From patchwork Tue Oct 11 18:54:50 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?J=C3=B6rg_Krause?= X-Patchwork-Id: 680864 Return-Path: X-Original-To: incoming@patchwork.ozlabs.org Delivered-To: patchwork-incoming@bilbo.ozlabs.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3stmQg4WTfz9svs for ; Wed, 12 Oct 2016 05:55:23 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; dkim=fail reason="key not found in DNS" (0-bit key; unprotected) header.d=embedded.rocks header.i=@embedded.rocks header.b=WrDEu1L9; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1797193392; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1Bx0Cwg46Ah3; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ash.osuosl.org (ash.osuosl.org [140.211.166.34]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75C36933C0; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Original-To: buildroot@lists.busybox.net Delivered-To: buildroot@osuosl.org Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by ash.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC78A1CF7B4 for ; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9EDE8C89D for ; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0jAjDBOaQ2LJ for ; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mout02.posteo.de (mout02.posteo.de [185.67.36.142]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5B3E08FAF3 for ; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 18:55:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from customer (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by submission (posteo.de) with ESMTPSA id 3stmQC3DJ4z103v for ; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 20:54:57 +0200 (CEST) Authentication-Results: mail.embedded.rocks (amavisd-new); dkim=pass reason="pass (just generated, assumed good)" header.d=embedded.rocks DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=embedded.rocks; h=content-transfer-encoding:content-type:content-type :mime-version:x-mailer:message-id:date:date:subject:subject:from :from:received:received; s=default; t=1476212096; x=1476816897; bh=NHRET2q3R9jIMWj7LXsKL636wGOlp2XYbACxtP4id3g=; b=WrDEu1L9wpYZ afMNoaDOlSpSicmj3Fkp+LO9Cm/y1G+OygiL9HWCU5qeH0jEaUaoK9pKRwqZtN6w bKAieP6sItk4AEcSR+gqUaqw03ADjlpW9T3QHjMeRfOSPNxv7fAf0A9CgysVWnri dLf93elvP0DtSVr+hiM5geX4O2GXn45tijnGNgZSRGCSYfgc0By1MBvz4eiHrDm2 j+nWa1Tk5jLHt/00v7e4+bJ7yxOZtLgZXITysMPsLIfQNoMey+hz6Bp0kc4UElxF vTjyvSk9xoC1115Mg1d+UiiIgA7wtIsLlOqxkK+KkPudiWM1IopXNmntllu0eOH1 kvCKVgfdQw== Received: from mail.embedded.rocks ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.embedded.rocks [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10025) with ESMTP id osidi54LLmno; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 20:54:56 +0200 (CEST) Received: from nzxt.fritz.box (x4d0c8d2e.dyn.telefonica.de [77.12.141.46]) (Authenticated sender: joerg.krause@embedded.rocks) by mail.embedded.rocks (Postfix) with ESMTPSA; Tue, 11 Oct 2016 20:54:55 +0200 (CEST) From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rg=20Krause?= To: buildroot@buildroot.org Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2016 20:54:50 +0200 Message-Id: <20161011185451.1644-1-joerg.krause@embedded.rocks> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] package/wpa_supplicant: bump to version 2.6 X-BeenThere: buildroot@busybox.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussion and development of buildroot List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: buildroot-bounces@busybox.net Sender: "buildroot" Remove all patches as they are applied to or were fetched from upstream. Signed-off-by: Jörg Krause --- .../0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch | 26 ------- ...Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch | 32 -------- ...-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch | 54 -------------- ...erver-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch | 51 ------------- ...r-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch | 34 --------- .../wpa_supplicant/0006-fix-libwpa_client.patch | 39 ---------- ...ate-service-files-according-to-dbus-inter.patch | 77 -------------------- ...ject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch | 85 ---------------------- ...parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch | 53 -------------- ...ines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch | 84 --------------------- ...CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch | 65 ----------------- ...commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch | 53 -------------- package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash | 2 +- package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk | 2 +- 14 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 655 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0006-fix-libwpa_client.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0007-systemd-Update-service-files-according-to-dbus-inter.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0008-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0009-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0010-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0011-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch delete mode 100644 package/wpa_supplicant/0012-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2a9b832..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0001-fix-readline-libs-ordering.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -commit 631f0893038743cebd2def39df61aceb48bd43a9 -Author: David du Colombier <0intro@gmail.com> -Date: Sun Sep 13 23:40:43 2015 +0200 - - wpa_supplicant: fix static link with readline - - The readline library depends on ncurses, so - it should be set before ncurses on the linker - command line to be able to be statically linked - successfully. - - Signed-off-by: David du Colombier <0intro@gmail.com> - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -index 1597412..581db02 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ LIBS += $(DBUS_LIBS) - - ifdef CONFIG_READLINE - OBJS_c += ../src/utils/edit_readline.o --LIBS_c += -lncurses -lreadline -+LIBS_c += -lreadline -lncurses - else - ifdef CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT - OBJS_c += ../src/utils/edit.o diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 00e5b7c..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0002-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no - PMF in use - -WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is -enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station -side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -index 954de67..7d79499 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - end = ptr + key_len_total; - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); - -+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { -+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, -+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ - while (ptr + 1 < end) { - if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 82c2639..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5315) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * buffer and ACK the fragment - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - data->in_frag_pos += len; - if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " -@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - return NULL; - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, - EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, - EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); -@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * we're buffering and this is the last fragment - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", - (int) len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - } --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bfc4c74..