From patchwork Fri Nov 10 05:37:57 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mahesh Bandewar X-Patchwork-Id: 836615 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="Yy+QG3CW"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3yY82k2XdWz9t2M for ; Fri, 10 Nov 2017 16:38:22 +1100 (AEDT) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755696AbdKJFiH (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Nov 2017 00:38:07 -0500 Received: from mail-it0-f65.google.com ([209.85.214.65]:54758 "EHLO mail-it0-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755555AbdKJFiD (ORCPT ); Fri, 10 Nov 2017 00:38:03 -0500 Received: by mail-it0-f65.google.com with SMTP id 72so279692itk.3 for ; Thu, 09 Nov 2017 21:38:02 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=ohBMtFzi8aoyp2jYndHxEkYaHUvT9D85a7lDIxBG/LY=; b=Yy+QG3CW7+/OMrwYBpe1PMr3ROJh8iSTVEk+wr/SS1yvPnu0qTkJPCWwynT7uRrpcd sw9PhJWvRxPMnt0AGsPCC91zzZNGoIKceVhTj+oPvTz1nrSrl9zHe53EuINQrtBZyUyf J3IRKr0tj2ggP5P7QoThiEx4oF8iCE+VfkFPSxPqBHuz6MSh0OjXd1GX/+H068MgXqhe Jv2I3ysZM8mEIeQPPhOZvrpogKhhxmmC0uvY76etJUK9MlD9vnVixLxVemVpEtP9kOJi Ouxps0qLSpuj4RqyeZk17NEadCrKEBBWb3di6DKOta25mrr10fEQLxBNCMyg49GGk8o9 vIyQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=ohBMtFzi8aoyp2jYndHxEkYaHUvT9D85a7lDIxBG/LY=; b=bbcvMfCpnG4tnLFXSyYP+yveyLng6+qni8T1kx/qyyVVoU5Xz2m9WkQGB+zBkYwY1z lf6dUUDiZXjXi/a2QHF5+CN9H+UZWRgxiCmHR9m1bZcqz3Bnwoe2Kr/bdTXhBBOOg7n+ BAG+3kMsdywuPeEqYtVO7IcL1Rm2fINNwNTIq3qtVqzWDWCx/zCSuad0lyNSye1jGtCr XIRZf9aWR316L+j0YwqTUAEqPa2uGhl6OzOXkUik7Y2Gj7y3JRWEc1f93PPII4wrw86Q XfcbOsbx0eYGWQGMwhTsY/wvRv8knDuKjtgwL0fAdzX+HYqbCcQUDL3UNnKmzZ5i3ILt ILVg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJaThX6osoXbplhdehZgAQOYER2+zj/IhjU9iDjVDgfPGL+O+CmEDqiw FPflkCwAKE/C0NMTY4xgeRIyyA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGs4zMbi3oQ64YWbDT3z2mqVBjZoDpxz9dWUIsppBAWIjpB93jjkgmj+9JEgKcNY0qWs+b2GIw5SeQ== X-Received: by 10.36.14.145 with SMTP id 139mr239044ite.111.1510292282582; Thu, 09 Nov 2017 21:38:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost ([2620:15c:2c4:201:1505:9ec4:1586:9751]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id s17sm4217711ioi.28.2017.11.09.21.38.01 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 09 Nov 2017 21:38:01 -0800 (PST) From: Mahesh Bandewar To: LKML , Netdev Cc: Kernel-hardening , Linux API , Kees Cook , Serge Hallyn , "Eric W . Biederman" , Eric Dumazet , David Miller , Mahesh Bandewar , Mahesh Bandewar Subject: [PATCHv2 2/2] userns: control capabilities of some user namespaces Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 21:37:57 -0800 Message-Id: <20171110053757.21170-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.15.0.448.gf294e3d99a-goog Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org From: Mahesh Bandewar With this new notion of "controlled" user-namespaces, the controlled user-namespaces are marked at the time of their creation while the capabilities of processes that belong to them are controlled using the global mask. Init-user-ns is always uncontrolled and a process that has SYS_ADMIN that belongs to uncontrolled user-ns can create another (child) user- namespace that is uncontrolled. Any other process (that either does not have SYS_ADMIN or belongs to a controlled user-ns) can only create a user-ns that is controlled. global-capability-whitelist (controlled_userns_caps_whitelist) is used at the capability check-time and keeps the semantics for the processes that belong to uncontrolled user-ns as it is. Processes that belong to controlled user-ns however are subjected to different checks- (a) if the capability in question is controlled and process belongs to controlled user-ns, then it's always denied. (b) if the capability in question is NOT controlled then fall back to the traditional check. Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- v2: Don't recalculate user-ns flags for every setns() call. v1: Initial submission. include/linux/capability.h | 1 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/capability.c | 5 +++++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 ++++ security/commoncap.c | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 7d79a4689625..a1fd9e460379 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap); extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size); diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 3fe714da7f5a..647f825c7b5f 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */ }; #define USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED 1UL +#define USERNS_CONTROLLED 2UL #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED @@ -103,6 +104,16 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) __put_user_ns(ns); } +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + return ns->flags & USERNS_CONTROLLED; +} + +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + ns->flags |= USERNS_CONTROLLED; +} + struct seq_operations; extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations; extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations; @@ -161,6 +172,15 @@ static inline struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) { return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); } + +static inline bool is_user_ns_controlled(const struct user_namespace *ns) +{ + return false; +} + +static inline void mark_user_ns_controlled(struct user_namespace *ns) +{ +} #endif #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 4a859b7d4902..bffe249922de 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -511,6 +511,11 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) } /* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */ +bool is_capability_controlled(int cap) +{ + return !cap_raised(controlled_userns_caps_whitelist, cap); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index c490f1e4313b..600c7dcb9ff7 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) goto fail_keyring; set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); + if (!ns_capable(parent_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + is_user_ns_controlled(parent_ns)) + mark_user_ns_controlled(ns); + return 0; fail_keyring: #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index fc46f5b85251..89103f16ac37 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -73,6 +73,14 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; + /* If the capability is controlled and user-ns that process + * belongs-to is 'controlled' then return EPERM and no need + * to check the user-ns hierarchy. + */ + if (is_user_ns_controlled(cred->user_ns) && + is_capability_controlled(cap)) + return -EPERM; + /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target * user namespace's parents.