| Message ID | 1446204910-29948-2-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com |
|---|---|
| State | New |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > return -EINVAL; > opt->pcrlock = lock; > break; > + case Opt_hash: > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > + opt->hash = i; > + break; > + } > + } > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent inadvertent change of dev". > + if (res < 0) > + return res; > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > + return -EINVAL; > + break; If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. Mimi > default: > return -EINVAL; > } ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 07:16:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > return -EINVAL; > > opt->pcrlock = lock; > > break; > > + case Opt_hash: > > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > + opt->hash = i; > > + break; > > + } > > + } > > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > > While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to > the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: > two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit > "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent > inadvertent change of dev". Ouch. I'll send a fix that reverts the behavior. Good catch and apologies. Platforms that I've used BIOS let choose either dTPM 1.2 or fTPM and platforms that have dTPM 2.0 do not have fTPM option at all. That's why it went unnoticed. > > + if (res < 0) > > + return res; > > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + break; > > If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM > 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. Yup. > Mimi > > > default: > > return -EINVAL; > > } /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 07:16:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > return -EINVAL; > > opt->pcrlock = lock; > > break; > > + case Opt_hash: > > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > + opt->hash = i; > > + break; > > + } > > + } > > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > > While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to > the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: > two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit > "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent > inadvertent change of dev". > > > + if (res < 0) > > + return res; > > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + break; > > If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM > 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. Now that we are going fix this issue in 4.3 and 4.4 do you find this patch otherwise acceptable? PS. In other options that we don't support in TPM2 I'm planning to submit a fix that they will return -EINVAL (like pcrinfo). > Mimi /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Tue, 2015-11-03 at 09:39 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 07:16:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > return -EINVAL; > > > opt->pcrlock = lock; > > > break; > > > + case Opt_hash: > > > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > > + opt->hash = i; > > > + break; > > > + } > > > + } > > > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > > > > While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to > > the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: > > two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit > > "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent > > inadvertent change of dev". > > > > > + if (res < 0) > > > + return res; > > > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > > > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + break; > > > > If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM > > 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. > > Now that we are going fix this issue in 4.3 and 4.4 do you find this > patch otherwise acceptable? > > PS. In other options that we don't support in TPM2 I'm planning to > submit a fix that they will return -EINVAL (like pcrinfo). I don't have a problem failing the request, but I do suggest adding some sort of error message. Different systems might behavior differently without any explanation. Mimi ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 10:39:11AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Tue, 2015-11-03 at 09:39 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 07:16:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > opt->pcrlock = lock; > > > > break; > > > > + case Opt_hash: > > > > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > > > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > > > + opt->hash = i; > > > > + break; > > > > + } > > > > + } > > > > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > > > > > > While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to > > > the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: > > > two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit > > > "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent > > > inadvertent change of dev". > > > > > > > + if (res < 0) > > > > + return res; > > > > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > > > > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > + break; > > > > > > If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM > > > 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. > > > > Now that we are going fix this issue in 4.3 and 4.4 do you find this > > patch otherwise acceptable? > > > > PS. In other options that we don't support in TPM2 I'm planning to > > submit a fix that they will return -EINVAL (like pcrinfo). > > I don't have a problem failing the request, but I do suggest adding some > sort of error message. Different systems might behavior differently > without any explanation. Something like the pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x supports only sha1")? > Mimi /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 06:12:17PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, Nov 03, 2015 at 10:39:11AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Tue, 2015-11-03 at 09:39 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > On Mon, Nov 02, 2015 at 07:16:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > On Fri, 2015-10-30 at 13:35 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > > > > > > @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, > > > > > return -EINVAL; > > > > > opt->pcrlock = lock; > > > > > break; > > > > > + case Opt_hash: > > > > > + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { > > > > > + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { > > > > > + opt->hash = i; > > > > > + break; > > > > > + } > > > > > + } > > > > > + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); > > > > > > > > While looking at this, I wanted to verify that chips are still added to > > > > the tail of the tpm_chip_list. Unfortunately, commit "afb5abc tpm: > > > > two-phase chip management functions" reverted David Howell's commit > > > > "770ab65 TPM: Add new TPMs to the tail of the list to prevent > > > > inadvertent change of dev". > > > > > > > > > + if (res < 0) > > > > > + return res; > > > > > + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || > > > > > + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) > > > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > > > + break; > > > > > > > > If the first TPM registered is a TPM 1.2, then changing the default TPM > > > > 2.0 hash algorithm will fail. > > > > > > Now that we are going fix this issue in 4.3 and 4.4 do you find this > > > patch otherwise acceptable? > > > > > > PS. In other options that we don't support in TPM2 I'm planning to > > > submit a fix that they will return -EINVAL (like pcrinfo). > > > > I don't have a problem failing the request, but I do suggest adding some > > sort of error message. Different systems might behavior differently > > without any explanation. > > Something like the pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x supports only sha1")? I've started to think that maybe it was a bad idea to break this into patch set as the changes are small and they make sense only together. What do you think? Should quash everything into single patch? > > Mimi /Jarkko ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt index e105ae9..fd2565b 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt @@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ Usage: pcrlock= pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) + hash= hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only + allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values + are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256. "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard TPM_STORED_DATA format. The key length for new keys are always in bytes. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index f91ecd9..a6a1008 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t pcrinfo_len; unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; int pcrlock; + uint32_t hash; }; extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index 72483b8..fe4d74e 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC select CRYPTO_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO help This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys, diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index d3633cf..7a87bcd 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt */ +#include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> @@ -710,7 +711,8 @@ enum { Opt_err = -1, Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, - Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable + Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, + Opt_hash, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -723,6 +725,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"}, {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, + {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -736,6 +739,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, int res; unsigned long handle; unsigned long lock; + int i; while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') @@ -787,6 +791,20 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; opt->pcrlock = lock; break; + case Opt_hash: + for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { + if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { + opt->hash = i; + break; + } + } + res = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (res < 0) + return res; + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST || + (!res && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1)) + return -EINVAL; + break; default: return -EINVAL; }
Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt | 3 +++ include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + security/keys/Kconfig | 1 + security/keys/trusted.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)