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5314) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - /* - * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " - "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", -@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - data->in_frag_pos += len; -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", - (int) len); - return; -@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3088f6a..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message - -If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity -exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and -data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() -did not take this corner case into account and could end up -dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid -message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 75ceef1..892b590 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); - - fin: -- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); -+ if (data->grp) -+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); - BN_clear_free(x); - BN_clear_free(y); - if (data->outbuf == NULL) { --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0006-fix-libwpa_client.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0006-fix-libwpa_client.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 11c5402..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0006-fix-libwpa_client.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 6f7e0354a9035ce33742a5f869f817a6b39b2f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rg=20Krause?= -Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2015 11:39:03 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 1/1] wpa_supplicant/Makefile: fix libwpa_client -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -Building libwpa_client requires src/utils/common.c for bin_clear_free() else -loading the library fails with: - - Error relocating /usr/lib/libwpa_client.so: bin_clear_free: symbol not found - -Backported from: 736b7cb2daf877a0cb9ad42ff15a2efbbd65fa42 - -Signed-off-by: Jörg Krause ---- - wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 2 ++ - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -index 61f8f18..0c444b0 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -@@ -1706,9 +1706,11 @@ wpa_cli: $(OBJS_c) - - LIBCTRL += ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.o - LIBCTRL += ../src/utils/os_$(CONFIG_OS).o -+LIBCTRL += ../src/utils/common.c - LIBCTRL += ../src/utils/wpa_debug.o - LIBCTRLSO += ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.c - LIBCTRLSO += ../src/utils/os_$(CONFIG_OS).c -+LIBCTRLSO += ../src/utils/common.c - LIBCTRLSO += ../src/utils/wpa_debug.c - - libwpa_client.a: $(LIBCTRL) --- -2.6.2 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0007-systemd-Update-service-files-according-to-dbus-inter.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0007-systemd-Update-service-files-according-to-dbus-inter.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 59c5450..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0007-systemd-Update-service-files-according-to-dbus-inter.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,77 +0,0 @@ -From b6cea24d6191d9ccdcd1ac38a5322e3da73218db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Marcin Niestroj -Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2016 13:23:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] systemd: Update service files according to dbus interface - version used - -systemd service files were supplied with old DBus bus name. After -service activation systemd was waiting for appearance of specified bus -name to consider it started successfully. However, if wpa_supplicant was -compiled only with new dbus interface name, then systemd didn't notice -configured (old) DBus bus name appearance. In the end service was -considered malfunctioning and it was deactivated. - -Update systemd service BusName property according to supported DBus -interface version. - -Signed-off-by: Marcin Niestroj ---- - wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 8 ++++++-- - wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service.in | 4 ++-- - 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -index ad9ead9..fbd1b25 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile -@@ -1374,6 +1374,7 @@ ifndef DBUS_INCLUDE - DBUS_INCLUDE := $(shell $(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags dbus-1) - endif - DBUS_CFLAGS += $(DBUS_INCLUDE) -+DBUS_INTERFACE=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant - endif - - ifdef CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW -@@ -1399,6 +1400,7 @@ DBUS_OBJS += dbus/dbus_new_introspect.o - DBUS_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO - endif - DBUS_CFLAGS += $(DBUS_INCLUDE) -+DBUS_INTERFACE=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1 - endif - - ifdef DBUS -@@ -1760,11 +1762,13 @@ else - endif - - %.service: %.service.in -- $(Q)sed -e 's|\@BINDIR\@|$(BINDIR)|g' $< >$@ -+ $(Q)sed -e 's|\@BINDIR\@|$(BINDIR)|g' \ -+ -e 's|\@DBUS_INTERFACE\@|$(DBUS_INTERFACE)|g' $< >$@ - @$(E) " sed" $< - - %@.service: %.service.arg.in -- $(Q)sed -e 's|\@BINDIR\@|$(BINDIR)|g' $< >$@ -+ $(Q)sed -e 's|\@BINDIR\@|$(BINDIR)|g' \ -+ -e 's|\@DBUS_INTERFACE\@|$(DBUS_INTERFACE)|g' $< >$@ - @$(E) " sed" $< - - wpa_supplicant.exe: wpa_supplicant -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service.in b/wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service.in -index ea964ce..bc5d49a 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service.in -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/systemd/wpa_supplicant.service.in -@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ Wants=network.target - - [Service] - Type=dbus --BusName=fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant -+BusName=@DBUS_INTERFACE@ - ExecStart=@BINDIR@/wpa_supplicant -u - - [Install] - WantedBy=multi-user.target --Alias=dbus-fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant.service -+Alias=dbus-@DBUS_INTERFACE@.service --- -2.8.0 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0008-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0008-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 282aa95..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0008-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ -From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as -STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or -WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated -the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from -an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should -such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file -could become invalid and fail to be parsed. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -Patch status: upstream (ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022) - - src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c -index 450e2c6519ba..27b7c02de10b 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.c -+++ b/src/utils/common.c -@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { -+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) -+ return 1; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) -diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h -index 701dbb236ed5..a97224070385 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.h -+++ b/src/utils/common.h -@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); -diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -index eadb22fe2e78..e8c4579309ab 100644 ---- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) - cred->key_len--; - #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ - } -+ -+ -+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && -+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); -+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", -+ cred->key, cred->key_len); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - return 0; - } - --- -2.8.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0009-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0009-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 316c070..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0009-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase -includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of -almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration -file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., -opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, -load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. -This would allow code from that library to be executed under the -wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -Patch status: upstream (73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd) - - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index b1c7870dafe0..fdd964356afa 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, - } - wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", - (u8 *) value, len); -+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", -+ line); -+ return -1; -+ } - if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && - os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { - /* No change to the previously configured value */ --- -2.8.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0010-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0010-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8a40dce..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0010-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,84 +0,0 @@ -From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Stewart -Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network output - -Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the -wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block -parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have -been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control -characters in the psk parameter. - -Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -Patch status: upstream (0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9) - - src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c -index 27b7c02de10b..9856463242c7 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.c -+++ b/src/utils/common.c -@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_newline(const char *str) -+{ -+ while (*str) { -+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') -+ return 1; -+ str++; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) -diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h -index a97224070385..d19927b375bf 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.h -+++ b/src/utils/common.h -@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); - int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_newline(const char *str); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index fdd964356afa..eb97cd5e4e6e 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { - const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; -- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) -- return field->writer(field, ssid); -+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { -+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); -+ -+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", -+ var); -+ os_free(ret); -+ ret = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return ret; -+ } - } - - return NULL; --- -2.8.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0011-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0011-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 530681f..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0011-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in-.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the - string values - -Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without -filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, -unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the credential value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -Patch status: upstream (b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5) - - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index eb97cd5e4e6e..69152efdea1a 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - - if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && - os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { -+ if (has_newline(value)) -+ return -1; - str_clear_free(cred->password); - cred->password = os_strdup(value); - cred->ext_password = 1; -@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - } - - val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); -- if (val == NULL) { -+ if (val == NULL || -+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ has_newline(val))) { - wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " - "value '%s'.", line, var, value); -+ os_free(val); - return -1; - } - --- -2.8.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/0012-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch b/package/wpa_supplicant/0012-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a29df07..0000000 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/0012-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,53 +0,0 @@ -From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the string - values - -Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings -without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the -value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen -Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach ---- -Patch status: upstream (2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488) - - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index 69152efdea1a..d9a1603f6d7e 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, - return -1; - } - -+ if (has_newline(pos)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", -+ line, data->name); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - tmp = os_strdup(pos); - if (tmp == NULL) - return -1; --- -2.8.1 - diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash index 19e4359..22b2e8d 100644 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.hash @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ # Locally calculated -sha256 cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316 wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz +sha256 b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450 wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz diff --git a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk index d46328e..e3e6f3a 100644 --- a/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk +++ b/package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.mk @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.5 +WPA_SUPPLICANT_VERSION = 2.6 WPA_SUPPLICANT_SITE = http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE = BSD-3c WPA_SUPPLICANT_LICENSE_FILES = README