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Wed, 19 Apr 2023 15:17:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Atish Patra To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Atish Patra , Alexandre Ghiti , Andrew Jones , Andrew Morton , Anup Patel , Atish Patra , =?utf-8?b?QmrDtnJuIFTDtnBlbA==?= , Suzuki K Poulose , Will Deacon , Marc Zyngier , Sean Christopherson , linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Dylan Reid , abrestic@rivosinc.com, Samuel Ortiz , Christoph Hellwig , Conor Dooley , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Guo Ren , Heiko Stuebner , Jiri Slaby , kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mayuresh Chitale , Palmer Dabbelt , Paolo Bonzini , Paul Walmsley , Rajnesh Kanwal , Uladzislau Rezki Subject: [RFC 00/48] RISC-V CoVE support Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2023 15:16:28 -0700 Message-Id: <20230419221716.3603068-1-atishp@rivosinc.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20230419_151733_609687_C65F8F50 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 29.60 ) X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam detection software, running on the system "bombadil.infradead.org", has NOT identified this incoming email as spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: This patch series adds the RISC-V Confidential VM Extension (CoVE) support to Linux kernel. The RISC-V CoVE specification introduces non-ISA, SBI APIs. These APIs enable a confidential environment in [...] Content analysis details: (0.0 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at https://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [2607:f8b0:4864:20:0:0:0:631 listed in] [list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.0 SPF_HELO_NONE SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid X-BeenThere: kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "kvm-riscv" Errors-To: kvm-riscv-bounces+incoming=patchwork.ozlabs.org@lists.infradead.org This patch series adds the RISC-V Confidential VM Extension (CoVE) support to Linux kernel. The RISC-V CoVE specification introduces non-ISA, SBI APIs. These APIs enable a confidential environment in which a guest VM's data can be isolated from the host while the host retains control of guest VM management and platform resources(memory, CPU, I/O). This is a very early WIP work. We want to share this with the community to get any feedback on overall architecture and direction. Any other feedback is welcome too. The detailed CoVE architecture document can be found here [0]. It used to be called AP-TEE and renamed to CoVE recently to avoid overloading term of TEE in general. The specification is in the draft stages and is subjected to change based on the feedback from the community. The CoVE specification introduces 3 new SBI extensions. COVH - CoVE Host side interface COVG - CoVE Guest side interface COVI - CoVE Secure Interrupt management extension Some key acronyms introduced: TSM - TEE Security Manager TVM - TEE VM (aka Confidential VM) CoVE Architecture: ==================== The CoVE APIs are designed to be implementation and architecture agnostic, allowing for different deployment models while retaining common host and guest kernel code. Two examples are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. As shown in both figures, the architecture introduces a new software component called the "TEE Security Manager" (TSM) that runs in HS mode. The TSM has minimal hw attested footprint on TCB as it is a passive component that doesn't support scheduling or timer interrupts. Both example deployment models provide memory isolation between the host and the TEE VM (TVM). Non secure world | Secure world | | | Non | | Virtualized | Virtualized | Virtualized Virtualized | Env | Env | Env Env | +----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | -------------- | | | | | | | | | | | | Host Apps| | | Apps | | | Apps | | Apps | | VU-Mode | (VMM) | | | | | | | | | | +----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | -------------- | | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TVM | | TVM | | | | | Guest | | | Guest | | Guest | | VS-Mode Syscalls | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | | | | | | | SBI | SBI(COVG + COVI) | | | | | | +--------------------------+ | +---------------------------+ -------------- | Host (Linux) | | | TSM (Salus) | +--------------------------+ | +---------------------------+ | | | HS-Mode SBI (COVH + COVI) | SBI (COVH + COVI) | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- | Firmware(OpenSBI) + TSM Driver | M-Mode +-----------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Hardware (RISC-V CPU + RoT + IOMMU) +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 1: Host in HS model The deployment model shown in Figure 1 runs the host in HS mode where it is peer to the TSM which also runs in HS mode. It requires another component