From patchwork Tue Jan 30 05:37:19 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Yong Huang X-Patchwork-Id: 1892663 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@legolas.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: legolas.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=smartx-com.20230601.gappssmtp.com header.i=@smartx-com.20230601.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20230601 header.b=0we04U9b; dkim-atps=neutral Authentication-Results: legolas.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=nongnu.org (client-ip=209.51.188.17; helo=lists.gnu.org; envelope-from=qemu-devel-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@nongnu.org; receiver=patchwork.ozlabs.org) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by legolas.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4TPDXy5qxXz23gd for ; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:40:49 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1rUgqW-0002rv-KN; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 00:39:44 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1rUgqQ-0002r0-Nc for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 00:39:38 -0500 Received: from mail-ua1-x934.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4864:20::934]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1rUgqO-0001MF-9P for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 30 Jan 2024 00:39:38 -0500 Received: by mail-ua1-x934.google.com with SMTP id a1e0cc1a2514c-7d2dfa3bc64so507823241.2 for ; Mon, 29 Jan 2024 21:37:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=smartx-com.20230601.gappssmtp.com; s=20230601; t=1706593054; x=1707197854; darn=nongnu.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=mgBjKCmGIw1QzGuAtBe8Fn0BN4xSBkw1xT0mmLT2npc=; b=0we04U9bPNNYh1In4+leZUwv/OtiL6f+JjI5IEifrIWSh8/JQ3bDV7PLovTraKt9aj h+ecFJ76oHqTVeNcms5ybH177SNYbo1fCZtBLiwq+ps0lrIAMfic2pLwawnnLoVmJP7V UUXi6GQTtYLorl85vPRuZ30VMW+uLOE8gWmFt7peKe4+GswXbwYUmi/1BuL5F4Jw1wr/ Rg87e5OVZFG4TFRFkSLOOjxlpT5CHeZQVTm6RyduS4E7JAz6QbFS/IzFzWnDKU3gJiNY wQRoCn/l6SsiZvjrpA0cG4wqTbcoep1v97aDxeaqIGHPAd7u2DwmgHQGycw91hzf30/E bhSg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1706593054; x=1707197854; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:references:in-reply-to :message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=mgBjKCmGIw1QzGuAtBe8Fn0BN4xSBkw1xT0mmLT2npc=; b=wgWdSNl+oj0LgR+yK0R1ElSox9lmEzF3tqavqxHiW++PhJ9ja+0EuHBWmuCs68vJvG 9FWUQzyb+P1DlvbkwJI7kWo1/8Is+Lf1iZtBl4ob7OJya3W3B2j/5mkH4jAORe+U+Vot Ns2hLrHzMnX+oC8sOLDPS3BK1+fMBhwUTGsJi5Zh3eNgT6q0CL4Djo6Oi1t5krqvphFh dK+//FE0GDI3cLgmxNfOSerKvyPxbywyG8H8F4ds5Atyd3PlrYzuBMVICZja7lFRTQ7Y yN5BBp+cVuP/FqMbFEhdErNgrW5qsnVqlxZ3FzsgSuqlSzqVRIlWsnZZxJWaqP5ePbuo JCxQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YwVdTxgO05TYJtaKWj3fv3GjNr9ibjb9yImpNdDhpYXl9xr4S9/ XKUAKzkr0yYrZ5Yd+EyVPQJSk0j2XZ9DEuzmi6cN1kXSGr41b/t+9LwBfXpjzmmLyneTNLT1CeJ 79RU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IHEdsnnvhbd1i+PHsLhVYF/9HKrKR3440uMhQ7nQMMkJVuPGhsv6/4PbqbLxLLaGualIi3jYw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6102:2143:b0:46b:5b70:dfe1 with SMTP id h3-20020a056102214300b0046b5b70dfe1mr2287376vsg.2.1706593053347; Mon, 29 Jan 2024 21:37:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from anolis-dev.zelin.local ([221.122.98.162]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id bv123-20020a632e81000000b005c1ce3c960bsm7343532pgb.50.2024.01.29.21.37.31 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 29 Jan 2024 21:37:32 -0800 (PST) From: yong.huang@smartx.com To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Cc: =?utf-8?q?Daniel_P_=2E_Berrang=C3=A9?= , Eric Blake , Markus Armbruster , Hanna Reitz , Kevin Wolf , yong.huang@smartx.com Subject: [PATCH v4 1/7] crypto: Support LUKS volume with detached header Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:37:19 +0800 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: none client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::934; envelope-from=yong.huang@smartx.com; helo=mail-ua1-x934.google.com X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@nongnu.org From: Hyman Huang By enhancing the LUKS driver, it is possible to implement the LUKS volume with a detached header. Normally a LUKS volume has a layout: disk: | header | key material | disk payload data | With a detached LUKS header, you need 2 disks so getting: disk1: | header | key material | disk2: | disk payload data | There are a variety of benefits to doing this: * Secrecy - the disk2 cannot be identified as containing LUKS volume since there's no header * Control - if access to the disk1 is restricted, then even if someone has access to disk2 they can't unlock it. Might be useful if you have disks on NFS but want to restrict which host can launch a VM instance from it, by dynamically providing access to the header to a designated host * Flexibility - your application data volume may be a given size and it is inconvenient to resize it to add encryption.You can store the LUKS header separately and use the existing storage volume for payload * Recovery - corruption of a bit in the header may make the entire payload inaccessible. It might be convenient to take backups of the header. If your primary disk header becomes corrupt, you can unlock the data still by pointing to the backup detached header Take the raw-format image as an example to introduce the usage of the LUKS volume with a detached header: 1. prepare detached LUKS header images $ dd if=/dev/zero of=test-header.img bs=1M count=32 $ dd if=/dev/zero of=test-payload.img bs=1M count=1000 $ cryptsetup luksFormat --header test-header.img test-payload.img > --force-password --type luks1 2. block-add a protocol blockdev node of payload image $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"blockdev-add", > "arguments":{"node-name":"libvirt-1-storage", "driver":"file", > "filename":"test-payload.img"}}' 3. block-add a protocol blockdev node of LUKS header as above. $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"blockdev-add", > "arguments":{"node-name":"libvirt-2-storage", "driver":"file", > "filename": "test-header.img" }}' 4. object-add the secret for decrypting the cipher stored in LUKS header above $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"object-add", > "arguments":{"qom-type":"secret", "id": > "libvirt-2-storage-secret0", "data":"abc123"}}' 5. block-add the raw-drived blockdev format node $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"blockdev-add", > "arguments":{"node-name":"libvirt-1-format", "driver":"raw", > "file":"libvirt-1-storage"}}' 6. block-add the luks-drived blockdev to link the raw disk with the LUKS header by specifying the field "header" $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"blockdev-add", > "arguments":{"node-name":"libvirt-2-format", "driver":"luks", > "file":"libvirt-1-format", "header":"libvirt-2-storage", > "key-secret":"libvirt-2-format-secret0"}}' 7. hot-plug the virtio-blk device finally $ virsh qemu-monitor-command vm '{"execute":"device_add", > "arguments": {"num-queues":"1", "driver":"virtio-blk-pci", > "drive": "libvirt-2-format", "id":"virtio-disk2"}}' Starting a VM with a LUKS volume with detached header is somewhat similar to hot-plug in that both maintaining the same json command while the starting VM changes the "blockdev-add/device_add" parameters to "blockdev/device". Signed-off-by: Hyman Huang Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé --- block/crypto.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/block-luks.c | 11 +++++++---- include/crypto/block.h | 5 +++++ qapi/block-core.json | 5 ++++- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/crypto.c b/block/crypto.c index 921933a5e5..68656158e9 100644 --- a/block/crypto.c +++ b/block/crypto.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ typedef struct BlockCrypto BlockCrypto; struct BlockCrypto { QCryptoBlock *block; bool updating_keys; + BdrvChild *header; /* Reference to the detached LUKS header */ }; @@ -63,12 +64,14 @@ static int block_crypto_read_func(QCryptoBlock *block, Error **errp) { BlockDriverState *bs = opaque; + BlockCrypto *crypto = bs->opaque; ssize_t ret; GLOBAL_STATE_CODE(); GRAPH_RDLOCK_GUARD_MAINLOOP(); - ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, offset, buflen, buf, 0); + ret = bdrv_pread(crypto->header ? crypto->header : bs->file, + offset, buflen, buf, 0); if (ret < 0) { error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read encryption header"); return ret; @@ -84,12 +87,14 @@ static int block_crypto_write_func(QCryptoBlock *block, Error **errp) { BlockDriverState *bs = opaque; + BlockCrypto *crypto = bs->opaque; ssize_t ret; GLOBAL_STATE_CODE(); GRAPH_RDLOCK_GUARD_MAINLOOP(); - ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, buflen, buf, 0); + ret = bdrv_pwrite(crypto->header ? crypto->header : bs->file, + offset, buflen, buf, 0); if (ret < 0) { error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not write encryption header"); return ret; @@ -262,6 +267,8 @@ static int block_crypto_open_generic(QCryptoBlockFormat format, int flags, Error **errp) { + ERRP_GUARD(); + BlockCrypto *crypto = bs->opaque; QemuOpts *opts = NULL; int ret; @@ -276,6 +283,13 @@ static int block_crypto_open_generic(QCryptoBlockFormat format, return ret; } + crypto->header = bdrv_open_child(NULL, options, "header", bs, + &child_of_bds, BDRV_CHILD_METADATA, + true, errp); + if (*errp != NULL) { + return -EINVAL; + } + GRAPH_RDLOCK_GUARD_MAINLOOP(); bs->supported_write_flags = BDRV_REQ_FUA & @@ -299,6 +313,9 @@ static int block_crypto_open_generic(QCryptoBlockFormat format, if (flags & BDRV_O_NO_IO) { cflags |= QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_NO_IO; } + if (crypto->header != NULL) { + cflags |= QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_DETACHED; + } crypto->block = qcrypto_block_open(open_opts, NULL, block_crypto_read_func, bs, diff --git a/crypto/block-luks.c b/crypto/block-luks.c index fb01ec38bb..10373aaba4 100644 --- a/crypto/block-luks.c +++ b/crypto/block-luks.c @@ -457,12 +457,15 @@ qcrypto_block_luks_load_header(QCryptoBlock *block, * Does basic sanity checks on the LUKS header */ static int -qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(const QCryptoBlockLUKS *luks, Error **errp) +qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(const QCryptoBlockLUKS *luks, + unsigned int flags, + Error **errp) { size_t i, j; unsigned int header_sectors = QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_KEY_SLOT_OFFSET / QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_SECTOR_SIZE; + bool detached = flags & QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_DETACHED; if (memcmp(luks->header.magic, qcrypto_block_luks_magic, QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_MAGIC_LEN) != 0) { @@ -494,7 +497,7 @@ qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(const QCryptoBlockLUKS *luks, Error **errp) return -1; } - if (luks->header.payload_offset_sector < + if (!detached && luks->header.payload_offset_sector < DIV_ROUND_UP(QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_KEY_SLOT_OFFSET, QCRYPTO_BLOCK_LUKS_SECTOR_SIZE)) { error_setg(errp, "LUKS payload is overlapping with the header"); @@ -543,7 +546,7 @@ qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(const QCryptoBlockLUKS *luks, Error **errp) return -1; } - if (start1 + len1 > luks->header.payload_offset_sector) { + if (!detached && start1 + len1 > luks->header.payload_offset_sector) { error_setg(errp, "Keyslot %zu is overlapping with the encrypted payload", i); @@ -1203,7 +1206,7 @@ qcrypto_block_luks_open(QCryptoBlock *block, goto fail; } - if (qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(luks, errp) < 0) { + if (qcrypto_block_luks_check_header(luks, flags, errp) < 0) { goto fail; } diff --git a/include/crypto/block.h b/include/crypto/block.h index 4f63a37872..d0d97f5d12 100644 --- a/include/crypto/block.h +++ b/include/crypto/block.h @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ bool qcrypto_block_has_format(QCryptoBlockFormat format, typedef enum { QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_NO_IO = (1 << 0), + QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_DETACHED = (1 << 1), } QCryptoBlockOpenFlags; /** @@ -95,6 +96,10 @@ typedef enum { * metadata such as the payload offset. There will be * no cipher or ivgen objects available. * + * If @flags contains QCRYPTO_BLOCK_OPEN_DETACHED then + * the open process will be optimized to skip the LUKS + * payload overlap check. + * * If any part of initializing the encryption context * fails an error will be returned. This could be due * to the volume being in the wrong format, a cipher diff --git a/qapi/block-core.json b/qapi/block-core.json index 48c181e55d..ae604c6019 100644 --- a/qapi/block-core.json +++ b/qapi/block-core.json @@ -3365,11 +3365,14 @@ # decryption key (since 2.6). Mandatory except when doing a # metadata-only probe of the image. # +# @header: block device holding a detached LUKS header. (since 9.0) +# # Since: 2.9 ## { 'struct': 'BlockdevOptionsLUKS', 'base': 'BlockdevOptionsGenericFormat', - 'data': { '*key-secret': 'str' } } + 'data': { '*key-secret': 'str', + '*header': 'BlockdevRef'} } ## # @BlockdevOptionsGenericCOWFormat: