| Message ID | 155024683432.21651.14153938339749694146.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk |
|---|---|
| Headers | show |
| Series | Containers and using authenticated filesystems | expand |
On Fri, 15 Feb 2019, David Howells wrote: > > Here's a collection of patches that containerises the kernel keys and makes > it possible to separate keys by namespace. This can be extended to any > filesystem that uses request_key() to obtain the pertinent authentication > token on entry to VFS or socket methods. Shouldn't Eric Biederman be cc'd on this?
So you missed the main mailing lists for discussion of this kind of thing, and the maintainer. So I have reservations about the quality of your due diligence already. Looking at your description you are introducing a container id. You don't descibe which namespace your contianer id lives in. Without the container id living in a container this breaks nested containers and process migration aka CRIU. So based on the your description. Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes: > Here's a collection of patches that containerises the kernel keys and makes > it possible to separate keys by namespace. This can be extended to any > filesystem that uses request_key() to obtain the pertinent authentication > token on entry to VFS or socket methods. > > I have this working with AFS and AF_RXRPC so far, but it could be extended > to other filesystems, such as NFS and CIFS. > > The following changes are made: > > (1) Add optional namespace tags to a key's index_key. This allows the > following: > > (a) Automatic invalidation of all keys with that tag when the > namespace is removed. > > (b) Mixing of keys with the same description, but different areas of > operation within a keyring. > > (c) Sharing of cache keyrings, such as the DNS lookup cache. > > (d) Diversion of upcalls based on namespace criteria. > > (2) Provide each network namespace with a tag that can be used with (1). > This is used by the DNS query, rxrpc, nfs idmapper keys. > > [!] Note that it might still be better to move these keyrings into the > network namespace. > > (3) Provide key ACLs. These allow: > > (a) The permissions can be split more finely, in particular separating > out Invalidate and Join. > > (b) Permits to be granted to non-standard subjects. So, for instance, > Search permission could be granted to a container object, allowing > a search of the container keyring by a denizen of the container to > find a key that they can't otherwise see. > > (4) Provide a kernel container object. Currently, this is created with a > system call and passed flags that indicate the namespaces to be > inherited or replaced. It might be better to actually use something > like fsconfig() to configure the container by setting key=val type > options. > > The kernel container object provides the following facilities: > > (a) request_key upcall interception. The manager of a container can > intercept requests made inside the container and, using a series > of filters, can cause the authkeys to be placed into keyrings that > serve as queues for one or more upcall processing programs. These > upcall programs use key notifications to monitor those keyrings. > > (b) Per-container keyring. A keyring can be attached to the container > such that this is searched by a request_key() performed by a > denizen of the container after searching the thread, process and > session keyrings. The keyring and the keys contained therein must > be granted Search for that container. > > This allows: > > (i) Authenticated filesystems to be used transparently inside of > the container without any cooperation from the occupant > thereof. All the key maintenance can be done by the manager. > > (ii) Keys to be made available to the denizens of a container (by > granting extra permissions to the container subject). > > (c) Per-container ID that can be used in audit messages. > > (d) Container object creation gives the manager a file descriptor that > can: > > (i) Be passed to a dirfd parameter to a VFS syscall, such as > mkdirat(), allowing an operation to be done inside the > container. > > (ii) Be passed to fsopen()/fsconfig() to indicate that the target > filesystem is going to be created inside a container, in that > container's namespaces. > > (iii) Be passed to the move_mount() syscall as a destination for > setting the root filesystem inside a new mount namespace made > upon container creation. > > (e) The ability to configure the container with namespaces or > whatever, and then fork a process into that container to 'boot' > it. > > > Three sample programs are provided: > > (1) test-container. This: > > - Creates a kernel container with a blank mount ns. > - Creates its root mount and moves it to the container root. > - Mounts /proc therein. > - Creates a keyring called "_container" > - Sets that as the container keyring. > - Grants Search permission to the container on that keyring. > - Removes owner permission on that keyring. > - Creates a sample user key "foobar" in the container keyring. > - Grants various permissions to the container on that key. > - Creates a keyring called "upcall" > - Intercepts "user" key upcalls from the container to there. > - Forks a process into the container > - Prints the container keyring ID if it can > - Exec's bash. > > This program expects to be given the device name for a partition it > can mount as the root and expects it to contain things like /etc, > /bin, /sbin, /lib, /usr containing programs that can be run and /proc > to mount procfs upon. E.g.: > > ./test-container /dev/sda3 > > (2) test-upcall. This is a service program that monitors the "upcall" > keyring created by test-container for authkeys appearing, which it > then hands off to /sbin/request-key. This: > > - Opens /dev/watch_queue. > - Sets the size to 1 page. > - Sets a filter to watch for "Link creation" key events. > - Sets a watch on the upcall keyring. > - Polls the watch queue for events > - When an event comes in: > - Gets the authkey ID from the event buffer. > - Queries the authkey. > - Forks of a handler which: > - Moves the authkey to its thread keyring > - Sets up a new session keyring with the authkey in it. > - Execs /sbin/request-key. > > This can be run in a shell that shares the session keyring with > test-container, from which it will find the upcall keyring. > Alternatively, the keyring ID can be provided on the command line: > > ./test-upcall [<upcall-keyring>] > > It can be triggered from inside of the container with something like: > > keyctl request2 user debug:e a @s > > and something like: > > ptrs h=4 t=2 m=2000003 > NOTIFY[00000004-00000002] ty=0003 sy=0002 i=01000010 > KEY 78543393 change=2 aux=141053003 > Authentication key 141053003 > - create 779280685 > - uid=0 gid=0 > - rings=0,0,798528519 > - callout='a' > RQDebug keyid: 779280685 > RQDebug desc: debug:e > RQDebug callout: a > RQDebug session keyring: 798528519 > > will appear on stdout/stderr from it and /sbin/request-key. > > (3) test-cont-grant. This is a program to make the nominated key > available to a container's denizens. It: > > - Grants search permission to the nominated key. > - Links the nominated key into the container keyring. > > It can be run from outside of the keyring like so: > > ./test-cont-grant <key> [<container-keyring>] > > If the keyring isn't given, it will look for one called "_container" > in the session keyring where test-container is expected to have placed > it. > > With kAFS, it can be used like follows: > > kinit dhowells@REDHAT.COM > kafs-aklog redhat.com > > which would log into kerberos and then get a key for accessing an AFS > cell called "redhat.com". This can be seen in the session keyring by > calling "keyctl show": > > 120378984 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses > 474754113 ---lswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0 > 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@redhat.com > 78543393 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: upcall > 661655334 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _container > 639103010 --alswrv 0 0 \_ user: foobar > > Then doing: > > ./test-cont-grant 64049961 > > will result in: > > 120378984 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses > 474754113 ---lswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0 > 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@procyon.org.uk > 78543393 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: upcall > 661655334 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _container > 639103010 --alswrv 0 0 \_ user: foobar > 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@procyon.org.uk > > Inside the container, the cell could be mounted: > > mount -t afs "%redhat.com:root.cell" /mnt > > and then operations in /mnt will be done using the token that has been > made available. However, this can be overridden locally inside the > container by doing kinit and kafs-aklog there with a different user. > > More to the point, the container manager could mount the container's > rootfs, say, over authenticated AFS and then attach the token to the > container and mount the rootfs into the container and the container's > inhabitant need not have any means to gain a kerberos login. > > [?] I do wonder if the possibility to use container key searches for > direct mounts should be controlled by a mount option, say: > > fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_CONTAINER, NULL, NULL, cfd); > > where you have to have the container handle available. > > [!] Note that test-cont-grant picks the container by name and does not > require the container handle when setting the key ACL - but the > name must come from the set of children of the current container. > > > The patches can be found here also: > > http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=container > > Note that this is dependent on the mount-api-viro, fsinfo, notifications > and keys-namespace branches. > > David > --- > David Howells (27): > containers: Rename linux/container.h to linux/container_dev.h > containers: Implement containers as kernel objects > containers: Provide /proc/containers > containers: Allow a process to be forked into a container > containers: Open a socket inside a container > containers, vfs: Allow syscall dirfd arguments to take a container fd > containers: Make fsopen() able to create a superblock in a container > containers, vfs: Honour CONTAINER_NEW_EMPTY_FS_NS > vfs: Allow mounting to other namespaces > containers: Provide fs_context op for container setting > containers: Sample program for driving container objects > containers: Allow a daemon to intercept request_key upcalls in a container > keys: Provide a keyctl to query a request_key authentication key > keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() > keys: Make __key_link_begin() handle lockdep nesting > keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys > keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings > keys: Find the least-recently used unseen key in a keyring. > containers: Sample: request_key upcall handling > container, keys: Add a container keyring > keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key > KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL > KEYS: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION > keys: Allow a container to be specified as a subject in a key's ACL > keys: Provide a way to ask for the container keyring > keys: Allow containers to be included in key ACLs by name > containers: Sample to grant access to a key in a container > > > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 3 > arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 3 > arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c | 2 > certs/blacklist.c | 7 > certs/system_keyring.c | 12 > drivers/acpi/container.c | 2 > drivers/base/container.c | 2 > drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 2 > drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 2 > fs/afs/security.c | 2 > fs/afs/super.c | 18 + > fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 25 + > fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 28 + > fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 > fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 2 > fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 2 > fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 > fs/fs_context.c | 39 + > fs/fscache/object-list.c | 2 > fs/fsopen.c | 54 ++ > fs/namei.c | 45 +- > fs/namespace.c | 129 ++++- > fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 29 + > fs/proc/root.c | 20 + > fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 > include/linux/container.h | 100 +++- > include/linux/container_dev.h | 25 + > include/linux/cred.h | 3 > include/linux/fs_context.h | 5 > include/linux/init_task.h | 1 > include/linux/key-type.h | 2 > include/linux/key.h | 122 +++-- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 20 + > include/linux/nsproxy.h | 7 > include/linux/pid.h | 5 > include/linux/proc_ns.h | 6 > include/linux/sched.h | 3 > include/linux/sched/task.h | 3 > include/linux/security.h | 15 + > include/linux/socket.h | 3 > include/linux/syscalls.h | 6 > include/uapi/linux/container.h | 28 + > include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 85 +++ > include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 4 > init/Kconfig | 7 > init/init_task.c | 3 > ipc/mqueue.c | 10 > kernel/Makefile | 2 > kernel/container.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++ > kernel/cred.c | 45 ++ > kernel/exit.c | 1 > kernel/fork.c | 111 ++++ > kernel/namespaces.h | 15 + > kernel/nsproxy.c | 32 + > kernel/pid.c | 4 > kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 > lib/digsig.c | 2 > net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 2 > net/compat.c | 2 > net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 12 > net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | 15 - > net/rxrpc/key.c | 16 - > net/socket.c | 34 + > samples/vfs/Makefile | 12 > samples/vfs/test-cont-grant.c | 84 +++ > samples/vfs/test-container.c | 382 ++++++++++++++ > samples/vfs/test-upcall.c | 243 +++++++++ > security/integrity/digsig.c | 31 - > security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 > security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 > security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 13 > security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 > .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 13 > security/keys/Makefile | 2 > security/keys/compat.c | 20 + > security/keys/container.c | 419 ++++++++++++++++ > security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 > security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 2 > security/keys/gc.c | 2 > security/keys/internal.h | 34 + > security/keys/key.c | 35 - > security/keys/keyctl.c | 176 +++++-- > security/keys/keyring.c | 198 ++++++- > security/keys/permission.c | 446 +++++++++++++++-- > security/keys/persistent.c | 27 + > security/keys/proc.c | 17 - > security/keys/process_keys.c | 102 +++- > security/keys/request_key.c | 70 ++- > security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 21 + > security/security.c | 12 > security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 + > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 > 92 files changed, 3696 insertions(+), 425 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 include/linux/container_dev.h > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/container.h > create mode 100644 kernel/container.c > create mode 100644 kernel/namespaces.h > create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-cont-grant.c > create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-container.c > create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-upcall.c > create mode 100644 security/keys/container.c
Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: > So you missed the main mailing lists for discussion of this kind of > thing Yeah, sorry about that. I was primarily aiming it at Trond and Steve as I'd like to consider how to go about interpolating request_key() into NFS and CIFS so that they can make use of the key-related facilities that this makes available with AFS. And I was in a bit tight for time to mail it out before having to go out. I know, excuses... ;-) > and the maintainer. That would be me. I maintain keyrings. No one is listed in MAINTAINERS as owning namespaces. If you feel that should be you, please add a record. > Looking at your description you are introducing a container id. Yes. For audit logging, which was why I cc'd Richard. > You don't descibe which namespace your contianer id lives in. It doesn't. Not everything has to have a namespace. As you yourself pointed out, it should be globally unique, in which case the world is the namespace, maybe even the universe;-). > Without the container id living in a container this breaks > nested containers and process migration aka CRIU. As long as IDs are globally unique, why should break container migration? Having a kernel container object might even make CRIU easier. And what does "Without the container id living in a container" mean anyway? I have IDs attached to containers. A container can see the IDs of its child containers. There should be no problem with nesting. David
On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 6:42 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: ... > > Looking at your description you are introducing a container id. > > Yes. For audit logging, which was why I cc'd Richard. Not to pile on, but it is more important to CC the audit mailing list. You can obviously still CC Richard, but you should send it to the entire mailing list.
On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 10:35:20AM -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > So you missed the main mailing lists for discussion of this kind of > thing, and the maintainer. So I have reservations about the quality of > your due diligence already. > > Looking at your description you are introducing a container id. > You don't descibe which namespace your contianer id lives in. > Without the container id living in a container this breaks > nested containers and process migration aka CRIU. > > So based on the your description. > > Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> > > > > David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> writes: > > > Here's a collection of patches that containerises the kernel keys and makes > > it possible to separate keys by namespace. This can be extended to any > > filesystem that uses request_key() to obtain the pertinent authentication > > token on entry to VFS or socket methods. /me puts on kernel hat: I'm not neccessarily opposed to making containers kernel objects even though I have been for quite a while (for brevity I'll use "kcontainers" for this). But I think the approach taken here is a little misguided. This patchsets pushes the argument that kcontainers are needed because of keyrings and authenticated filesystems and is designed around this use-case. Imho, that is bound to fall short of requirements and use-cases that have been piling up over the years. If we want to make kcontainers a thing we need to have a separate discussion and a separate patchset that is *solely* concerned with creating a kcontainer api. And frankly, that is likely going to take a long time. At this point containers have become a real "thing" on Linux - like it or not. So justifying it to making them in-kernel citizens doesn't need the detour over keyrings or something else. We should just discuss whether we think that the benefits of kcontainers (e.g. security) outweight the costs (e.g. maintenance). /me puts on runtime maintainer hat: One thing that is true is that userspace containers (let's call them "ucontainers") as implemented by runtimes today will not go away. We have been living with this ad-hoc concept and it's various implementations on upstream Linux at least since 2008. And kernels without kcontainers will be with us until the end of (Linux)time probably. So anyone who thinks that kcontainers will replace ucontainers and that'll be it will be thoroughly disappointed in the end. It is also very likely that not all use-cases we can currently cover with ucontainers can be covered by kcontainers. Now that might be ok but if we ever introduce kcontainers through a proper kernel api we will end up maintaining ucontainers and kcontainers simultaneously. That's a burden we shouldn't underestimate.
On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 5:42 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > > Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote: > > > So you missed the main mailing lists for discussion of this kind of > > thing > > Yeah, sorry about that. I was primarily aiming it at Trond and Steve as I'd > like to consider how to go about interpolating request_key() into NFS and CIFS > so that they can make use of the key-related facilities that this makes > available with AFS. I am interested in this discussion because I have gotten various questions about using Containers better on SMB3 mounts, and the question about doing request_key better comes up **a lot** on SMB3 mounts (not just for kerberos, Active Directory), and usability could be improved of some of the cifs-utils that cifs.ko depends on. Note that various virtualization/container identify features were added to the protocol a few years ago (which we don't yet implement in Linux) but which probably be **very** useful to followup on how these could be exposed to help containers on network mounts in Linux. See in particular this new protocol feature (implemented by various servers including Windows but not by Linux client yet) described in the protocol spec (MS-SMB2 section 2.2.9.2.1) - the "SMB2_REMOTED_IDENTITY_TREE_CONNECT context" which can be sent at mount time: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-smb2/ee7ff411-93e0-484f-9f73-31916fee4cb8 This may be of interest to Samba server developers as well > > and the maintainer. > > That would be me. I maintain keyrings.
Here's a collection of patches that containerises the kernel keys and makes it possible to separate keys by namespace. This can be extended to any filesystem that uses request_key() to obtain the pertinent authentication token on entry to VFS or socket methods. I have this working with AFS and AF_RXRPC so far, but it could be extended to other filesystems, such as NFS and CIFS. The following changes are made: (1) Add optional namespace tags to a key's index_key. This allows the following: (a) Automatic invalidation of all keys with that tag when the namespace is removed. (b) Mixing of keys with the same description, but different areas of operation within a keyring. (c) Sharing of cache keyrings, such as the DNS lookup cache. (d) Diversion of upcalls based on namespace criteria. (2) Provide each network namespace with a tag that can be used with (1). This is used by the DNS query, rxrpc, nfs idmapper keys. [!] Note that it might still be better to move these keyrings into the network namespace. (3) Provide key ACLs. These allow: (a) The permissions can be split more finely, in particular separating out Invalidate and Join. (b) Permits to be granted to non-standard subjects. So, for instance, Search permission could be granted to a container object, allowing a search of the container keyring by a denizen of the container to find a key that they can't otherwise see. (4) Provide a kernel container object. Currently, this is created with a system call and passed flags that indicate the namespaces to be inherited or replaced. It might be better to actually use something like fsconfig() to configure the container by setting key=val type options. The kernel container object provides the following facilities: (a) request_key upcall interception. The manager of a container can intercept requests made inside the container and, using a series of filters, can cause the authkeys to be placed into keyrings that serve as queues for one or more upcall processing programs. These upcall programs use key notifications to monitor those keyrings. (b) Per-container keyring. A keyring can be attached to the container such that this is searched by a request_key() performed by a denizen of the container after searching the thread, process and session keyrings. The keyring and the keys contained therein must be granted Search for that container. This allows: (i) Authenticated filesystems to be used transparently inside of the container without any cooperation from the occupant thereof. All the key maintenance can be done by the manager. (ii) Keys to be made available to the denizens of a container (by granting extra permissions to the container subject). (c) Per-container ID that can be used in audit messages. (d) Container object creation gives the manager a file descriptor that can: (i) Be passed to a dirfd parameter to a VFS syscall, such as mkdirat(), allowing an operation to be done inside the container. (ii) Be passed to fsopen()/fsconfig() to indicate that the target filesystem is going to be created inside a container, in that container's namespaces. (iii) Be passed to the move_mount() syscall as a destination for setting the root filesystem inside a new mount namespace made upon container creation. (e) The ability to configure the container with namespaces or whatever, and then fork a process into that container to 'boot' it. Three sample programs are provided: (1) test-container. This: - Creates a kernel container with a blank mount ns. - Creates its root mount and moves it to the container root. - Mounts /proc therein. - Creates a keyring called "_container" - Sets that as the container keyring. - Grants Search permission to the container on that keyring. - Removes owner permission on that keyring. - Creates a sample user key "foobar" in the container keyring. - Grants various permissions to the container on that key. - Creates a keyring called "upcall" - Intercepts "user" key upcalls from the container to there. - Forks a process into the container - Prints the container keyring ID if it can - Exec's bash. This program expects to be given the device name for a partition it can mount as the root and expects it to contain things like /etc, /bin, /sbin, /lib, /usr containing programs that can be run and /proc to mount procfs upon. E.g.: ./test-container /dev/sda3 (2) test-upcall. This is a service program that monitors the "upcall" keyring created by test-container for authkeys appearing, which it then hands off to /sbin/request-key. This: - Opens /dev/watch_queue. - Sets the size to 1 page. - Sets a filter to watch for "Link creation" key events. - Sets a watch on the upcall keyring. - Polls the watch queue for events - When an event comes in: - Gets the authkey ID from the event buffer. - Queries the authkey. - Forks of a handler which: - Moves the authkey to its thread keyring - Sets up a new session keyring with the authkey in it. - Execs /sbin/request-key. This can be run in a shell that shares the session keyring with test-container, from which it will find the upcall keyring. Alternatively, the keyring ID can be provided on the command line: ./test-upcall [<upcall-keyring>] It can be triggered from inside of the container with something like: keyctl request2 user debug:e a @s and something like: ptrs h=4 t=2 m=2000003 NOTIFY[00000004-00000002] ty=0003 sy=0002 i=01000010 KEY 78543393 change=2 aux=141053003 Authentication key 141053003 - create 779280685 - uid=0 gid=0 - rings=0,0,798528519 - callout='a' RQDebug keyid: 779280685 RQDebug desc: debug:e RQDebug callout: a RQDebug session keyring: 798528519 will appear on stdout/stderr from it and /sbin/request-key. (3) test-cont-grant. This is a program to make the nominated key available to a container's denizens. It: - Grants search permission to the nominated key. - Links the nominated key into the container keyring. It can be run from outside of the keyring like so: ./test-cont-grant <key> [<container-keyring>] If the keyring isn't given, it will look for one called "_container" in the session keyring where test-container is expected to have placed it. With kAFS, it can be used like follows: kinit dhowells@REDHAT.COM kafs-aklog redhat.com which would log into kerberos and then get a key for accessing an AFS cell called "redhat.com". This can be seen in the session keyring by calling "keyctl show": 120378984 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses 474754113 ---lswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@redhat.com 78543393 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: upcall 661655334 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _container 639103010 --alswrv 0 0 \_ user: foobar Then doing: ./test-cont-grant 64049961 will result in: 120378984 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: _ses 474754113 ---lswrv 0 65534 \_ keyring: _uid.0 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@procyon.org.uk 78543393 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: upcall 661655334 --alswrv 0 0 \_ keyring: _container 639103010 --alswrv 0 0 \_ user: foobar 64049961 --alswrv 0 0 \_ rxrpc: afs@procyon.org.uk Inside the container, the cell could be mounted: mount -t afs "%redhat.com:root.cell" /mnt and then operations in /mnt will be done using the token that has been made available. However, this can be overridden locally inside the container by doing kinit and kafs-aklog there with a different user. More to the point, the container manager could mount the container's rootfs, say, over authenticated AFS and then attach the token to the container and mount the rootfs into the container and the container's inhabitant need not have any means to gain a kerberos login. [?] I do wonder if the possibility to use container key searches for direct mounts should be controlled by a mount option, say: fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_SET_CONTAINER, NULL, NULL, cfd); where you have to have the container handle available. [!] Note that test-cont-grant picks the container by name and does not require the container handle when setting the key ACL - but the name must come from the set of children of the current container. The patches can be found here also: http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=container Note that this is dependent on the mount-api-viro, fsinfo, notifications and keys-namespace branches. David --- David Howells (27): containers: Rename linux/container.h to linux/container_dev.h containers: Implement containers as kernel objects containers: Provide /proc/containers containers: Allow a process to be forked into a container containers: Open a socket inside a container containers, vfs: Allow syscall dirfd arguments to take a container fd containers: Make fsopen() able to create a superblock in a container containers, vfs: Honour CONTAINER_NEW_EMPTY_FS_NS vfs: Allow mounting to other namespaces containers: Provide fs_context op for container setting containers: Sample program for driving container objects containers: Allow a daemon to intercept request_key upcalls in a container keys: Provide a keyctl to query a request_key authentication key keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() keys: Make __key_link_begin() handle lockdep nesting keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings keys: Find the least-recently used unseen key in a keyring. containers: Sample: request_key upcall handling container, keys: Add a container keyring keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key KEYS: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL KEYS: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION keys: Allow a container to be specified as a subject in a key's ACL keys: Provide a way to ask for the container keyring keys: Allow containers to be included in key ACLs by name containers: Sample to grant access to a key in a container arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 3 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 3 arch/x86/ia32/sys_ia32.c | 2 certs/blacklist.c | 7 certs/system_keyring.c | 12 drivers/acpi/container.c | 2 drivers/base/container.c | 2 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 2 drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 2 fs/afs/security.c | 2 fs/afs/super.c | 18 + fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c | 25 + fs/cifs/cifsacl.c | 28 + fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c | 2 fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 2 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 fs/fs_context.c | 39 + fs/fscache/object-list.c | 2 fs/fsopen.c | 54 ++ fs/namei.c | 45 +- fs/namespace.c | 129 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 29 + fs/proc/root.c | 20 + fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 include/linux/container.h | 100 +++- include/linux/container_dev.h | 25 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 include/linux/fs_context.h | 5 include/linux/init_task.h | 1 include/linux/key-type.h | 2 include/linux/key.h | 122 +++-- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 20 + include/linux/nsproxy.h | 7 include/linux/pid.h | 5 include/linux/proc_ns.h | 6 include/linux/sched.h | 3 include/linux/sched/task.h | 3 include/linux/security.h | 15 + include/linux/socket.h | 3 include/linux/syscalls.h | 6 include/uapi/linux/container.h | 28 + include/uapi/linux/keyctl.h | 85 +++ include/uapi/linux/mount.h | 4 init/Kconfig | 7 init/init_task.c | 3 ipc/mqueue.c | 10 kernel/Makefile | 2 kernel/container.c | 532 ++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/cred.c | 45 ++ kernel/exit.c | 1 kernel/fork.c | 111 ++++ kernel/namespaces.h | 15 + kernel/nsproxy.c | 32 + kernel/pid.c | 4 kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 lib/digsig.c | 2 net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 2 net/compat.c | 2 net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 12 net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c | 15 - net/rxrpc/key.c | 16 - net/socket.c | 34 + samples/vfs/Makefile | 12 samples/vfs/test-cont-grant.c | 84 +++ samples/vfs/test-container.c | 382 ++++++++++++++ samples/vfs/test-upcall.c | 243 +++++++++ security/integrity/digsig.c | 31 - security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 2 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 13 security/integrity/integrity.h | 4 .../integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c | 13 security/keys/Makefile | 2 security/keys/compat.c | 20 + security/keys/container.c | 419 ++++++++++++++++ security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 2 security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c | 2 security/keys/gc.c | 2 security/keys/internal.h | 34 + security/keys/key.c | 35 - security/keys/keyctl.c | 176 +++++-- security/keys/keyring.c | 198 ++++++- security/keys/permission.c | 446 +++++++++++++++-- security/keys/persistent.c | 27 + security/keys/proc.c | 17 - security/keys/process_keys.c | 102 +++- security/keys/request_key.c | 70 ++- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 21 + security/security.c | 12 security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 92 files changed, 3696 insertions(+), 425 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/container_dev.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/container.h create mode 100644 kernel/container.c create mode 100644 kernel/namespaces.h create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-cont-grant.c create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-container.c create mode 100644 samples/vfs/test-upcall.c create mode 100644 security/keys/container.c