known as TSM Driver running in higher privilege mode than host/TSM. It is responsible for switching the context between the host and the TSM. TSM driver also manages the platform specific hardware solution via confidential domain bit as described in the specification[0] to provide the required memory isolation. Non secure world | Secure world | Virtualized Env | Virtualized Virtualized | Env Env | +-------------------------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | ------------ | | | | | | | | | | | | Host Apps| | | Apps | | | Apps | | Apps | | VU-Mode +----------+ | +----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | ------------ | | | | | Syscalls SBI | | | | | | | | | +--------------------------+ | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | Host (Linux) | | | TVM Guest| | TVM Guest| | VS-Mode +--------------------------+ | +-----------+ +-----------+ | | | | | | SBI (COVH + COVI) | SBI SBI | | | (COVG + COVI) (COVG + COVI)| | | | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- | TSM(Salus) | HS-Mode +-----------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- | SBI | +---------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- | Firmware(OpenSBI) | M-Mode +---------------------------------------------------------+ -------------- +----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Hardware (RISC-V CPU + RoT + IOMMU) +---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 2: Host in VS model The deployment model shown in Figure 2 simplifies the context switch and memory isolation by running the host in VS mode as a guest of TSM. Thus, the memory isolation is achieved by gstage mapping by the TSM. We don't need any additional hardware confidential domain bit to provide memory isolation. The downside of this model the host has to run the non-confidential VMs in nested environment which may have lower performance (yet to be measured). The current implementation Salus(TSM) doesn't support full nested virtualization yet. The platform must have a RoT to provide attestation in either model. This patch series implements the APIs defined by CoVE. The current TSM implementation allows the host to run TVMs as shown in figure 2. We are working on deployment model 1 in parallel. We do not expect any significant changes in either host/guest side ABI due to that. Shared memory between the host & TSM: ===================================== To accelerate the H-mode CSR/GPR access, CoVE also reuses the Nested Acceleration (NACL) SBI extension[1]. NACL defines a per physical cpu shared memory area that is allocated at the boot. It allows the host running in VS mode to access H-mode CSR/GPR easily without trapping into the TSM. The CoVE specification clearly defines the exact state of the shared memory with r/w permissions at every call. Secure Interrupt management: =========================== The CoVE specification relies on the MSI based interrupt scheme defined in Advanced Interrupt Architecture specification[2]. The COVI SBI extension adds functions to bind a guest interrupt file to a TVMs. After that, only TCB components (TSM, TVM, TSM driver) can modify that. The host can inject an interrupt via TSM only. The TVMs are also in complete control of which interrupts it can receive. By default, all interrupts are denied. In this proof-of-concept implementation, all the interrupts are allowed by the guest at boot time to keep it simple. Device I/O: =========== In order to support paravirt I/O devices, SWIOTLB bounce buffer must be used by the guest. As the host can not access confidential memory, this buffer memory must be shared with the host via share/unshare functions defined in COVG SBI extension. RISC-V implementation achieves this generalizing mem_encrypt_init() similar to TDX/SEV/CCA. That's why, the CoVE Guest is only allowed to use virtio devices with VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM and VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 as they force virtio drivers to use the DMA API. MMIO emulation: ====================== TVM can register regions of address space as MMIO regions to be emulated by the host. TSM provides explicit SBI functions i.e. SBI_EXT_COVG_[ADD/REMOVE]_MMIO_REGION to request/remove MMIO regions. Any reads or writes to those MMIO region after SBI_EXT_COVG_ADD_MMIO_REGION call are forwarded to the host for emulation. This series allows any ioremapped memory to be emulated as MMIO region with above APIs via arch hookups inspired from pKVM work. We are aware that this model doesn't address all the threat vectors. We have also implemented the device filtering/authorization approach adopted by TDX[4]. However, those patches are not part of this series as the base TDX patches are still under active development. RISC-V CoVE will also adapt the revamped device filtering work once it is accepted by the Linux community in the future. The direct assignment of devices are a work in progress