From patchwork Thu Jun 7 07:11:18 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Juerg Haefliger X-Patchwork-Id: 926181 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=lists.ubuntu.com (client-ip=91.189.94.19; helo=huckleberry.canonical.com; envelope-from=kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=canonical.com Received: from huckleberry.canonical.com (huckleberry.canonical.com [91.189.94.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 411cCq69Jvz9s1R; Thu, 7 Jun 2018 17:11:35 +1000 (AEST) Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=huckleberry.canonical.com) by huckleberry.canonical.com with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1fQp4t-0007Lc-3w; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 07:11:23 +0000 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]) by huckleberry.canonical.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1fQp4r-0007LI-83 for kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 07:11:21 +0000 Received: from mail-wr0-f197.google.com ([209.85.128.197]) by youngberry.canonical.com with esmtps (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1fQp4r-0004mF-04 for kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 07:11:21 +0000 Received: by mail-wr0-f197.google.com with SMTP id j8-v6so4897165wrh.18 for ; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 00:11:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:subject:date:message-id; bh=DRjeaYXV/Ao6aOpfu1BVHc/90qFFQJI4FJsGucAif0U=; b=ha8p0Nex9EeBmk+q4rZL1a1KGF9o1kyXSOC4mWo9oAgVjYIoLVIsi7WwtBbbQF/DPn 6xdvmzWuQxrA8KgePXr+nRt/099fmGZEn6qAHns03ZfnPyoVhs/rgHQ+meKHGEaxLMPR bxuIFDWwdHK9hSRgW+eOCpjfVo1OPodnROGdosPVZEo31JvwDukexwE8/MAhbnTqA+Gt rPctiSXtnKQfdGwp0y7JVgYd9PlkErvuReoKnbkHv7ouG+e2QF7L4k6GNShijtPDAY93 x1Lz/9/mLnNOx7FVXdUi/wXkmT4ezcAkOlGd6MJ0X2SgV02JdlkWSJoHGfEHlhifAU7u DPFQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E2ptPBH0ylHTsBewamkbZRKtOdL8N9VcYDtMuLeJk3UtZTBSQB4 UsIJpt0ZtvjY3QClEhkOMY0RMHlgwn+SgBFel3cNIDv4+O5JlYas5Xpk1xrF8JSFZ46XEo5QtPC RHi/XO+ZMrSPCXZm92TiiaU6T0LikC5FRc34638ql1Q== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:d7cb:: with SMTP id e11-v6mr1284179eds.83.1528355480514; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 00:11:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADUXVKKzoSkNQr0MxcmSOyBtAoY813QzdatyYArUba4Q4IBzGbJ5u5tAKlk+Y5uYrxIrINZt+yGalg== X-Received: by 2002:aa7:d7cb:: with SMTP id e11-v6mr1284173eds.83.1528355480337; Thu, 07 Jun 2018 00:11:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gollum.fritz.box ([81.221.205.149]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s2-v6sm14599813edm.13.2018.06.07.00.11.19 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 07 Jun 2018 00:11:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Juerg Haefliger X-Google-Original-From: Juerg Haefliger To: kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Subject: [SRU][Xenial][PULL] Update to upstream's implementation of Spectre v1 mitigation (LP: #1774181) Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2018 09:11:18 +0200 Message-Id: <64d8307cf6ffc09278aeda29bed31a0e72a680c1.1528355271.git.juergh@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 X-BeenThere: kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.20 Precedence: list List-Id: Kernel team discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: kernel-team-bounces@lists.ubuntu.com Sender: "kernel-team" BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1774181 Xenial/Trusty/Precise are currently lacking full support of upstream's Spectre v1 mitigation. Add the missing patches and merge them with Ubuntu's current implementation. The non-SAUCE patches are the stable 4.4 patches from 4.4.118 to 4.4.131. The rest will come in through follow-on updates to the current stable version 4.4.135. The SAUCE patches is the add-on/difference between the original embargoed patchset and what finally landed in upstream. == SRU Justification == Ubuntu's Spectre v1 mitigation is based on the original embargoed patchset which introduced a barrier macro to prevent speculation beyond array boundaries for user controlled indices. What eventually landed in upstream is slightly different and uses a barrier macro in combination with a masking solution (plus syscall table and user pointer sanitation). During the updates to newer stable upstream versions, all those patches were skipped. After reviewing them, we want to bring them back and merge them with the current implementation which brings us back in sync with upstream stable. == Fix == Add all the missing Spectre v1 patches from upstream stable 4.4.118 to 4.4.131. Where appropriate, replace Ubuntu's additional barriers with the masking macro. == Regression Potential == Low. The patches have been in upstream for quite a while now and we keep the speculation barriers that are currently in Ubuntu but not in upstream. == Test Case == TBD. Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger Acked-by: Stefan Bader Acked-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza --- The following changes since commit 8a4cab02850143918a93afbd9dd284cdef0b84d3: UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.4.0-128.154 (2018-05-25 16:01:29 +0200) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.launchpad.net/~juergh/+git/xenial-linux lp1774181 for you to fetch changes up to 64d8307cf6ffc09278aeda29bed31a0e72a680c1: UBUNTU: SAUCE: bpf: Use barrier_nospec() instead of osb() (2018-06-05 17:27:01 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dan Williams (12): array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec x86: Introduce barrier_nospec x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation mpls, nospec: Sanitize array index in mpls_label_ok() nospec: Include dependency nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Jiri Slaby (1): x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation fix Juerg Haefliger (3): UBUNTU: SAUCE: Replace osb() calls with array_index_nospec() UBUNTU: SAUCE: Rename osb() to barrier_nospec() UBUNTU: SAUCE: bpf: Use barrier_nospec() instead of osb() Mark Rutland (1): Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Rasmus Villemoes (1): nospec: Allow index argument to have const-qualified type Takashi Iwai (2): ALSA: seq: oss: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 ALSA: hda: Hardening for potential Spectre v1 Will Deacon (1): nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro Documentation/speculation.txt | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 2 - arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 2 - arch/powerpc/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 +- arch/s390/include/asm/barrier.h | 13 ++-- arch/x86/entry/common.c | 2 + arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 16 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 30 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 20 +++-- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 10 +++ drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/main.c | 3 +- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mr.c | 5 +- .../thermal/int340x_thermal/int340x_thermal_zone.c | 3 +- fs/udf/misc.c | 13 ++-- include/linux/fdtable.h | 3 +- include/linux/nospec.h | 53 +++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 6 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +- net/ipv4/raw.c | 7 +- net/ipv6/raw.c | 7 +- net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 28 ++++--- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 9 ++- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c | 15 ++-- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c | 2 + sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.c | 75 ++++++++++-------- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_synth.h | 3 +- sound/pci/hda/hda_hwdep.c | 12 ++- 29 files changed, 331 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt