| Message ID | 541815C3.7080509@strongswan.org |
|---|---|
| State | RFC, archived |
| Delegated to: | David Miller |
| Headers | show |
Ccing Herbert Xu. On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:49:39PM +0200, Tobias Brunner wrote: > Currently inbound policies for transport mode SAs are not enforced. > If no policy is found or if the templates don't match this is not > considered an error for transport mode SAs. > The strict inbound policy enforcement was implemented by Herbert. The commit predates our git history but can be found in the history tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git It was the following commit: commit 8fe7ee2ba983fd89b2555dce5930ffd0f7f6c361 Author: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Date: Thu Oct 23 14:57:11 2003 -0700 [IPSEC]: Strengthen policy checks. Maybe Herbert remembers why this was done only for tunnel mode. If I read section 5.2.1 of RFC 2401 correct, the inbound policy must be enforced regardless of the mode. > The new sysctl option (net.core.xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode) > allows enforcing the inbound policies also for transport mode SAs. > By default this option remains disabled. I'd not like to have a sysctl for this. I consider it as a bug if an installed policy can not be enforced, and we don't fix bugs with sysctls :). > > Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> > --- > Consider a transport mode SA between two peers over which only TCP and > ICMP traffic should be allowed. Because two protocols are involved the > selector on the SA itself (xfrm_usersa_info.sel) can't be set. Instead > one either has to negotiate separate SAs for each protocol (with a > selector on each) or negotiate one SA and install two policies that > use it. The problem with the latter is that the peer does not have to > adhere to the negotiated traffic selectors, it is basically free to > send anything over the SA e.g. UDP packets. So if no selectors are > installed on the SA itself, the current implementation would accept > such packets, even though the installed policies don't allow UDP > traffic (some might consider this a security issue - at the very least > it is not very intuitive, especially because the behavior is different > for tunnel mode SAs). > By enabling the new sysctl option the UDP packets would get dropped, > exactly as they would if the SA were negotiated in tunnel mode. > > The behavior for optional transport mode templates also changes when > the option is enabled. Basically, the special treatment of transport > mode SAs is disabled and the behavior is like it is for other modes. > I tested this with IPComp/ESP and strongSwan where the optional IPComp > transform is installed in transport or tunnel mode depending on the > negotiated mode of the SA (the ESP SA is always installed in transport > mode in this combination). But I'm not sure if there are other uses > for optional transport mode transforms that might rely on the current > behavior (i.e. why are optional templates treated differently depending > on their mode in the first place?). The code arround xfrm_policy_ok() looks a bit obscure, I'm not sure if all combinations of required and optional templates are handled correct. > > With this patch the default behavior remains as it is, but I wondered > why it is like that and if we could perhaps change it so that policies > are enforced by default, thus making such setups more secure out of > the box. Or if we could even change the whole inbound processing so > that transport mode SAs are treated exactly like their counterparts > in other modes, without an option to change it. > > Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt | 4 ++++ > include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 + > net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- > net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c | 8 ++++++++ > 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt > index 5bbd167..2fbe539 100644 > --- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt > +++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt > @@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ > xfrm_acq_expires - INTEGER > default 30 - hard timeout in seconds for acquire requests > + > +xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode - BOOLEAN > + default 0 (disabled) - whether to enforce inbound policies for transport > + mode SAs > \ No newline at end of file > diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h > index 9da7982..e045ecc 100644 > --- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h > +++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h > @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm { > u32 sysctl_aevent_rseqth; > int sysctl_larval_drop; > u32 sysctl_acq_expires; > + int sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode; > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_hdr; > #endif > diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c > index 55bcb86..5296f6b 100644 > --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c > +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c > @@ -2355,20 +2355,22 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x, > * Otherwise "-2 - errored_index" is returned. > */ > static inline int > -xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start, > - unsigned short family) > +xfrm_policy_ok(const struct net *net, const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, > + const struct sec_path *sp, int start, unsigned short family) > { > int idx = start; > if (tmpl->optional) { > - if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) > + if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT && > + !net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) > return start; > } else > start = -1; > for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) { > if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family)) > return ++idx; > - if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) { > + if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT || > + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) { > if (start == -1) > start = -2-idx; > break; > @@ -2393,10 +2395,13 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, > } > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_decode_session); > -static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct sec_path *sp, int k, int *idxp) > +static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct net *net, > + const struct sec_path *sp, > + int k, int *idxp) > { > for (; k < sp->len; k++) { > - if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) { > + if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT || > + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) { > *idxp = k; > return 1; > } > @@ -2469,7 +2474,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, > } > if (!pol) { > - if (skb->sp && secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) { > + if (skb->sp && > + secpath_has_nontransport(net, skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) { > xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl); > XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS); > return 0; > @@ -2535,7 +2541,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, > * are implied between each two transformations. > */ > for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) { > - k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family); > + k = xfrm_policy_ok(net, tpp[i], sp, k, family); > if (k < 0) { > if (k < -1) > /* "-2 - errored_index" returned */ > @@ -2545,7 +2551,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, > } > } > - if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k, &xerr_idx)) { > + if (secpath_has_nontransport(net, sp, k, &xerr_idx)) { > XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINTMPLMISMATCH); > goto reject; > } > diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c > index 05a6e3d..17671af 100644 > --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c > +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ static void __net_init __xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net) > net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth = XFRM_AE_SEQT_SIZE; > net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop = 1; > net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires = 30; > + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode = 0; > } > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL > @@ -37,6 +38,12 @@ static struct ctl_table xfrm_table[] = { > .mode = 0644, > .proc_handler = proc_dointvec > }, > + { > + .procname = "xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode", > + .maxlen = sizeof(int), > + .mode = 0644, > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec > + }, > {} > }; > @@ -53,6 +60,7 @@ int __net_init xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net) > table[1].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth; > table[2].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop; > table[3].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires; > + table[4].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode; > /* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */ > if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns) > -- > 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 11:24:38AM +0200, Steffen Klassert wrote: > Ccing Herbert Xu. > > On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 12:49:39PM +0200, Tobias Brunner wrote: > > Currently inbound policies for transport mode SAs are not enforced. > > If no policy is found or if the templates don't match this is not > > considered an error for transport mode SAs. > > > > The strict inbound policy enforcement was implemented by Herbert. > The commit predates our git history but can be found in the history > tree: > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git > > It was the following commit: > > commit 8fe7ee2ba983fd89b2555dce5930ffd0f7f6c361 > Author: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> > Date: Thu Oct 23 14:57:11 2003 -0700 > > [IPSEC]: Strengthen policy checks. > > Maybe Herbert remembers why this was done only for tunnel mode. Yes I remember :) Please refer to the following thread: http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-net/msg07342.html Cheers,
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt index 5bbd167..2fbe539 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt +++ b/Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt @@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ xfrm_acq_expires - INTEGER default 30 - hard timeout in seconds for acquire requests + +xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode - BOOLEAN + default 0 (disabled) - whether to enforce inbound policies for transport + mode SAs \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h index 9da7982..e045ecc 100644 --- a/include/net/netns/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/netns/xfrm.h @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct netns_xfrm { u32 sysctl_aevent_rseqth; int sysctl_larval_drop; u32 sysctl_acq_expires; + int sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode; #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL struct ctl_table_header *sysctl_hdr; #endif diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 55bcb86..5296f6b 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2355,20 +2355,22 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x, * Otherwise "-2 - errored_index" is returned. */ static inline int -xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start, - unsigned short family) +xfrm_policy_ok(const struct net *net, const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, + const struct sec_path *sp, int start, unsigned short family) { int idx = start; if (tmpl->optional) { - if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) + if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT && + !net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) return start; } else start = -1; for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) { if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family)) return ++idx; - if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) { + if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT || + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) { if (start == -1) start = -2-idx; break; @@ -2393,10 +2395,13 @@ int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_decode_session); -static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct sec_path *sp, int k, int *idxp) +static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct net *net, + const struct sec_path *sp, + int k, int *idxp) { for (; k < sp->len; k++) { - if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) { + if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT || + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode) { *idxp = k; return 1; } @@ -2469,7 +2474,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (!pol) { - if (skb->sp && secpath_has_nontransport(skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) { + if (skb->sp && + secpath_has_nontransport(net, skb->sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) { xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl); XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS); return 0; @@ -2535,7 +2541,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, * are implied between each two transformations. */ for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) { - k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family); + k = xfrm_policy_ok(net, tpp[i], sp, k, family); if (k < 0) { if (k < -1) /* "-2 - errored_index" returned */ @@ -2545,7 +2551,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, } } - if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k, &xerr_idx)) { + if (secpath_has_nontransport(net, sp, k, &xerr_idx)) { XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINTMPLMISMATCH); goto reject; } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c index 05a6e3d..17671af 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ static void __net_init __xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net) net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth = XFRM_AE_SEQT_SIZE; net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop = 1; net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires = 30; + net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode = 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL @@ -37,6 +38,12 @@ static struct ctl_table xfrm_table[] = {
Currently inbound policies for transport mode SAs are not enforced. If no policy is found or if the templates don't match this is not considered an error for transport mode SAs. The new sysctl option (net.core.xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode) allows enforcing the inbound policies also for transport mode SAs. By default this option remains disabled. Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> --- Consider a transport mode SA between two peers over which only TCP and ICMP traffic should be allowed. Because two protocols are involved the selector on the SA itself (xfrm_usersa_info.sel) can't be set. Instead one either has to negotiate separate SAs for each protocol (with a selector on each) or negotiate one SA and install two policies that use it. The problem with the latter is that the peer does not have to adhere to the negotiated traffic selectors, it is basically free to send anything over the SA e.g. UDP packets. So if no selectors are installed on the SA itself, the current implementation would accept such packets, even though the installed policies don't allow UDP traffic (some might consider this a security issue - at the very least it is not very intuitive, especially because the behavior is different for tunnel mode SAs). By enabling the new sysctl option the UDP packets would get dropped, exactly as they would if the SA were negotiated in tunnel mode. The behavior for optional transport mode templates also changes when the option is enabled. Basically, the special treatment of transport mode SAs is disabled and the behavior is like it is for other modes. I tested this with IPComp/ESP and strongSwan where the optional IPComp transform is installed in transport or tunnel mode depending on the negotiated mode of the SA (the ESP SA is always installed in transport mode in this combination). But I'm not sure if there are other uses for optional transport mode transforms that might rely on the current behavior (i.e. why are optional templates treated differently depending on their mode in the first place?). With this patch the default behavior remains as it is, but I wondered why it is like that and if we could perhaps change it so that policies are enforced by default, thus making such setups more secure out of the box. Or if we could even change the whole inbound processing so that transport mode SAs are treated exactly like their counterparts in other modes, without an option to change it. Documentation/networking/xfrm_sysctl.txt | 4 ++++ include/net/netns/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- net/xfrm/xfrm_sysctl.c | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec }, + { + .procname = "xfrm_enforce_policies_transport_mode", + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, {} }; @@ -53,6 +60,7 @@ int __net_init xfrm_sysctl_init(struct net *net) table[1].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth; table[2].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop; table[3].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_acq_expires; + table[4].data = &net->xfrm.sysctl_enforce_policies_transport_mode; /* Don't export sysctls to unprivileged users */ if (net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)