From patchwork Mon Mar 9 19:47:01 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Era Mayflower X-Patchwork-Id: 1251441 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming-netdev@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming-netdev@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20161025 header.b=VKsgax4i; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48bZfy5l6pz9sPR for ; Mon, 9 Mar 2020 21:47:22 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726469AbgCIKrS (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Mar 2020 06:47:18 -0400 Received: from mail-wr1-f68.google.com ([209.85.221.68]:35958 "EHLO mail-wr1-f68.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725956AbgCIKrS (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Mar 2020 06:47:18 -0400 Received: by mail-wr1-f68.google.com with SMTP id s5so6504724wrg.3; Mon, 09 Mar 2020 03:47:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=8Q5hLP6VCCRTSBbHs5v5bw6AJTAj4qvpYTw598TDaPk=; b=VKsgax4iWthP3woIu586uVQrk/tjJamkL/ku+1bkafArdJlaDcxwZLZsaBCalaHzod KEodXDdSiCR4QV11oTYtxPRexoXIb+AgDipsHw2VWP2yFtDLW6lIebi31oH/V86QODV9 0rKpJMrzUiOV8oR+gfA6/52Yr5xKHG97Mh6yqjx26KzryVv9oTN9lWKPVJxP3wF3SOqu EgowmNC/wavPzNfJ/ZokfYcjSDTV0qI9Ag51Tm016/NVr9r4UXXpDRNcaPS9huKeU1uy 0E9aRtqyHp9ZhoOacf/hjSx3yidxw6HgjBr/D29/BgpvnUkbD+E2h0LUGhZTgEGkP8VO nYig== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-transfer-encoding; bh=8Q5hLP6VCCRTSBbHs5v5bw6AJTAj4qvpYTw598TDaPk=; b=TAF1PWCDQyQmZhu3GoInbj0s9A2iWTXl0gq0FS+mFw9AEQ4VtgO+GI5onvCp8bfH9g JwS0Aa/+oXywccRk5GCSO3JJzgvgcypyd00jZh61l06/Onn/V8u+Eq/Qd/Wf7Mxdm5nj eifeqZWUCOrc9Emu142hnNb6uaD7RNCdsJbB2XUmd3S/ptLjRBTruQkPDzyK1c3zjA8R hHFE473saKqMennLvqCTGdebteJQwR8DyPm+TNblUWlnqykoe74A6ePfsOnq2aEZ3rqC FIuK9jbAL2kP0fhiL9loNHADgx6dSmltZnZWrwW+G+QPAHPnrLFmRwFpNNTWAA517HQM XYKw== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ1Myj2FSO2yOLOw73sJlPC3t5frhuzEDPdxf0dkEKsUyoIdR4iN iL+ClikNUm8KHLCE7pW5QkO84OOxhPPNIw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vs1DeZRsLneSJ1que7sFDLkTRqY/YfPMLhT/+R6DEfdYiV1PILobF/74G7n0Sbg3VrMFNt1hQ== X-Received: by 2002:adf:f002:: with SMTP id j2mr21186795wro.296.1583750834782; Mon, 09 Mar 2020 03:47:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (hosting85.skyberate.net. [185.87.248.81]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id c72sm19167752wme.35.2020.03.09.03.47.13 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 09 Mar 2020 03:47:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Era Mayflower To: davem@davemloft.net Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Era Mayflower Subject: [PATCH v3 1/2] macsec: Support XPN frame handling - IEEE 802.1AEbw Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2020 19:47:01 +0000 Message-Id: <20200309194702.117050-1-mayflowerera@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Support extended packet number cipher suites (802.1AEbw) frames handling. This does not include the needed netlink patches. * Added xpn boolean field to `struct macsec_secy`. * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_tx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5). * Added ssci field to `struct_macsec_rx_sa` (802.1AE figure 10-5). * Added salt field to `struct macsec_key` (802.1AE 10.7 NOTE 1). * Created pn_t type for easy access to lower and upper halves. * Created salt_t type for easy access to the "ssci" and "pn" parts. * Created `macsec_fill_iv_xpn` function to create IV in XPN mode. * Support in PN recovery and preliminary replay check in XPN mode. In addition, according to IEEE 802.1AEbw figure 10-5, the PN of incoming frame can be 0 when XPN cipher suite is used, so fixed the function `macsec_validate_skb` to fail on PN=0 only if XPN is off. Signed-off-by: Era Mayflower --- drivers/net/macsec.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ include/net/macsec.h | 45 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c index 45bfd99f1..de9578daa 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -68,6 +69,16 @@ struct macsec_eth_header { sc; \ sc = rtnl_dereference(sc->next)) +#define pn_same_half(pn1, pn2) (!