and will be added in the future[4]. VMM support: ============ This series is only tested with kvmtool support. Other VMM support (qemu-kvm, crossvm/rust-vmm) will be added later. Test cases: =========== We are working on kvm selftest for CoVE. We will post them as soon as they are ready. We haven't started any work on kvm unit-tests as RISC-V doesn't have basic infrastructure to support that. Once the kvm uni-test infrastructure is in place, we will add support for CoVE as well. Open design questions: ====================== 1. The current implementation has two separate configs for guest(CONFIG_RISCV_COVE_GUEST) and the host (RISCV_COVE_HOST). The default defconfig will enable both so that same unified image works as both host & guest. Most likely distro prefer this way to minimize the maintenance burden but some may want a minimal CoVE guest image that has only hardened drivers. In addition to that, Android runs a microdroid instance in the confidential guests. A separate config will help in those case. Please let us know if there is any concern with two configs. 2. Lazy gstage page allocation vs upfront allocation with page pool. Currently, all gstage mappings happen at runtime during the fault. This is expensive as we need to convert that page to confidential memory as well. A page pool framework may be a better choice which can hold all the confidential pages which can be pre-allocated upfront. A generic page pool infrastructure may benefit other CC solutions ? 3. In order to allow both confidential VM and non-confidential VM, the series uses regular branching instead of static branches for CoVE VM specific cases through out KVM. That may cause a few more branch penalties while running regular VMs. The alternate option is to use function pointers for any function that needs to take a different path. As per my understanding, that would be worse than branches. Patch organization: =================== This series depends on quite a few RISC-V patches that are not upstream yet. Here are the dependencies. 1. RISC-V IPI improvement series 2. RISC-V AIA support series. 3. RISC-V NACL support series In this series, PATCH [0-5] are generic improvement and cleanup patches which can be merged independently. PATCH [6-26, 34-37] adds host side for CoVE. PATCH [27-33] adds the interrupt related changes. PATCH [34-49] Adds the guest side changes for CoVE. The TSM project is written in rust and can be found here: https://github.com/rivosinc/salus Running the stack ==================== To run/test the stack, you would need the following components : 1) Qemu 2) Common Host & Guest Kernel 3) kvmtool 4) Host RootFS with KVMTOOL and Guest Kernel 5) Salus The detailed steps are available at[6] The Linux kernel patches are also available at [7] and the kvmtool patches are available at [8]. TODOs ======= As this is a very early work, the todo list is quite long :). Here are some of them (not in any specific order) 1. Support fd based private memory interface proposed in https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395 2. Align with updated guest runtime device filtering approach. 3. IOMMU integration 4. Dedicated device assignment via TDSIP & SPDM[4] 5. Support huge pages 6. Page pool allocator to avoid convert/reclaim at every fault 7. Other VMM support (qemu-kvm, crossvm) 8. Complete the PoC for the deployment model 1 where host runs in HS mode 9. Attestation integration 10. Harden the interrupt allowed list 11. kvm self-tests support for CoVE 11. kvm unit-tests support for CoVE 12. Guest hardening 13. Port pKVM on RISC-V using CoVE 14. Any other ? Links ============ [0] CoVE architecture Specification. https://github.com/riscv-non-isa/riscv-ap-tee/blob/main/specification/riscv-aptee-spec.pdf [1] https://lists.riscv.org/g/sig-hypervisors/message/260 [2] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-aia/releases/download/1.0-RC2/riscv-interrupts-1.0-RC2.pdf [3] https://github.com/rivosinc/linux/tree/cove_integration_device_filtering1 [4] https://github.com/intel/tdx/commits/guest-filter-upstream [5] https://lists.riscv.org/g/tech-ap-tee/message/83 [6] https://github.com/rivosinc/cove/wiki/CoVE-KVM-RISCV64-on-QEMU [7] https://github.com/rivosinc/linux/commits/cove-integration [8] https://github.com/rivosinc/kvmtool/tree/cove-integration-03072023 Atish Patra (33): RISC-V: KVM: Improve KVM error reporting to the user space RISC-V: KVM: Invoke aia_update with preempt disabled/irq enabled RISC-V: KVM: Add a helper function to get pgd size RISC-V: Add COVH SBI extensions definitions RISC-V: KVM: Implement COVH SBI extension RISC-V: KVM: Add a barebone CoVE implementation RISC-V: KVM: Add UABI to support static memory region attestation RISC-V: KVM: Add CoVE related nacl helpers RISC-V: KVM: Implement static memory region measurement RISC-V: KVM: Use the new VM IOCTL for measuring pages RISC-V: KVM: Exit to the user space for trap redirection RISC-V: KVM: Return early