| Message ID | 20160930222431.GA30208@dtor-ws |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted, archived |
| Delegated to: | David Miller |
| Headers | show |
From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 15:24:31 -0700 > From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> > > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit > message was being generated. > > The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors > because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To > prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is > switched to the noaudit variant. > > BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> > Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> > Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> > [dtor: reapplied after e79c6a4fc923 ("net: make net namespace sysctls > belong to container's owner") accidentally reverted the change.] > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Applied, but please be clear in the future what tree a patch is targetting, in this case 'net-next'. You can indicate this in the Subject line "[PATCH net-next]".
On Sat, Oct 01, 2016 at 03:25:04AM -0400, David Miller wrote: > From: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> > Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 15:24:31 -0700 > > > From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> > > > > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used > > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a > > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit > > message was being generated. > > > > The denial audit message caused confusion for some application authors > > because root-running Go applications always triggered the denial. To > > prevent this confusion, the capability check in net_ctl_permissions() is > > switched to the noaudit variant. > > > > BugLink: https://launchpad.net/bugs/1465724 > > > > Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> > > Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> > > Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> > > [dtor: reapplied after e79c6a4fc923 ("net: make net namespace sysctls > > belong to container's owner") accidentally reverted the change.] > > Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> > > Applied, but please be clear in the future what tree a patch > is targetting, in this case 'net-next'. > > You can indicate this in the Subject line "[PATCH net-next]". Sorry, will do next time. Thanks.
diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c index c5d37f4..9199813 100644 --- a/net/sysctl_net.c +++ b/net/sysctl_net.c @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ - if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { + if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; }