(((pn1) >> 31) ^ ((pn2) >> 31))) + +struct gcm_iv_xpn { + union { + u8 short_secure_channel_id[4]; + ssci_t ssci; + }; + __be64 pn; +} __packed; + struct gcm_iv { union { u8 secure_channel_id[8]; @@ -372,8 +383,8 @@ static const struct macsec_ops *macsec_get_ops(struct macsec_dev *macsec, return __macsec_get_ops(macsec->offload, macsec, ctx); } -/* validate MACsec packet according to IEEE 802.1AE-2006 9.12 */ -static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len) +/* validate MACsec packet according to IEEE 802.1AE-2018 9.12 */ +static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len, bool xpn) { struct macsec_eth_header *h = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data; int len = skb->len - 2 * ETH_ALEN; @@ -398,8 +409,8 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len) if (h->unused) return false; - /* rx.pn != 0 (figure 10-5) */ - if (!h->packet_number) + /* rx.pn != 0 if not XPN (figure 10-5 with 802.11AEbw-2013 amendment) */ + if (!h->packet_number && !xpn) return false; /* length check, f) g) h) i) */ @@ -411,6 +422,15 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len) #define MACSEC_NEEDED_HEADROOM (macsec_extra_len(true)) #define MACSEC_NEEDED_TAILROOM MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN +static void macsec_fill_iv_xpn(unsigned char *iv, ssci_t ssci, u64 pn, + salt_t salt) +{ + struct gcm_iv_xpn *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv_xpn *)iv; + + gcm_iv->ssci = ssci ^ salt.ssci; + gcm_iv->pn = cpu_to_be64(pn) ^ salt.pn; +} + static void macsec_fill_iv(unsigned char *iv, sci_t sci, u32 pn) { struct gcm_iv *gcm_iv = (struct gcm_iv *)iv; @@ -441,14 +461,19 @@ void macsec_pn_wrapped(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(macsec_pn_wrapped); -static u32 tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, struct macsec_secy *secy) +static pn_t tx_sa_update_pn(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, + struct macsec_secy *secy) { - u32 pn; + pn_t pn; spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); - pn = tx_sa->next_pn; - tx_sa->next_pn++; + pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves; + if (secy->xpn) + tx_sa->next_pn++; + else + tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower++; + if (tx_sa->next_pn == 0) __macsec_pn_wrapped(secy, tx_sa); spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); @@ -563,7 +588,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa; struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev); bool sci_present; - u32 pn; + pn_t pn; secy = &macsec->secy; tx_sc = &secy->tx_sc; @@ -605,12 +630,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, memmove(hh, eth, 2 * ETH_ALEN); pn = tx_sa_update_pn(tx_sa, secy); - if (pn == 0) { + if (pn.full64 == 0) { macsec_txsa_put(tx_sa); kfree_skb(skb); return ERR_PTR(-ENOLINK); } - macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn, sci_present); + macsec_fill_sectag(hh, secy, pn.lower, sci_present); macsec_set_shortlen(hh, unprotected_len - 2 * ETH_ALEN); skb_put(skb, secy->icv_len); @@ -641,7 +666,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } - macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn); + if (secy->xpn) + macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, tx_sa->ssci, pn.full64, tx_sa->key.salt); + else + macsec_fill_iv(iv, secy->sci, pn.lower); sg_init_table(sg, ret); ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); @@ -693,13 +721,14 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u u32 lowest_pn = 0; spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock); - if (rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window) - lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window; + if (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window) + lowest_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window; /* Now perform replay protection check again * (see IEEE 802.1AE-2006 figure 10-5) */ - if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn) { + if (secy->replay_protect && pn < lowest_pn && + (!secy->xpn || pn_same_half(pn, lowest_pn))) { spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock); u64_stats_update_begin(&rxsc_stats->syncp); rxsc_stats->stats.InPktsLate++; @@ -748,8 +777,15 @@ static bool macsec_post_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macsec_secy *secy, u } u64_stats_update_end(&rxsc_stats->syncp); - if (pn >= rx_sa->next_pn) - rx_sa->next_pn = pn + 1; + // Instead of "pn >=" - to support pn overflow in xpn + if (pn + 1 > rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) { + rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1; + } else if (secy->xpn && + !pn_same_half(pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower)) { + rx_sa->next_pn_halves.upper++; + rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = pn + 1; + } + spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock); } @@ -836,6 +872,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned char *iv; struct aead_request *req; struct macsec_eth_header *hdr; + u32 hdr_pn; u16 icv_len = secy->icv_len; macsec_skb_cb(skb)->valid = false; @@ -855,7 +892,21 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, } hdr = (struct macsec_eth_header *)skb->data; - macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, ntohl(hdr->packet_number)); + hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number); + + if (secy->xpn) { + pn_t recovered_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves; + + recovered_pn.lower = hdr_pn; + if (hdr_pn < rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower && + !pn_same_half(hdr_pn, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower)) + recovered_pn.upper++; + + macsec_fill_iv_xpn(iv, rx_sa->ssci, recovered_pn.full64, + rx_sa->key.salt); + } else { + macsec_fill_iv(iv, sci, hdr_pn); + } sg_init_table(sg, ret); ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); @@ -996,7 +1047,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) struct macsec_rxh_data *rxd; struct macsec_dev *macsec; sci_t sci; - u32 pn; + u32 hdr_pn; bool cbit; struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats *rxsc_stats; struct pcpu_secy_stats *secy_stats; @@ -1067,7 +1118,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) secy_stats = this_cpu_ptr(macsec->stats); rxsc_stats = this_cpu_ptr(rx_sc->stats); - if (!macsec_validate_skb(skb, secy->icv_len)) { + if (!macsec_validate_skb(skb, secy->icv_len, secy->xpn)) { u64_stats_update_begin(&secy_stats->syncp); secy_stats->stats.InPktsBadTag++; u64_stats_update_end(&secy_stats->syncp); @@ -1099,13 +1150,16 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) } /* First, PN check to avoid decrypting obviously wrong packets */ - pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number); + hdr_pn = ntohl(hdr->packet_number); if (secy->replay_protect) { bool late; spin_lock(&rx_sa->lock); - late = rx_sa->next_pn >= secy->replay_window && - pn < (rx_sa->next_pn - secy->replay_window); + late = rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower >= secy->replay_window && + hdr_pn < (rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower - secy->replay_window); + + if (secy->xpn) + late = late && pn_same_half(rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower, hdr_pn); spin_unlock(&rx_sa->lock); if (late) { @@ -1134,7 +1188,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb) return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED; } - if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, pn)) + if (!macsec_post_decrypt(skb, secy, hdr_pn)) goto drop; deliver: @@ -1661,7 +1715,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) { spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); - rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); + rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); } @@ -1868,7 +1922,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) } spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); - tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); + tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE]) @@ -2132,9 +2186,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) u8 assoc_num; struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1]; bool was_operational, was_active; - u32 prev_pn = 0; + pn_t prev_pn; int ret = 0; + prev_pn.full64 = 0; + if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX]) return -EINVAL; @@ -2154,8 +2210,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) { spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); - prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn; - tx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); + prev_pn = tx_sa->next_pn_halves; + tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); } @@ -2193,7 +2249,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) cleanup: if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) { spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); - tx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn; + tx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn; spin_unlock_bh(&tx_sa->lock); } tx_sa->active = was_active; @@ -2213,9 +2269,11 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1]; struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1]; bool was_active; - u32 prev_pn = 0; + pn_t prev_pn; int ret = 