From patchwork Mon Dec 16 07:15:26 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Budankov X-Patchwork-Id: 1210125 X-Patchwork-Delegate: bpf@iogearbox.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming-bpf@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming-bpf@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=bpf-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47bsxR1VNxz9sPK for ; Mon, 16 Dec 2019 18:15:39 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726710AbfLPHPi (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Dec 2019 02:15:38 -0500 Received: from mga17.intel.com ([192.55.52.151]:28040 "EHLO mga17.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726252AbfLPHPi (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 Dec 2019 02:15:38 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by fmsmga107.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Dec 2019 23:15:37 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.69,320,1571727600"; d="scan'208";a="266181381" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by FMSMGA003.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Dec 2019 23:15:36 -0800 Received: from [10.251.95.214] (abudanko-mobl.ccr.corp.intel.com [10.251.95.214]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 180E25802B1; Sun, 15 Dec 2019 23:15:27 -0800 (PST) Subject: [PATCH v2 2/7] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process From: Alexey Budankov To: Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , jani.nikula@linux.intel.com, joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com, rodrigo.vivi@intel.com, Alexei Starovoitov , james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org, Casey Schaufler , serge@hallyn.com, James Morris Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Namhyung Kim , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Thomas Gleixner , Tvrtko Ursulin , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, bgregg@netflix.com, Song Liu , bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org References: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 10:15:26 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <26101427-c0a3-db9f-39e9-9e5f4ddd009c@linux.intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: bpf-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov --- include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EACCES; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) { - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return -EPERM; return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);