386/sev.c > +++ b/target/i386/sev.c > @@ -721,13 +721,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) > } > } > > +static int > +sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s) > +{ > + int error, ret = 1; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish(); > + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error); > + if (ret) { > + error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); > + goto err; > + } > + > + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); > +err: > + return ret; > +} > + > + > static void > sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) > { > SEVState *s = opaque; > > if (running) { > - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { > + if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) { > + sev_receive_finish(s); > + } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { > sev_launch_finish(s); > } > } > @@ -1097,6 +1118,120 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, > return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent); > } > > +static int > +sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f) > +{ > + int ret = 1; > + int fw_error; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_start start = { }; > + gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL; > + > + /* get SEV guest handle */ > + start.handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle", > + &error_abort); > + > + /* get the source policy */ > + start.policy = qemu_get_be32(f); > + > + /* get source PDH key */ > + start.pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + if (!check_blob_length(start.pdh_len)) { > + return 1; > + } > + > + pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start.pdh_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start.pdh_len); > + start.pdh_uaddr = (uintptr_t)pdh_cert; > + > + /* get source session data */ > + start.session_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + if (!check_blob_length(start.session_len)) { > + return 1; > + } > + session = g_new(gchar, start.session_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start.session_len); > + start.session_uaddr = (uintptr_t)session; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start.policy, session, pdh_cert); > + > + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, > + &start, &fw_error); > + if (ret < 0) { > + error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); > + goto err; > + } > + > + object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start.handle, "handle", &error_abort); > + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE); > +err: > + g_free(session); > + g_free(pdh_cert); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + int ret = 1, fw_error = 0; > + gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; > + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data update = {}; > + > + /* get packet header */ > + update.hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + if (!check_blob_length(update.hdr_len)) { > + return 1; > + } > + > + hdr = g_new(gchar, update.hdr_len); > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update.hdr_len); > + update.hdr_uaddr = (uintptr_t)hdr; > + > + /* get transport buffer */ > + update.trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f); > + if (!check_blob_length(update.trans_len)) { > + goto err; > + } > + > + trans = g_new(gchar, update.trans_len); > + update.trans_uaddr = (uintptr_t)trans; > + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update.trans_uaddr, update.trans_len); > + > + update.guest_uaddr = (uintptr_t) ptr; > + update.guest_len = update.trans_len; > + > + trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update.guest_len, > + hdr, update.hdr_len); > + > + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, > + &update, &fw_error); > + if (ret) { > + error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", > + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); > + goto err; > + } > +err: > + g_free(trans); > + g_free(hdr); > + return ret; > +} > + > +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) > +{ > + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; > + > + /* > + * If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then > + * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context. > + */ > + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) && > + sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) { > + return 1; > + } > + > + return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr); > +} > + > static void > sev_register_types(void) > { > diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events > index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644 > --- a/target/i386/trace-events > +++ b/target/i386/trace-events > @@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" > kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" > kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d" > kvm_sev_send_finish(void) "" > +kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" > +kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d" > +kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) "" > -- > 2.17.1 > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c index a5b0ae9363..ba0e7fa2be 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c @@ -180,9 +180,15 @@ static int kvm_memcrypt_save_outgoing_page(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, bytes_sent); } +static int kvm_memcrypt_load_incoming_page(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + return sev_load_incoming_page(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle, f, ptr); +} + static struct MachineMemoryEncryptionOps sev_memory_encryption_ops = { .save_setup = kvm_memcrypt_save_setup, .save_outgoing_page = kvm_memcrypt_save_outgoing_page, + .load_incoming_page = kvm_memcrypt_load_incoming_page, }; int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len) diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c index 51b17b8141..1b6773ef72 100644 --- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c +++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c @@ -36,3 +36,8 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, { return 1; } + +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + return 1; +} diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h index f06fd203cd..e9371bd2dd 100644 --- a/include/sysemu/sev.h +++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h @@ -22,4 +22,5 @@ int sev_save_setup(void *handle, const char *pdh, const char *plat_cert, const char *amd_cert); int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, uint32_t size, uint64_t *bytes_sent); +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr); #endif diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c index 1820c62a71..a689011991 100644 --- a/target/i386/sev.c +++ b/target/i386/sev.c @@ -721,13 +721,34 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s) } } +static int +sev_receive_finish(SEVState *s) +{ + int error, ret = 1; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_finish(); + ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH, 0, &error); + if (ret) { + error_report("%s: RECEIVE_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error)); + goto err; + } + + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING); +err: + return ret; +} + + static void sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state) { SEVState *s = opaque; if (running) { - if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { + if (sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE)) { + sev_receive_finish(s); + } else if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) { sev_launch_finish(s); } } @@ -1097,6 +1118,120 @@ int sev_save_outgoing_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr, return sev_send_update_data(s, f, ptr, sz, bytes_sent); } +static int +sev_receive_start(QSevGuestInfo *sev, QEMUFile *f) +{ + int ret = 1; + int fw_error; + struct kvm_sev_receive_start start = { }; + gchar *session = NULL, *pdh_cert = NULL; + + /* get SEV guest handle */ + start.handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle", + &error_abort); + + /* get the source policy */ + start.policy = qemu_get_be32(f); + + /* get source PDH key */ + start.pdh_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + if (!check_blob_length(start.pdh_len)) { + return 1; + } + + pdh_cert = g_new(gchar, start.pdh_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)pdh_cert, start.pdh_len); + start.pdh_uaddr = (uintptr_t)pdh_cert; + + /* get source session data */ + start.session_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + if (!check_blob_length(start.session_len)) { + return 1; + } + session = g_new(gchar, start.session_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)session, start.session_len); + start.session_uaddr = (uintptr_t)session; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_start(start.policy, session, pdh_cert); + + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START, + &start, &fw_error); + if (ret < 0) { + error_report("Error RECEIVE_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); + goto err; + } + + object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start.handle, "handle", &error_abort); + sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE); +err: + g_free(session); + g_free(pdh_cert); + + return ret; +} + +static int sev_receive_update_data(QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + int ret = 1, fw_error = 0; + gchar *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL; + struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data update = {}; + + /* get packet header */ + update.hdr_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + if (!check_blob_length(update.hdr_len)) { + return 1; + } + + hdr = g_new(gchar, update.hdr_len); + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)hdr, update.hdr_len); + update.hdr_uaddr = (uintptr_t)hdr; + + /* get transport buffer */ + update.trans_len = qemu_get_be32(f); + if (!check_blob_length(update.trans_len)) { + goto err; + } + + trans = g_new(gchar, update.trans_len); + update.trans_uaddr = (uintptr_t)trans; + qemu_get_buffer(f, (uint8_t *)update.trans_uaddr, update.trans_len); + + update.guest_uaddr = (uintptr_t) ptr; + update.guest_len = update.trans_len; + + trace_kvm_sev_receive_update_data(trans, ptr, update.guest_len, + hdr, update.hdr_len); + + ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, + &update, &fw_error); + if (ret) { + error_report("Error RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'", + ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error)); + goto err; + } +err: + g_free(trans); + g_free(hdr); + return ret; +} + +int sev_load_incoming_page(void *handle, QEMUFile *f, uint8_t *ptr) +{ + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle; + + /* + * If this is first buffer and SEV is not in recieiving state then + * use RECEIVE_START command to create a encryption context. + */ + if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RECEIVE_UPDATE) && + sev_receive_start(s->sev_info, f)) { + return 1; + } + + return sev_receive_update_data(f, ptr); +} + static void sev_register_types(void) { diff --git a/target/i386/trace-events b/target/i386/trace-events index b41516cf9f..609752cca7 100644 --- a/target/i386/trace-events +++ b/target/i386/trace-events @@ -18,3 +18,6 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_send_start(uint64_t pdh, int l1, uint64_t plat, int l2, uint64_t amd, int l3) "pdh 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d plat 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d amd 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_send_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len) "guest %p trans %p len %d" kvm_sev_send_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_receive_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p" +kvm_sev_receive_update_data(void *src, void *dst, int len, void *hdr, int hdr_len) "guest %p trans %p len %d hdr %p hdr_len %d" +kvm_sev_receive_finish(void) ""
The sev_load_incoming_page() provide the implementation to read the incoming guest private pages from the socket and load it into the guest memory. The routines uses the RECEIVE_START command to create the incoming encryption context on the first call then uses the RECEIEVE_UPDATE_DATA command to load the encrypted pages into the guest memory. After migration is completed, we issue the RECEIVE_FINISH command to transition the SEV guest to the runnable state so that it can be executed. Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 6 ++ accel/kvm/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ include/sysemu/sev.h | 1 + target/i386/sev.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 3 + 5 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)