From patchwork Thu Sep 21 21:56:50 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mahesh Bandewar X-Patchwork-Id: 817181 X-Patchwork-Delegate: davem@davemloft.net Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="d6oBlpfY"; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3xyr7N0dVFz9t2c for ; Fri, 22 Sep 2017 07:57:20 +1000 (AEST) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751903AbdIUV45 (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Sep 2017 17:56:57 -0400 Received: from mail-pg0-f66.google.com ([74.125.83.66]:37228 "EHLO mail-pg0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751803AbdIUV4y (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Sep 2017 17:56:54 -0400 Received: by mail-pg0-f66.google.com with SMTP id v5so4103563pgn.4 for ; Thu, 21 Sep 2017 14:56:54 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bandewar-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=KZAsMYS7NZzpvGeKoLKcYcJzITRjuIUvln6jBhez3/A=; b=d6oBlpfYs/EhYSEzvZ5vUl2CwUhPVOfVZIEQZKLaBCx8+KSCugstTADkeAGng4EFq4 MMpz7DVWJQQDMJW7qjT6qnYaNgAX9Dj6TtuMI3AA7w1dJBNSqFZiLLjj9d1QZz/aGt9T kvjiJEgkoCYboXLmnY0Z4mihJ1+5Yi8aq7lc+ItlvtjF3IbGVcLCA2BfEI7yO1fZXyL2 udfJ22hnuOKGkGaMT5q4/EqEW+ef1w5N15JWvMP+9GLYRVcmQYgxYLPkqxxVEbgRsbo3 pVVKrH8D4cbXa/OHLsklKirx6QCqMOohXKmeyiGpeK738x102Uy2kGE7jV7OTgjDNtob 4LNA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id; bh=KZAsMYS7NZzpvGeKoLKcYcJzITRjuIUvln6jBhez3/A=; b=M22IGfUsPaqVj4f7xC6MPFm+z+KPbjdHRaRLN0XS2ci+aaygcZuuvAAutmNHNib6I/ nf5qbnmLran2TuYThBmIqKQjn4OoASMEMYSeoBAR7kHpmZpRuI2GSPm9qPUaE7+ZgY7j 68TcFLIKdWVWH+Hybfr8nOT9cO35LsQUOAYFCkgofH5yE0Mi5XcJlnF3CIWfjNcADXNR yyD1YJFv7txXwjGWtUvfQc2efzfschzhy18we8HiSZzWvjByCTbDxh2yn9m8a0Y8U9Ee 3L/n8ZflGPJeZZJHHP1MtBr8r1L+lTnSXWk/AzFuukKMNVB/GgepuDUdOfIpT3s9r5Lq +KTg== X-Gm-Message-State: AHPjjUgh2gNpmNsOD7P7yEYiYOL/ZxAnoXrHsce5K7yA+sz5je5XdDDe ++5VQjaPYVgNZTNtniFMYVS/7Q== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QC3kto1UqQfo/qdeEuJzYWTdZyBZmVDCWBdQ4T38wxVwZvvvbkESA8Puyq0rLkTZpBxMqXKKA== X-Received: by 10.98.190.19 with SMTP id l19mr7081510pff.309.1506031013878; Thu, 21 Sep 2017 14:56:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost ([2620:15c:2cb:201:71b1:5d9c:e713:6f1c]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 195sm3705174pgg.42.2017.09.21.14.56.53 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 21 Sep 2017 14:56:53 -0700 (PDT) From: Mahesh Bandewar To: LKML , Netdev Cc: Kees Cook , Serge Hallyn , "Eric W . Biederman" , Eric Dumazet , David Miller , Mahesh Bandewar , Mahesh Bandewar Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/2] capability: introduce sysctl for controlled user-ns capability whitelist Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2017 14:56:50 -0700 Message-Id: <20170921215650.11206-1-mahesh@bandewar.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.1.821.g8fa685d3b7-goog Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org From: Mahesh Bandewar Add a sysctl variable kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist. This takes input as capability mask expressed as two comma separated hex u32 words. The mask, however, is stored in kernel as kernel_cap_t type. Any capabilities that are not part of this mask will be controlled and will not be allowed to processes in controlled user-ns. Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar CC: Serge Hallyn CC: Kees Cook CC: "Eric W. Biederman" --- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++ kernel/capability.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt index ce61d1fe08ca..ec0d74476f48 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - bootloader_version [ X86 only ] - callhome [ S390 only ] - cap_last_cap +- controlled_userns_caps_whitelist - core_pattern - core_pipe_limit - core_uses_pid @@ -186,6 +187,26 @@ CAP_LAST_CAP from the kernel. ============================================================== +controlled_userns_caps_whitelist + +Capability mask that is whitelisted for "controlled" user namespaces. +Any capability that is missing from this mask will not be allowed to +any process that is attached to a controlled-userns. e.g. if CAP_NET_RAW +is not part of this mask, then processes running inside any controlled +userns's will not be allowed to perform action that needs CAP_NET_RAW +capability. However, processes that are attached to a parent user-ns +hierarchy that is *not* controlled and has CAP_NET_RAW can continue +performing those actions. User-namespaces are marked "controlled" at +the time of their creation based on the capabilities of the creator. +A process that does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN will create user-namespaces +that are controlled. + +The value is expressed as two comma separated hex words (u32). This +sysctl is avaialble in init-ns and users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init-ns +are allowed to make changes. + +============================================================== + core_pattern: core_pattern is used to specify a core dumpfile pattern name. diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index b52e278e4744..6c0b9677c03f 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H #include +#include #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 @@ -247,6 +248,8 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size); diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index f97fe77ceb88..62dbe3350c1b 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); int file_caps_enabled = 1; +kernel_cap_t controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = CAP_FULL_SET; + static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) { file_caps_enabled = 0; @@ -506,3 +508,48 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) rcu_read_unlock(); return (ret == 0); } + +/* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + DECLARE_BITMAP(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP); + struct ctl_table caps_table; + char tbuf[NAME_MAX]; + int ret; + + ret = bitmap_from_u32array(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP, + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist.cap, + _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S); + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP) + return -1; + + scnprintf(tbuf, NAME_MAX, "%*pb", CAP_LAST_CAP, caps_bitmap); + + caps_table.data = tbuf; + caps_table.maxlen = NAME_MAX; + caps_table.mode = table->mode; + ret = proc_dostring(&caps_table, write, buff, lenp, ppos); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (write) { + kernel_cap_t tmp; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + ret = bitmap_parse_user(buff, *lenp, caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = bitmap_to_u32array(tmp.cap, _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S, + caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP); + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP) + return -1; + + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = tmp; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 6648fbbb8157..9903cf0de287 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1229,6 +1229,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra2 = &one, }, #endif + { + .procname = "controlled_userns_caps_whitelist", + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douserns_caps_whitelist, + }, { } };