| Message ID | 1472070263-29988-5-git-send-email-daniel@zonque.org |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested, archived |
| Delegated to: | David Miller |
| Headers | show |
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index bc04e5c..163f75b 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ int sk_filter_trim_cap(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int cap) if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb) && !sock_flag(sk, SOCK_MEMALLOC)) return -ENOMEM; + err = cgroup_bpf_run_filter(sk, skb, + BPF_ATTACH_TYPE_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS); + if (err) + return err; + err = security_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb); if (err) return err;
If the cgroup associated with the receiving socket has an eBPF programs installed, run them from sk_filter_trim_cap(). eBPF programs used in this context are expected to either return 1 to let the packet pass, or != 1 to drop them. The programs have access to the full skb, including the MAC headers. Note that cgroup_bpf_run_filter() is stubbed out as static inline nop for !CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF, and is otherwise guarded by a static key if the feature is unused. Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org> --- net/core/filter.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)