0; + prev_pn.full64 = 0; + if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX]) return -EINVAL; @@ -2238,8 +2296,8 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) { spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); - prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn; - rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); + prev_pn = rx_sa->next_pn_halves; + rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]); spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); } @@ -2272,7 +2330,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) cleanup: if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) { spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); - rx_sa->next_pn = prev_pn; + rx_sa->next_pn_halves = prev_pn; spin_unlock_bh(&rx_sa->lock); } rx_sa->active = was_active; @@ -2791,7 +2849,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev, } if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) || - nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn) || + nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, tx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) || nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, tx_sa->key.id) || nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, tx_sa->active)) { nla_nest_cancel(skb, txsa_nest); @@ -2895,7 +2953,7 @@ dump_secy(struct macsec_secy *secy, struct net_device *dev, nla_nest_end(skb, attr); if (nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN, i) || - nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn) || + nla_put_u32(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN, rx_sa->next_pn_halves.lower) || nla_put(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID, MACSEC_KEYID_LEN, rx_sa->key.id) || nla_put_u8(skb, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE, rx_sa->active)) { nla_nest_cancel(skb, rxsa_nest); diff --git a/include/net/macsec.h b/include/net/macsec.h index 92e43db8b..43cd54e17 100644 --- a/include/net/macsec.h +++ b/include/net/macsec.h @@ -11,18 +11,45 @@ #include #include +#define MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12 +#define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */ + typedef u64 __bitwise sci_t; +typedef u32 __bitwise ssci_t; -#define MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /* 2 bits for the association number */ +typedef union salt { + struct { + u32 ssci; + u64 pn; + } __packed; + u8 bytes[MACSEC_SALT_LEN]; +} __packed salt_t; + +typedef union pn { + struct { +#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD) + u32 lower; + u32 upper; +#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD) + u32 upper; + u32 lower; +#else +#error "Please fix " +#endif + }; + u64 full64; +} pn_t; /** * struct macsec_key - SA key * @id: user-provided key identifier * @tfm: crypto struct, key storage + * @salt: salt used to generate IV in XPN cipher suites */ struct macsec_key { u8 id[MACSEC_KEYID_LEN]; struct crypto_aead *tfm; + salt_t salt; }; struct macsec_rx_sc_stats { @@ -64,12 +91,17 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc_stats { * @next_pn: packet number expected for the next packet * @lock: protects next_pn manipulations * @key: key structure + * @ssci: short secure channel identifier * @stats: per-SA stats */ struct macsec_rx_sa { struct macsec_key key; + ssci_t ssci; spinlock_t lock; - u32 next_pn; + union { + pn_t next_pn_halves; + u64 next_pn; + }; refcount_t refcnt; bool active; struct macsec_rx_sa_stats __percpu *stats; @@ -110,12 +142,17 @@ struct macsec_rx_sc { * @next_pn: packet number to use for the next packet * @lock: protects next_pn manipulations * @key: key structure + * @ssci: short secure channel identifier * @stats: per-SA stats */ struct macsec_tx_sa { struct macsec_key key; + ssci_t ssci; spinlock_t lock; - u32 next_pn; + union { + pn_t next_pn_halves; + u64 next_pn; + }; refcount_t refcnt; bool active; struct macsec_tx_sa_stats __percpu *stats; @@ -152,6 +189,7 @@ struct macsec_tx_sc { * @key_len: length of keys used by the cipher suite * @icv_len: length of ICV used by the cipher suite * @validate_frames: validation mode + * @xpn: enable XPN for this SecY * @operational: MAC_Operational flag * @protect_frames: enable protection for this SecY * @replay_protect: enable packet number checks on receive @@ -166,6 +204,7 @@ struct macsec_secy { u16 key_len; u16 icv_len; enum macsec_validation_type validate_frames; + bool xpn; bool operational; bool protect_frames; bool replay_protect;