diff mbox series

[v2] target/arm: Enable FEAT_CMOW for -cpu max

Message ID 20241104142606.941638-1-gustavo.romero@linaro.org
State New
Headers show
Series [v2] target/arm: Enable FEAT_CMOW for -cpu max | expand

Commit Message

Gustavo Romero Nov. 4, 2024, 2:26 p.m. UTC
FEAT_CMOW introduces support for controlling cache maintenance
instructions executed in EL0/1 and is mandatory from Armv8.8.

On real hardware, the main use for this feature is to prevent processes
from invalidating or flushing cache lines for addresses they only have
read permission, which can impact the performance of other processes.

QEMU implements all cache instructions as NOPs, and, according to rule
[1], which states that generating any Permission fault when a cache
instruction is implemented as a NOP is implementation-defined, no
Permission fault is generated for any cache instruction when it lacks
read and write permissions.

QEMU does not model any cache topology, so the PoU and PoC are before
any cache, and rules [2] apply. These rules state that generating any
MMU fault for cache instructions in this topology is also
implementation-defined. Therefore, for FEAT_CMOW, we do not generate any
MMU faults either, instead, we only advertise it in the feature
register.

[1] Rule R_HGLYG of section D8.14.3, Arm ARM K.a.
[2] Rules R_MZTNR and R_DNZYL of section D8.14.3, Arm ARM K.a.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gustavo.romero@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
---
 docs/system/arm/emulation.rst | 1 +
 target/arm/cpu-features.h     | 5 +++++
 target/arm/cpu.h              | 1 +
 target/arm/helper.c           | 5 +++++
 target/arm/tcg/cpu64.c        | 1 +
 5 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

Comments

Peter Maydell Nov. 4, 2024, 4:58 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, 4 Nov 2024 at 14:26, Gustavo Romero <gustavo.romero@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> FEAT_CMOW introduces support for controlling cache maintenance
> instructions executed in EL0/1 and is mandatory from Armv8.8.
>
> On real hardware, the main use for this feature is to prevent processes
> from invalidating or flushing cache lines for addresses they only have
> read permission, which can impact the performance of other processes.
>
> QEMU implements all cache instructions as NOPs, and, according to rule
> [1], which states that generating any Permission fault when a cache
> instruction is implemented as a NOP is implementation-defined, no
> Permission fault is generated for any cache instruction when it lacks
> read and write permissions.
>
> QEMU does not model any cache topology, so the PoU and PoC are before
> any cache, and rules [2] apply. These rules state that generating any
> MMU fault for cache instructions in this topology is also
> implementation-defined. Therefore, for FEAT_CMOW, we do not generate any
> MMU faults either, instead, we only advertise it in the feature
> register.
>
> [1] Rule R_HGLYG of section D8.14.3, Arm ARM K.a.
> [2] Rules R_MZTNR and R_DNZYL of section D8.14.3, Arm ARM K.a.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gustavo.romero@linaro.org>
> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>



Applied to target-arm.next, thanks.

-- PMM
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
index 35f52a54b1..a2a388f091 100644
--- a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
+++ b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@  the following architecture extensions:
 - FEAT_BF16 (AArch64 BFloat16 instructions)
 - FEAT_BTI (Branch Target Identification)
 - FEAT_CCIDX (Extended cache index)
+- FEAT_CMOW (Control for cache maintenance permission)
 - FEAT_CRC32 (CRC32 instructions)
 - FEAT_Crypto (Cryptographic Extension)
 - FEAT_CSV2 (Cache speculation variant 2)
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu-features.h b/target/arm/cpu-features.h
index 04ce281826..e806f138b8 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu-features.h
+++ b/target/arm/cpu-features.h
@@ -802,6 +802,11 @@  static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tidcp1(const ARMISARegisters *id)
     return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, TIDCP1) != 0;
 }
 
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_cmow(const ARMISARegisters *id)
+{
+    return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, CMOW) != 0;
+}
+
 static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_hafs(const ARMISARegisters *id)
 {
     return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr1, ID_AA64MMFR1, HAFDBS) != 0;
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
index 8fc8b6398f..1ea4c545e0 100644
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
@@ -1367,6 +1367,7 @@  void pmu_init(ARMCPU *cpu);
 #define SCTLR_EnIB    (1U << 30) /* v8.3, AArch64 only */
 #define SCTLR_EnIA    (1U << 31) /* v8.3, AArch64 only */
 #define SCTLR_DSSBS_32 (1U << 31) /* v8.5, AArch32 only */
+#define SCTLR_CMOW    (1ULL << 32) /* FEAT_CMOW */
 #define SCTLR_MSCEN   (1ULL << 33) /* FEAT_MOPS */
 #define SCTLR_BT0     (1ULL << 35) /* v8.5-BTI */
 #define SCTLR_BT1     (1ULL << 36) /* v8.5-BTI */
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
index 0a731a38e8..f55e8ced54 100644
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
@@ -6215,6 +6215,11 @@  static void hcrx_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
     if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_nmi, cpu)) {
         valid_mask |= HCRX_TALLINT | HCRX_VINMI | HCRX_VFNMI;
     }
+    /* FEAT_CMOW adds CMOW */
+
+    if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_cmow, cpu)) {
+        valid_mask |= HCRX_CMOW;
+    }
 
     /* Clear RES0 bits.  */
     env->cp15.hcrx_el2 = value & valid_mask;
diff --git a/target/arm/tcg/cpu64.c b/target/arm/tcg/cpu64.c
index 0168920828..2963d7510f 100644
--- a/target/arm/tcg/cpu64.c
+++ b/target/arm/tcg/cpu64.c
@@ -1218,6 +1218,7 @@  void aarch64_max_tcg_initfn(Object *obj)
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, ETS, 2);      /* FEAT_ETS2 */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, HCX, 1);      /* FEAT_HCX */
     t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, TIDCP1, 1);   /* FEAT_TIDCP1 */
+    t = FIELD_DP64(t, ID_AA64MMFR1, CMOW, 1);     /* FEAT_CMOW */
     cpu->isar.id_aa64mmfr1 = t;
 
     t = cpu->isar.id_aa64mmfr2;