From patchwork Wed Sep 25 05:06:44 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Bharata B Rao X-Patchwork-Id: 1166987 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=vger.kernel.org (client-ip=209.132.180.67; helo=vger.kernel.org; envelope-from=kvm-ppc-owner@vger.kernel.org; receiver=) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46dQz13ncGz9sPl for ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 15:07:09 +1000 (AEST) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2442285AbfIYFHI (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Sep 2019 01:07:08 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:4516 "EHLO mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2442284AbfIYFHI (ORCPT ); Wed, 25 Sep 2019 01:07:08 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0127361.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x8P52jsI070299 for ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 01:07:06 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2v7ky9ujpr-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 01:07:06 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 06:07:05 +0100 Received: from b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (9.149.26.192) by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (192.168.101.131) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Wed, 25 Sep 2019 06:07:02 +0100 Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.59]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x8P56XLs37159298 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 25 Sep 2019 05:06:33 GMT Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id ED153A4055; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 05:07:00 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05295A4051; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 05:06:59 +0000 (GMT) Received: from bharata.ibmuc.com (unknown [9.199.52.56]) by d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 25 Sep 2019 05:06:58 +0000 (GMT) From: Bharata B Rao To: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, paulus@au1.ibm.com, aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, jglisse@redhat.com, linuxram@us.ibm.com, sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com, cclaudio@linux.ibm.com, hch@lst.de, Bharata B Rao Subject: [PATCH v9 3/8] KVM: PPC: Shared pages support for secure guests Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 10:36:44 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190925050649.14926-1-bharata@linux.ibm.com> References: <20190925050649.14926-1-bharata@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19092505-4275-0000-0000-0000036ABCED X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19092505-4276-0000-0000-0000387D36B2 Message-Id: <20190925050649.14926-4-bharata@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-09-25_03:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1909250050 Sender: kvm-ppc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org A secure guest will share some of its pages with hypervisor (Eg. virtio bounce buffers etc). Support sharing of pages between hypervisor and ultravisor. Shared page is reachable via both HV and UV side page tables. Once a secure page is converted to shared page, the device page that represents the secure page is unmapped from the HV side page tables. Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 3 ++ arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h index 2595d0144958..4e98dd992bd1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h @@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ #define H_TLB_INVALIDATE 0xF808 #define H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST 0xF80C +/* Flags for H_SVM_PAGE_IN */ +#define H_PAGE_IN_SHARED 0x1 + /* Platform-specific hcalls used by the Ultravisor */ #define H_SVM_PAGE_IN 0xEF00 #define H_SVM_PAGE_OUT 0xEF04 diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c index 312f0fedde0b..5e5b5a3e9eec 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_uvmem.c @@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ * available in the platform for running secure guests is hotplugged. * Whenever a page belonging to the guest becomes secure, a page from this * private device memory is used to represent and track that secure page - * on the HV side. + * on the HV side. Some pages (like virtio buffers, VPA pages etc) are + * shared between UV and HV. However such pages aren't represented by + * device private memory and mappings to shared memory exist in both + * UV and HV page tables. * * For each page that gets moved into secure memory, a device PFN is used * on the HV side and migration PTE corresponding to that PFN would be @@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt { unsigned long *rmap; struct kvm *kvm; unsigned long gpa; + bool skip_page_out; }; /* @@ -190,8 +194,70 @@ kvmppc_svm_page_in(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, return ret; } +/* + * Shares the page with HV, thus making it a normal page. + * + * - If the page is already secure, then provision a new page and share + * - If the page is a normal page, share the existing page + * + * In the former case, uses dev_pagemap_ops.migrate_to_ram handler + * to unmap the device page from QEMU's page tables. + */ +static unsigned long +kvmppc_share_page(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, unsigned long page_shift) +{ + + int ret = H_PARAMETER; + struct page *uvmem_page; + struct kvmppc_uvmem_page_pvt *pvt; + unsigned long pfn; + unsigned long *rmap; + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; + unsigned long gfn = gpa >> page_shift; + int srcu_idx; + + srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); + slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn); + if (!slot) + goto out; + + rmap = &slot->arch.rmap[gfn - slot->base_gfn]; + mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock); + if (kvmppc_rmap_type(rmap) == KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN) { + uvmem_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN); + pvt = uvmem_page->zone_device_data; + pvt->skip_page_out = true; + } + +retry: + mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock); + pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gfn); + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) + goto out; + + mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock); + if (kvmppc_rmap_type(rmap) == KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN) { + uvmem_page = pfn_to_page(*rmap & ~KVMPPC_RMAP_UVMEM_PFN); + pvt = uvmem_page->zone_device_data; + pvt->skip_page_out = true; + kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn); + goto retry; + } + + if (!uv_page_in(kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift, gpa, 0, page_shift)) + ret = H_SUCCESS; + kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.uvmem_lock); +out: + srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx); + return ret; +} + /* * H_SVM_PAGE_IN: Move page from normal memory to secure memory. + * + * H_PAGE_IN_SHARED flag makes the page shared which means that the same + * memory in is visible from both UV and HV. */ unsigned long kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, @@ -208,9 +274,12 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, if (page_shift != PAGE_SHIFT) return H_P3; - if (flags) + if (flags & ~H_PAGE_IN_SHARED) return H_P2; + if (flags & H_PAGE_IN_SHARED) + return kvmppc_share_page(kvm, gpa, page_shift); + ret = H_PARAMETER; srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu); down_read(&kvm->mm->mmap_sem); @@ -292,8 +361,17 @@ kvmppc_svm_page_out(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, pvt = spage->zone_device_data; pfn = page_to_pfn(dpage); - ret = uv_page_out(pvt->kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift, - pvt->gpa, 0, page_shift); + /* + * This function is used in two cases: + * - When HV touches a secure page, for which we do UV_PAGE_OUT + * - When a secure page is converted to shared page, we *get* + * the page to essentially unmap the device page. In this + * case we skip page-out. + */ + if (!pvt->skip_page_out) + ret = uv_page_out(pvt->kvm->arch.lpid, pfn << page_shift, + pvt->gpa, 0, page_shift); + if (ret == U_SUCCESS) *mig.dst = migrate_pfn(pfn) | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED; else {