diff mbox

[Lucid,Karmic,Hardy] filter: make sure filters dont read uninitialized memory, CVE-2010-4158

Message ID 1298047306-17034-2-git-send-email-stefan.bader@canonical.com
State Accepted
Commit ce8f09d9dda94b6b0bb1dd1f4d15a4ac5e873c44
Headers show

Commit Message

Stefan Bader Feb. 18, 2011, 4:41 p.m. UTC 
From: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

CVE-2010-4158
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/721282

There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
hostile user.

Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
expensive since most filters dont even use this array.

Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
the jumps. This might be done later.

In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.

For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.

[ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
  and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]

Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

(backported from commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream)
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
---
 net/core/filter.c |   64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

Comments

John Johansen Feb. 18, 2011, 10 p.m. UTC | #1 
On 02/18/2011 08:41 AM, Stefan Bader wrote:
> From: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> 
> CVE-2010-4158
> BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/721282
> 
> There is a possibility malicious users can get limited information about
> uninitialized stack mem array. Even if sk_run_filter() result is bound
> to packet length (0 .. 65535), we could imagine this can be used by
> hostile user.
> 
> Initializing mem[] array, like Dan Rosenberg suggested in his patch is
> expensive since most filters dont even use this array.
> 
> Its hard to make the filter validation in sk_chk_filter(), because of
> the jumps. This might be done later.
> 
> In this patch, I use a bitmap (a single long var) so that only filters
> using mem[] loads/stores pay the price of added security checks.
> 
> For other filters, additional cost is a single instruction.
> 
> [ Since we access fentry->k a lot now, cache it in a local variable
>   and mark filter entry pointer as const. -DaveM ]
> 
> Reported-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> 
> (backported from commit 57fe93b374a6b8711995c2d466c502af9f3a08bb upstream)
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index d1d779c..0127397 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -111,39 +111,41 @@  EXPORT_SYMBOL(sk_filter);
  */
 unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int flen)
 {
-	struct sock_filter *fentry;	/* We walk down these */
 	void *ptr;
 	u32 A = 0;			/* Accumulator */
 	u32 X = 0;			/* Index Register */
 	u32 mem[BPF_MEMWORDS];		/* Scratch Memory Store */
+	unsigned long memvalid = 0;
 	u32 tmp;
 	int k;
 	int pc;
 
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_MEMWORDS > BITS_PER_LONG);
 	/*
 	 * Process array of filter instructions.
 	 */
 	for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
-		fentry = &filter[pc];
+		const struct sock_filter *fentry = &filter[pc];
+		u32 f_k = fentry->k;
 
 		switch (fentry->code) {
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_ADD|BPF_X:
 			A += X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_ADD|BPF_K:
-			A += fentry->k;
+			A += f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_SUB|BPF_X:
 			A -= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_SUB|BPF_K:
-			A -= fentry->k;
+			A -= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_MUL|BPF_X:
 			A *= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_MUL|BPF_K:
-			A *= fentry->k;
+			A *= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_DIV|BPF_X:
 			if (X == 0)
@@ -151,49 +153,49 @@  unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int
 			A /= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_DIV|BPF_K:
-			A /= fentry->k;
+			A /= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_AND|BPF_X:
 			A &= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_AND|BPF_K:
-			A &= fentry->k;
+			A &= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_OR|BPF_X:
 			A |= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_OR|BPF_K:
-			A |= fentry->k;
+			A |= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_LSH|BPF_X:
 			A <<= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_LSH|BPF_K:
-			A <<= fentry->k;
+			A <<= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_RSH|BPF_X:
 			A >>= X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_RSH|BPF_K:
-			A >>= fentry->k;
+			A >>= f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_ALU|BPF_NEG:
 			A = -A;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JA:
-			pc += fentry->k;
+			pc += f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JGT|BPF_K:
-			pc += (A > fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+			pc += (A > f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JGE|BPF_K:
-			pc += (A >= fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+			pc += (A >= f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K:
-			pc += (A == fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+			pc += (A == f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JSET|BPF_K:
-			pc += (A & fentry->k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
+			pc += (A & f_k) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_JMP|BPF_JGT|BPF_X:
 			pc += (A > X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
@@ -208,7 +210,7 @@  unsigned int sk_run_filter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock_filter *filter, int
 			pc += (A & X) ? fentry->jt : fentry->jf;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS:
-			k = fentry->k;
+			k = f_k;
 load_w:
 			ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 4, &tmp);
 			if (ptr != NULL) {
@@ -217,7 +219,7 @@  load_w:
 			}
 			break;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_H|BPF_ABS:
-			k = fentry->k;
+			k = f_k;
 load_h:
 			ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 2, &tmp);
 			if (ptr != NULL) {
@@ -226,7 +228,7 @@  load_h:
 			}
 			break;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_B|BPF_ABS:
-			k = fentry->k;
+			k = f_k;
 load_b:
 			ptr = load_pointer(skb, k, 1, &tmp);
 			if (ptr != NULL) {
@@ -241,32 +243,34 @@  load_b:
 			X = skb->len;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_IND:
-			k = X + fentry->k;
+			k = X + f_k;
 			goto load_w;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_H|BPF_IND:
-			k = X + fentry->k;
+			k = X + f_k;
 			goto load_h;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_B|BPF_IND:
-			k = X + fentry->k;
+			k = X + f_k;
 			goto load_b;
 		case BPF_LDX|BPF_B|BPF_MSH:
-			ptr = load_pointer(skb, fentry->k, 1, &tmp);
+			ptr = load_pointer(skb, f_k, 1, &tmp);
 			if (ptr != NULL) {
 				X = (*(u8 *)ptr & 0xf) << 2;
 				continue;
 			}
 			return 0;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_IMM:
-			A = fentry->k;
+			A = f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_LDX|BPF_IMM:
-			X = fentry->k;
+			X = f_k;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_LD|BPF_MEM:
-			A = mem[fentry->k];
+			A = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ?
+				mem[f_k] : 0;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_LDX|BPF_MEM:
-			X = mem[fentry->k];
+			X = (memvalid & (1UL << f_k)) ?
+				mem[f_k] : 0;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_MISC|BPF_TAX:
 			X = A;
@@ -275,14 +279,16 @@  load_b:
 			A = X;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_RET|BPF_K:
-			return fentry->k;
+			return f_k;
 		case BPF_RET|BPF_A:
 			return A;
 		case BPF_ST:
-			mem[fentry->k] = A;
+			memvalid |= 1UL << f_k;
+			mem[f_k] = A;
 			continue;
 		case BPF_STX:
-			mem[fentry->k] = X;
+			memvalid |= 1UL << f_k;
+			mem[f_k] = X;
 			continue;
 		default:
 			WARN_ON(1);