for gstage modifications RISC-V: KVM: Skip dirty logging updates for TVM RISC-V: KVM: Add a helper function to trigger fence ops RISC-V: KVM: Skip most VCPU requests for TVMs RISC-V : KVM: Skip vmid/hgatp management for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Skip TLB management for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Register memory regions as confidential for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Add gstage mapping for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Handle SBI call forward from the TSM RISC-V: KVM: Implement vcpu load/put functions for CoVE guests RISC-V: KVM: Wireup TVM world switch RISC-V: KVM: Skip HVIP update for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Implement COVI SBI extension RISC-V: KVM: Add interrupt management functions for TVM RISC-V: KVM: Skip AIA CSR updates for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Perform limited operations in hardware enable/disable RISC-V: KVM: Indicate no support user space emulated IRQCHIP RISC-V: KVM: Add AIA support for TVMs RISC-V: KVM: Hookup TVM VCPU init/destroy RISC-V: KVM: Initialize CoVE RISC-V: KVM: Add TVM init/destroy calls drivers/hvc: sbi: Disable HVC console for TVMs Rajnesh Kanwal (15): mm/vmalloc: Introduce arch hooks to notify ioremap/unmap changes RISC-V: KVM: Update timer functionality for TVMs. RISC-V: Add COVI extension definitions RISC-V: KVM: Read/write gprs from/to shmem in case of TVM VCPU. RISC-V: Add COVG SBI extension definitions RISC-V: Add CoVE guest config and helper functions RISC-V: Implement COVG SBI extension RISC-V: COVE: Add COVH invalidate, validate, promote, demote and remove APIs. RISC-V: KVM: Add host side support to handle COVG SBI calls. RISC-V: Allow host to inject any ext interrupt id to a CoVE guest. RISC-V: Add base memory encryption functions. RISC-V: Add cc_platform_has() for RISC-V for CoVE RISC-V: ioremap: Implement for arch specific ioremap hooks riscv/virtio: Have CoVE guests enforce restricted virtio memory access. RISC-V: Add shared bounce buffer to support DBCN for CoVE Guest. arch/riscv/Kbuild | 2 + arch/riscv/Kconfig | 27 + arch/riscv/cove/Makefile | 2 + arch/riscv/cove/core.c | 40 + arch/riscv/cove/cove_guest_sbi.c | 109 +++ arch/riscv/include/asm/cove.h | 27 + arch/riscv/include/asm/covg_sbi.h | 38 + arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 2 + arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_cove.h | 206 +++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_cove_sbi.h | 101 +++ arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_vcpu_sbi.h | 3 + arch/riscv/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 26 + arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h | 107 +++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 17 + arch/riscv/kernel/irq.c | 12 + arch/riscv/kernel/setup.c | 2 + arch/riscv/kvm/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kvm/aia.c | 101 ++- arch/riscv/kvm/aia_device.c | 41 +- arch/riscv/kvm/aia_imsic.c | 127 ++- arch/riscv/kvm/cove.c | 1005 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kvm/cove_sbi.c | 490 +++++++++++ arch/riscv/kvm/main.c | 30 +- arch/riscv/kvm/mmu.c | 45 +- arch/riscv/kvm/tlb.c | 11 +- arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu.c | 69 +- arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_exit.c | 34 +- arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_insn.c | 115 ++- arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi.c | 16 + arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_covg.c | 232 ++++++ arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_timer.c | 26 +- arch/riscv/kvm/vm.c | 34 +- arch/riscv/kvm/vmid.c | 17 +- arch/riscv/mm/Makefile | 3 + arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 17 +- arch/riscv/mm/ioremap.c | 45 + arch/riscv/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 61 ++ drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_riscv_sbi.c | 5 + drivers/tty/serial/earlycon-riscv-sbi.c | 51 +- include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 8 + mm/vmalloc.c | 16 + 42 files changed, 3222 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/riscv/cove/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/riscv/cove/core.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/cove/cove_guest_sbi.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/cove.h create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/covg_sbi.h create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_cove.h create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/kvm_cove_sbi.h create mode 100644 arch/riscv/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kvm/cove.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kvm/cove_sbi.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_covg.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/mm/ioremap.c create mode 100644 arch/riscv/mm/mem_encrypt.c --- 2.25.1